Neal v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-01502-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-17-2011 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Burglary - Suppression of confession - Other crimes' evidence Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Lamar, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): King, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Kitchens, J. With Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-28-2009 Appealed from: Lowndes County Circuit Court Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr. Disposition: The jury, after having considered all the evidence, found the defendant guilty of burglary. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 2007-0305-CR1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Edward Lamont Neal |
OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS: BENJAMIN ALLEN SUBER, LESLIE S. LEE, GARY GOODWIN |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: SCOTT STUART |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Burglary - Suppression of confession - Other crimes' evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Edward Neal was convicted of burglary. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Suppression of confession Neal argues that he was denied his right to counsel. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Once this right to counsel has attached and has been invoked, any subsequent waiver during a police-initiated custodial interview is ineffective. The Sixth Amendment right, however, is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings – whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Neal was in custody on a felony-escape charge, and, by the time he confessed to the burglary, he had been arrested for burglary and had made his first appearance before a judicial officer, where, once again, he had been informed of his rights. He was not served with warrants for the September and December 2006 crimes until after his first custodial interrogation had begun that day. He expressed early on that he wanted to see his lawyer and that he had a lawyer, before receiving warrants on the new charges. Had Neal been asked any questions regarding the offense of felony escape, his Sixth-Amendment right to counsel would have been violated, but he was not. There is no evidence in the record that Neal’s Sixth-Amendment right to counsel extended to the burglary charge. Neal had a Fifth-Amendment right neither to sign anything nor to speak without an attorney, which he initially asserted, only to waive later. Neal has not offered any credible evidence of coercion, threat, or promise to secure his confession. The confession has every appearance of being the product of his own free will. Neal submitted no credible evidence that his waiver of Fifth-Amendment privileges was anything other than voluntary. Issue 2: Other crimes’ evidence Neal argues that evidence of the robbery should not have been admitted, because the robbery and the burglary did not constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. It was only after Neal testified (contrary to the advice of his trial counsel) that the issue of the robbery came up. Neal testified that he was being interrogated for a robbery and other burglaries in an attempt to buttress why he admitted guilt for the burglary for which he was being tried. The trial court properly allowed cross-examination regarding Neal’s claims. The trial court then also allowed the State to rebut Neal’s claim, not because it was part of single transaction, but because Neal had opened the door by his testimony, in which he asserted a different motive for the burglary and claimed the police offered him a deal. If a defendant opens the door to the line of testimony, ordinarily he may not complain about the prosecutor's decision to accept the benevolent invitation to cross the threshold. |
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