Sherron v. State
| Docket Number: | 2004-KA-01668-COA Linked Case(s): 2004-KA-01668-COA ; 2004-CT-01668-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-07-2006 Opinion Author: Southwick, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Accessory after the fact to statutory rape - Abortion rights of minor - Section 41-41-53 - Sufficiency of evidence - Jury instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Chandler, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): King, C.J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Roberts, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result Joined By 1: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., and Griffis, J. Concurs in Result Only: Irving, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-19-2004 Appealed from: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Lee J. Howard Disposition: CONVICTION OF ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT TO STATUTORY RAPE. SENTENCE OF THREE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. District Attorney: FORREST ALLGOOD Case Number: 2002-0626-CR1 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Charlotte Sherron |
PHILLIP BROADHEAD, GARY GOODWIN |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOSE BENJAMIN SIMO, CHARLES W. MARIS |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Accessory after the fact to statutory rape - Abortion rights of minor - Section 41-41-53 - Sufficiency of evidence - Jury instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | Charlotte Sherron was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to her husband’s crime of statutory rape by assisting the victim, who was her minor daughter, obtain an abortion. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Abortion rights A constitutional issue which was not raised on appeal is whether the prosecution interferes with the child’s abortion rights recognized by the United States Supreme Court. The facts indicate many things that Charlotte Sherron did not do – she did not contact law enforcement authorities; she did not throw her husband out of the house; she did not send her daughter elsewhere to escape this man; and she did not in any other way initiate an accounting for his crimes. Most of the elements of Charlotte Sherron’s damning inaction are not crimes in Mississippi. The exception is failure to report child abuse. Even if Charlotte Sherron could have been prosecuted for failing to report the abuse, the offense is a misdemeanor. Though it was overwhelmingly proven that the mother failed to take any meaningful steps to protect the daughter from further abuse or to cause the husband’s crimes to be detected, this conviction as an accessory to that crime depends on Sherron’s consent to her daughter’s abortion. Section 41-41-53 requires a parent to consent in order for a child to have an abortion or else the girl must file a petition in court. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that state rules that impose an undue burden on a female’s decision to abort a non-viable fetus are unconstitutional. The evidence in the record fully supports that this defendant consistently failed her daughter in responding to the initial incidents of sexual abuse by her husband and also in the response to the rape that led to pregnancy. However, the question is whether prosecuting a parent for such activity unduly burdens the daughter’s recognized constitutional right. The pretrial demurrer to the indictment reveals that Sherron’s trial attorney sought a ruling on the right now asserted. The purported right was allegedly rejected by the court and then clearly abandoned by the defendant. In the post-trial motions, the issue was not asserted. In the briefing for the appeal, the issue was not raised. The implied judgment here by trial and appellate counsel was that there was insufficient merit, in light of other considered arguments, to continue pursuing a favorable ruling on the mother’s alleged right to be free from prosecution for assisting in her minor child’s receiving an abortion. Even if an appellate court has the power to examine any issue, waiver ends the right to review. Since waiver means the trial judge did not err in a manner subject to review, there is no need to resolve the extent of any implicated constitutional rights. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence The prosecution had to prove that Charlotte Sherron concealed, received, relieved, aided or assisted her husband and that she knew he had committed a felony. The evidence supported that Sherron concealed, received, relieved, aided or assisted her husband when she took her daughter to Tuscaloosa for an abortion. The State had to prove that Sherron intended to enable her husband to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment after he committed statutory rape. Sherron argues there is not sufficient evidence that she intended to shield her husband from punishment for statutory rape and her intent was solely to help her daughter. It is further argued that failure to report the statutory rape was solely a function of her husband’s intimidating nature. However, the defendant admitted to other considerations such as that she would lose her children and that she would not be able to pay the bills. This evidence constitutes circumstantial proof that one of Sherron’s intents was to keep the crime of rape from being exposed. When an act is done with multiple intents, it may be criminalized if one of the intents is an element of the relevant offense. The existence of the improper intent will be a jury issue, determined largely by circumstantial evidence and guided by proper jury instructions. Since the jury certainly could find on this evidence that the defendant intended to hide her husband’s crime no matter what else she intended to do, there was sufficient evidence of a criminal intent. Issue 3: Jury instruction Sherron argues that the court erred in denying her instruction that “The Court instructs the jury that the law does not require the defendant to report the crime committed against her daughter.” A defendant is entitled to submit instructions that present her theory of the case. An instruction should not single out certain parts of the evidence to the point that it amounts to a comment on the evidence. The question here is whether the instruction would tend in its emphasis to mislead the jurors on the actual legal questions before them. It was reasonable to conclude that it would. Additionally, and more importantly, the instruction was legally in error. There are obligations to report sexual abuse of children. Denial of this instruction was proper. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
