Vaughn v. Vaughn


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-00915-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-22-2011
Opinion Author: Maxwell, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce - Motion to compel - M.R.C.P. 37(a) - Due process - Marital home
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Carlton, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving, P.J. Without Separate Written Opinion
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-15-2009
Appealed from: Clay County Chancer Court
Judge: Kenneth M. Burns
Disposition: Judgment Entered Granting Divorce, Dividing Property, and Awarding Custody to the Mother
Case Number: 2008-0356-B

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Daniel C. Vaughn




ELIZABETH FOX AUSBERN



 
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Terri W. Vaughn CARRIE A. JOURDAN  

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    Topic: Divorce - Motion to compel - M.R.C.P. 37(a) - Due process - Marital home

    Summary of the Facts: Terri and Daniel “Craig” Vaughn were granted a divorce and Terri was awarded custody of their one minor child. Craig appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Motion to compel Craig filed a motion to compel discovery which the chancellor denied in part because it was untimely. Craig argues that by denying his motion to compel, the chancellor deprived him of his right to enjoy advance notice of Terri’s contentions. M.R.C.P. 37(a) provides that a party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery. Here, the chancellor, at Craig’s request, pushed back the divorce hearing for almost a month and a half. The chancellor then granted Craig another continuance. The record indicates that two days later, on March 18, Craig mailed a copy of the motion to Terri’s counsel. But the motion was not filed with the court until March 20. This was less than three days before the rescheduled March 23 hearing, and less than one business day prior to the hearing. Not only did Craig file his motion less than one business day prior to the March 23 hearing, he also waited until after the court had rescheduled the hearing. For these reasons, there is no error in the chancellor’s denial of Craig’s motion to compel for lack of reasonable notice. Though Craig is correct that Terri served her interrogatory responses outside the thirty-day deadline, her tardiness alone did not mandate that the chancellor grant Craig’s motion to compel. The chancellor explained at the outset of the hearing that if the lack of discovery prejudiced Craig, the chancellor would give him an opportunity to develop the issue. Craig has not explained how he was in any way surprised by the witnesses or documentary evidence presented by Terri. Issue 2: Due process Craig argues the chancellor’s denial of his motion to compel infringed upon his due-process rights. A due process violation occurs where a party is not allowed a full and complete hearing before being deprived of life, liberty or property. Though Mississippi has not squarely addressed this precise issue, several courts have held the Due Process Clause does not confer a constitutional right to discovery. Because Craig had a fair hearing and full opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim to custody, there was no procedural due-process violation. Craig suggests his substantive due-process rights were somehow violated by the chancellor denying his motion to compel. The chancellor’s discovery ruling did not infringe on Craig’s parental control or child-rearing decisions; he simply denied Craig’s request to compel discovery. For these reasons, there are no substantive due-process violations. Issue 3: Marital home Terri’s grandmother sold the marital home to Terri and Craig for approximately $70,000. From the proceeds of the sale, Terri’s grandmother loaned approximately $35,000 to the parties. Much of the loan was in the form of checks to the parties’ creditors. The grandmother then transferred the amount left over, $4,820.25, directly to Terri. Based upon a 2009 appraisal, the chancellor valued the home at $105,000. From that value, the chancellor subtracted the debt owed on the home to determine the equity in the home, which the chancellor split evenly between the parties. As a result, Craig was awarded $667.78 in the marital home’s equity. Craig argues that the chancellor “miscalculated” his share of the equity in the marital home. In ordering an equitable distribution of property, chancellors must apply the Ferguson factors and should also consider each party’s marital fault. In this case, the chancellor made findings of fact and conclusions of law on each Ferguson factor. He found important that Terri and Craig contributed equally to the accumulation of marital property, with Craig being the primary wage earner and Terri contributing most domestic and child-rearing duties. The chancellor also noted that neither party had contributed stability or harmony to the marriage, with Terri having an extramarital affair and Craig exhibiting excessive drinking habits. With these considerations in mind, the chancellor divided the marital estate approximately 50/50. Additionally, the chancellor divided the equity in the marital home exactly evenly between Craig and Terri. In so doing, the chancellor evenly split the debt owed to Terri’s grandmother. The chancellor’s overall equitable division - which included Craig’s recommendation for division of the equity in the marital home – was reasonable based on the equitable considerations involved in this case.


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