In Re Estate of Brill
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01968-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01968-COA ; 2009-CT-01968-SCT ; 2009-CT-01968-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-22-2011 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wills & estates - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.A.P. 4(a) - M.R.C.P. 54(b) - Enforcement of bond - Conditional bequest Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-16-2009 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Patricia D. Wise Disposition: Denied Motion to Remove Co-Administratrices, Dispensed with Inventory, Approved Final Accounting, and Ruled that Decedent's Sister Take all Residuary Assets Free and Clear of Any Claims of the Other Heirs Case Number: P2004-354 R/1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | In The Matter of The Estate of Bobbye N. Brill, Deceased and Annie Hobson Nichols, Deceased: Frank Nichols |
RHETT R. RUSSELL, CLARENCE MCDONALD LELAND, W.O. DILLARD |
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| Appellee: | Shirlee N. Phillips and Kathryn Kennington | ROBERT DAVID MARCHETTI, CAMILLE HENICK EVANS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wills & estates - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.A.P. 4(a) - M.R.C.P. 54(b) - Enforcement of bond - Conditional bequest |
| Summary of the Facts: | Bobbye Brill died in 2004. Bobbye’s two sons predeceased her, and she was survived by her mother, Annie Hobson Nichols, and her siblings, Frank Nichols and Shirlee Phillips. The chancery court appointed Shirlee and Kathryn Kennington as co-administratrices of Bobbye’s will and entered a decree admitting Bobbye’s will to probate. Frank filed a caveat against the probate of the will in common and solemn form, alleging that Bobbye lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of her holographic will, and he alleged that his sister’s will was the product of undue influence by Shirlee. In 2005, Annie died testate, and Frank was appointed executor of his mother’s estate. The chancellor denied Frank’s motion to discharge the co-administratrices. The chancellor later found that Frank failed to provide substantial evidence to show that Bobbye lacked testamentary capacity at the time she drafted and executed her will; thus, the chancellor held that the will was valid. Shirlee and Kathryn filed a petition for construction of Bobbye’s will with a request that the will be construed to leave the residuary of the estate to Shirlee, as sole residuary beneficiary, free of any expressed or resulting trust. The chancellor interpreted the will as conditioning that if Shirlee took care of Annie, then Shirlee would be entitled to the remainder of Bobbye’s estate. Frank filed another motion to remove Shirlee and Kathryn as coadministratrices, claiming that Shirlee and Kathryn had utilized their fiduciary positions to seek personal gain for Shirlee to the detriment of other beneficiaries of Bobbye’s will. The chancellor entered an opinion finding that Shirlee had rendered reasonable and appropriate care to her mother, and she found that the residuary bequest should be upheld. Frank then filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal which was denied by the Supreme Court. The chancellor subsequently issued a judgment finding that no partiality resulted from Shirlee’s dual role as fiduciary and beneficiary, and she denied Frank’s petition to remove the coadministratrices. Upon petition of Shirlee and Kathryn, the chancellor waived all annual accountings except for the first and second annual accountings and the final accounting. The chancellor entered a judgment approving the accountings and closing Bobbye’s estate. Frank appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Timeliness of appeal Shirlee and Kathryn argue that this appeal, filed on December 10, 2009, regarding the 2007 and 2008 rulings interpreting the will, was untimely filed under M.R.A.P. 4(a). However, the record shows that the 2008 judgment did not settle all issues pending before the parties; thus, this judgment did not constitute a final judgment under M.R.C.P. 54(b). Issue 2: Enforcement of bond Frank argues that the chancellor erred by not enforcing the bond, inventory, and accounting requirements of Bobbye’s will. He also argues that the chancellor erred in denying his motions to remove Shirlee and Kathryn as co-administratrices. The chancellor entered a judgment waiving the bond requirements and all accounting requirements except the first and second annual accountings and the final accounting. A court possesses the discretion to waive annual accountings if the beneficiaries approve and the interests of creditors are not jeopardized. Frank, did not possess the status of beneficiary of the residuary estate; therefore, he was not entitled to an accounting of the residuary estate. In addition, Shirlee and Kathryn indeed filed two inventories between April 2005 and August 2009, which the chancellor approved. Under the circumstances, the chancellor’s judgment was not manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Issue 3: Conditional bequest Frank argues that Bobbye intended to benefit Annie through the language in the last two sentences of her will. He also argues that in the event that the Court finds that the two-sentence residuary clause in Bobbye’s will conveyed an interest to Shirlee, the Court should find that the interest was subject to a condition precedent which Shirlee failed to fulfill. The chancellor found that the language in Bobbye’s will stating, “[t]he remainder of my estate I leave to my sister, Shirlee Phillips, with the understanding she will take care of my mother, Annie Nichols. Please be sure this is carried out,” was not ambiguous on its face. The chancellor held the language established that if Shirlee took care of her mother, then Shirlee would be entitled to the remainder of Bobbye’s estate. There is no error in the chancellor’s determination that the last two sentences of Bobbye’s will clearly convey Bobbye’s testamentary intent that Shirlee receive her residuary estate upon satisfaction of the stated condtion and that Shirlee had fulfilled the conditional bequest created by Bobbye’s will. |
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