Shirley v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-KA-00184-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-14-2006 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Manslaughter by culpable negligence - Weight of evidence - Lay witness opinion - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 704 - Exclusion of evidence - Jury instructions Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-15-2004 Appealed from: Alcorn County Circuit Court Judge: Sharion R. Aycock Disposition: CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH EIGHT YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, PAY A FINE OF $4,000 AND $4,500 TO THE MISSISSIPPI CRIME VICTIMS’ COMPENSATION FUND District Attorney: JOHN RICHARD YOUNG Case Number: CR04-092 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Alfred G. Shirley a/k/a Alfred Glen Shirley |
JOHN R. WHITE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN R. HENRY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Manslaughter by culpable negligence - Weight of evidence - Lay witness opinion - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 704 - Exclusion of evidence - Jury instructions |
| Summary of the Facts: | Alfred Shirley was convicted on one count of manslaughter by culpable negligence. Shirley appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Weight of evidence Shirley argues that the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Shirley testified that he struck the victim in self-defense. However, the overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests otherwise. Even if Shirley did initially defend himself against a perceived attack from the victim, the fear for his own safety would necessarily have ended once the victim fell to the ground and was obviously incapacitated. Yet, Shirley continued to beat the victim well after any initial threat had passed. Shirley also argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed manslaughter and that the only eyewitness testimony offered showed that he acted in self-defense. Shirley’s account of what happened that night sharply contrasted with the evidence presented by the State. Conflicting testimony exists as to who was the first aggressor. Thus, Shirley’s argument is without merit. Issue 2: Lay witness opinion Shirley argues that he was unable on direct examination of his friend to ask his opinion as to Shirley acting in self-defense. Under M.R.E. 701, a lay witness’s opinion is admissible only if it is rationally based on the witness’s perception and is helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or of a fact in issue. Under M.R.E. 704, opinion testimony is not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by a trier of fact. The comment to Rule 704 provides that such questions which relate to ultimate issues of fact are allowed if they are helpful to a determination of the case. The trial court did allow questions pertaining to the ultimate issue of Shirley’s self-defense theory, but the court required that they be made in a manner more helpful to the jury. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing certain questions. Issue 3: Exclusion of evidence Shirley argues that he should have been able to enter into evidence an entry from a police logbook, which would have shown that he was stopped by the police twenty-two before the event in question. At trial, the State objected because Shirley failed to provide reciprocal discovery and had not informed the State of his intention to introduce a portion of the logbook. It is uncontroverted that the defense was able to present testimony to the jury reflecting the contents of the logbook. The only piece of evidence not admitted was the logbook entry itself. Therefore, any error in handling the issue of a possible discovery violation is deemed to be harmless. Issue 4: Jury instructions Shirley argues that by allowing certain jury instructions, the jury had inadequate guidance to reach a fair verdict. Shirley argues that jury instruction No. 8 impermissibly shifted the burden of proof for self-defense onto the defendant. The instruction expounds a theory of self-defense, but the burden of proof required is not included in this particular instruction. However, another instruction properly informed the jury that the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of not only Shirley’s guilt, but also that Shirley did not act in self-defense. Shirley argues that jury instruction No. 9 was impermissible because it instructed the jury to find whether or not Shirley “believed it was necessary to kill.” However, the language in the jury instruction properly tracks what is set forth under the statute, and the jury was not instructed to determine Shirley’s intent to kill. Shirley argues that jury instructions No.11 and No. 14 improperly used abstract principles of law without applying any facts of the case at hand. Shirley did not object to No. 11 based on abstraction. Thus, the issue regarding No. 11 is procedurally barred. His argument concerning the other instruction is without merit because jury instruction Nos. 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 all provide adequate facts for the jury to decide whether or not Shirley acted in self-defense or whether the force used was excessive. Shirley also argues that the court erred in not allowing some of his proposed jury instructions. Shirley argues that the rejected jury instruction D-1 provides a more thorough explanation of “reasonable doubt.” Reasonable doubt defines itself; it therefore needs no definition by the court. Shirley argues that his D-7 instruction regarding self-defense is better than the instruction allowed. The trial court was within its discretion in finding that the other instruction was a better statement of the law. Jury instruction D-9 concerns the Weathersby rule that if eyewitness testimony is uncontroverted by other evidence or common sense, then the jury must take the eyewitness testimony as true. Shirley’s testimony was negated by other evidence; thus, the Weathersby rule is inapplicable. Shirley argues that the rejected D-10 is more properly worded than the allowed No. 11. When giving a jury instruction on excusable homicide, the full text of the statute should be included. D-10 merely lists self-defense as the only excuse the jury can find. However, section 97-3-17 contains other elements. |
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