Wiltshire v. Miss. Fairgrounds Comm'n
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01797-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01797-COA ; 2009-CT-01797-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-29-2011 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Renewed motion for summary judgment - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - Immunity - Discretionary function - Section 11-46-9(1)(d) - Dangerous condition - Section 11-46-9(v) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Dissenting Author : Carlton, J. Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-23-2009 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: William F. Coleman Disposition: Summary Judgment Granted to Defendant Case Number: 251-03-586CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Sherry Wiltshire |
JOSEPH E. ROBERTS JR. |
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| Appellee: | Mississippi Fairgrounds Commission | MARK D. MORRISON | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Renewed motion for summary judgment - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - Immunity - Discretionary function - Section 11-46-9(1)(d) - Dangerous condition - Section 11-46-9(v) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Sherry Wiltshire was trampled to the ground by a cow while attending the Dixie National Livestock Show at the Mississippi State Fairgrounds. The incident resulted in severe injuries to Wiltshire’s leg. In May 2003, Wiltshire initially filed suit against the State of Mississippi, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, Mississippi Fairgrounds Commission, and Defendants A - Z, seeking compensation for her injuries under premises liability. Ultimately, several other defendants were added to the suit. MFC and the State of Mississippi filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded the motions were “premature” on the grounds of governmental immunity and denied them. Approximately seven weeks later, IHL renewed its motion for summary judgment, and co-defendant MFC joined. In November 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment to MFC and IHL, and in January 2009, the trial court entered a final judgment of dismissal with prejudice regarding the action’s other pending claims and all other defendants. Wiltshire appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Renewed motion for summary judgment Wiltshire argues that the trial court improperly considered MFC’s renewed motion for summary judgment. She claims this issue is controlled by M.R.C.P. 59(e) and that the arguments in the renewed motion “were a mere rehash” of the original motion, with the addition of an affidavit which was available when the original motion was filed. Wiltshire is incorrect that Rule 59(e) controls the trial court’s consideration of MFC’s renewed motion for summary judgment. Rule 59(e) deals with motions to alter or amend a judgment. Wiltshire is correct that a motion to set aside or reconsider an order granting summary judgment will be treated as a motion under Rule 59(e). However, that is not the situation here, as there had been no judgment granted when the trial court considered the renewed motion. There is no law which supports Wiltshire’s proposition that it is improper for a trial court to examine a party’s renewed motion for summary judgment prior to trial. MFC renewed its motion in an attempt to cure a deficiency, and there was no error in this regard. Issue 2: Immunity Wiltshire argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of MFC based upon the discretionary-function exception of section 11-46-9(1)(d) and that there remained a genuine issue of material fact regarding immunity for a dangerous condition on government property under section 11-46-9(v). In determining whether a function is afforded immunity under the discretionary exception, it must first be determined whether the activity involved an element of choice or judgment. If so, it must then be determined whether the choice involved social, economic or political policy. Wiltshire concedes that the first prong of the discretionary-function test is met – that MFC’s conduct involved an element of choice or judgment. There was no error in the trial court’s determination that the public-policy prong of the test is satisfied by Dr. Holder’s affidavit. Thus, MFC has offered sufficient evidence on the public-policy implications for its conduct in hosting livestock shows; the most important implication is the 4-H programs’ usefulness in developing a young person’s life skills. Wiltshire also argues that MFC had constructive knowledge of the dangerous conditions existing at the State Fairgrounds, and it permitted the barn aisles to be cluttered and dogs to run loose, thereby potentially exciting the livestock and creating a dangerous situation. Since the trial court properly found no genuine issue of material fact regarding immunity under 11-46-9(1)(d), a genuine issue of material fact on another subsection cannot defeat summary judgment for MFC. |
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