City of Laurel v. Guy
| Docket Number: | 2010-WC-00444-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-29-2011 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Workers' compensation - Loss of a scheduled-member - Section 71-3-17(c) - Loss of wage-earning capacity - Presumption of total industrial loss - Usual employment Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J. Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Admin or Agency Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-04-2010 Appealed from: Jones County Circuit Court Judge: Billy Joe Landrum Disposition: Affirmed Workers' Compensation Commission Decision Awarding Claimant 100% Industrial Loss of His Left Lower Extremity Case Number: 2009-0096-CV11 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | City of Laurel, Mississippi and Mississippi Municipal Workers' Compensation Group |
LOUIE FREDERICK RUFFIN, CHADWICK LESTER SHOOK |
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| Appellee: | Gavin Guy | WILLIAM H. JONES |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Workers' compensation - Loss of a scheduled-member - Section 71-3-17(c) - Loss of wage-earning capacity - Presumption of total industrial loss - Usual employment |
| Summary of the Facts: | While working as a patrolman for the Laurel Police Department, Gavin Guy injured his left knee apprehending a suspect fleeing from a nightclub brawl. In 2006, Guy voluntarily left Laurel to take a job with the Petal Police Department as a warrant officer. He was promoted to the Investigations Unit, a position that paid $10,000 a year more than his former position with Laurel. In 2007, Petal initiated physical testing for all its police officers, including Guy. Petal’s chief of police accommodated Guy’s knee injury by allowing him to perform the test on a stationary bike instead of requiring him to run. The administrative judge found Guy’s numerous knee surgeries, his inability to continue as a patrol officer, and his need for special accommodation to pass the physical test given by Petal and most police forces all supported the finding that Guy had sustained a 100% industrial loss to his left leg. The AJ found Guy’s present employment and higher salary did not weigh against finding a 100% industrial loss of Guy’s left leg because the chief of police could be replaced after next city election, leaving the possibility that Guy might be unable to pass the physical testing requirements under a new chief at Petal or with a different police force. Both the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the circuit court affirmed the AJ’s decision. The City of Laurel appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | If a worker suffers permanent total disability, section 71-3-17(a) provides him two thirds of his average weekly wage, subject to the maximum limit of benefits, for up to 450 weeks. If a worker suffers the loss of a scheduled-member, section 71-3-17(c) provides him two thirds of his average weekly wage for the number of weeks arbitrarily assigned by the Legislature to the particular body part. Loss of a leg equals 200 weeks of compensation. The purpose of permanent total disability is to compensate for loss of wage-earning capacity and not the worker’s medical disability. In contrast, compensation for scheduled-member disability is arbitrarily awarded according to which scheduled-member is disabled. This is a scheduled-member case, controlled by section 71-3-17(c). Subsection 17(c) compensates for the loss of a scheduled member (e.g. amputation), the loss of use of a scheduled member (e.g. paralyzation), and partial loss of use. The law compensates for two types of loss of use: “functional” or “medical” and “industrial” or “occupational.” In a scheduled-member case, a worker is always entitled to compensation for the medical or functional loss of his body part, regardless of whether the functional loss impacts his wage-earning capacity. But the law recognizes there may be times when the industrial loss is greater than the medical loss. In these cases, the claimant’s industrial or occupational disability or loss of wage-earning capacity controls his degree of disability. There is a presumption of 100% industrial loss when the worker proves he can no longer perform the substantial acts of his usual employment. Usual employment means the jobs in which the claimant has past experience, jobs requiring similar skills, or jobs for which the worker is otherwise suited by his age, education, experience, and any other relevant factual criteria. In the face of undisputed evidence of Guy’s continued earning wages in the field of law enforcement, the award of 100% industrial loss is unsupportable. Based on Guy’s past experience and job skills, Guy is suited for a number of positions in law enforcement, making his “usual employment” broader than being a patrolman. But even under the broader view that Guy’s usual employment was law enforcement, the presumption of total industrial loss arose based on the physical test required of all law-enforcement officers. Because Guy cannot run and because being able to run is a substantial act required of all law enforcement officers, he at least earned the presumption of total industrial loss of his leg. But this presumption was subject to other proof of the claimant’s ability to earn the same wages which the claimant was receiving at the time of injury. It is not disputed that Guy, instead of being terminated, voluntarily left Laurel for a job with Petal and now earns more wages. The police chief’s future employment is irrelevant to the issue of Guy’s wage-earning capacity. The AJ’s conclusion that Guy might lose his job if the police chief were not reappointed is far too speculative to support an award of total loss of wage earning capacity. Laurel presented clear evidence that Guy has not suffered any loss in wages earned, rebutting any presumption of total industrial loss. |
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