McCain v. State


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Docket Number: 2009-KA-01865-COA
Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-01865-COA ; 2009-CT-01865-SCT ; 2009-CT-01865-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-29-2011
Opinion Author: Irving, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Robbery - Habitual offender status - Right to speedy trial - Authentication of evidence - M.R.E. 901 - Defective indictment - Section 99-7-9
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Myers, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. Without Separate Written Opinion
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-30-2009
Appealed from: Warren County Circuit Court
Judge: Isadore Patrick
Disposition: Convicted of Robbery and Sentenced, as a Habitual Offender, Without Eligibility for Parole or Probation, to Life in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, Without Eligibility for Parole of Probation
District Attorney: Richard Early Smith, Jr.
Case Number: 08,0167-CRP

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Kevin Dale McCain




HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD  

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    Topic: Robbery - Habitual offender status - Right to speedy trial - Authentication of evidence - M.R.E. 901 - Defective indictment - Section 99-7-9

    Summary of the Facts: Kevin McCain was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life as a habitual offender, without eligibility for parole or probation. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Habitual offender status The document that was filed by the State after the initial sentencing hearing was sufficient to prove McCain’s habitual-offender status. The document, produced and certified by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, showed that McCain had two prior convictions for which he had served at least a year and a day for each conviction. McCain argues that the State failed to introduce the newer document as an exhibit during the continued sentencing hearing. While this is true, the document, with an attached letter of certification, was filed in the circuit court. Furthermore, the circuit court took notice of the document at the second sentencing hearing. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding of McCain’s habitual-offender status. Issue 2: Right to speedy trial McCain argues that both his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated. Factors to consider in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated include length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Because more than eight months passed between the time of McCain’s arrest and his trial, the delay is presumptively prejudicial. One of the delays in this case occurred because McCain and the State had agreed to continue his trial. Another delay occurred because the State was unsure whether it was going to continue its prosecution of McCain. The record shows no particular explanation for any other delays except the circuit court’s crowded docket. Therefore, all of those delays weigh only slightly against the State. McCain asserted his right to a speedy trial in a letter to the court. There is no evidence to show that McCain was prejudiced by the delay in bringing him to trial. Thus, McCain’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated since there is no evidence that his case was prejudiced in any way by the delay in bringing him to trial. With regard to his statutory right, although more than 270 days had passed between the time of McCain’s arraignment and trial. However, good cause exists for all but two months of the delay. Therefore, McCain’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. Issue 3: Admission of evidence McCain argues that the entry into evidence of a Texas Longhorns cap was error, because the cap was not properly authenticated in accordance with M.R.E. 901 because the chain of custody was not established. In order for the defendant to show a break in the chain of custody, there must be an indication or reasonable inference of probable tampering with the evidence or substitution of the evidence. There was a sufficient basis for the admission of the cap into evidence. An officer testified that he retrieved the cap directly from the Simpson County Jail at the same time he took McCain from the jail. The officer testified that McCain was wearing the cap when he was arrested at the impound lot. Furthermore, even if the circuit court had erred in admitting the cap into evidence, that error would be harmless at worst, as there is overwhelming evidence of McCain’s guilt. Issue 4: Defective indictment McCain argues that the circuit court erred when it declined to quash his indictment, because his indictment was not stamped ‘filed’ as required by section 99-7-9. McCain did not raise the issue timely, and this contention of error is procedurally barred. In addition, there is no doubt that McCain was informed of the nature of the charges against him. Therefore, a procedural error on the indictment is an insufficient reason to reverse his conviction.


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