Harkness v. Butterworth Hunting Club, Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01842-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-15-2011 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: Reversed and rendered. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Easement by necessity - Section 65-7-201 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Griffis, P.J., Myers, Ishee and Maxwell, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. Without Separate Writing Opinion Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J. Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-24-2009 Appealed from: Holmes County Chancery Court Judge: Janace H. Goree Disposition: Easement by Necessity Awarded to Butterworth Hunting Club |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | D.L. Harkness and Mary P. Harkness |
MICHAEL D. SIMMONS |
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| Appellee: | Butterworth Hunting Club, Inc., Robert Hammett, Richard Hammett and Harold Hammett | JOHN MICHAEL GILMORE | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Easement by necessity - Section 65-7-201 |
| Summary of the Facts: | D.L. and Mary Harkness sued Butterworth Hunting Club for trespass, to quiet title, and to enjoin BHC from trespassing across a portion of the Harknesses’ property in Holmes County. BHC countersued for an easement by necessity. The chancery court declined to grant the Harknesses any relief and awarded BHC an easement by necessity. The Harknesses appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The Harknesses argue that the chancellor erred when she awarded BHC an easement by necessity. An easement by necessity arises by implied grant when a part of a commonly-owned tract of land is severed in such a way that either portion of the property has been rendered inaccessible except by passing over the other portion or by trespassing on the lands of another. To demonstrate a prima facie case for an easement by necessity, a claimant must prove that the dominant and servient parcels were once under common ownership, severance by the common owner(s), the necessity for the easement arose at the time of the severance by the common owner(s), and the necessity is continuing. Essentially, the Harknesses argue that they should not be responsible for providing BHC with access to its property when they were not responsible for BHC’s property becoming landlocked, and they will not be compensated in any way for the easement that BHC obtained. BHC argues that it is irrelevant that its property was landlocked at the time it acquired it. It was undisputed that BHC had an alternate route to access its land without trespassing across the Harknesses’ property, although that means was more inconvenient to BHC, and it would be more expensive than acquiring an easement by necessity from the Harknesses. An easement by necessity will not be awarded when the only evidence presented was that an alternative route would be longer and less convenient. Where one seeks to obtain a “way of access” easement by necessity but submits no evidence as to the allegedly higher costs of an alternative route, a trial court will not err in declining to award an easement. Because BHC presented no evidence regarding the costs of accessing its property by some means other than by crossing the Harknesses’ land, the chancellor further erred when she awarded BHC an easement by necessity without any supporting proof. Simply stating that it would appear to be “very expensive” to access property by some other means is not sufficient. BHC had the option of employing a different legal mechanism pursuant to section 65-7-201 to secure access over the Road. However, in the event that BHC obtained an easement across the Harknesses’ land pursuant to the procedure set forth in section 65-7-201, BHC would have been required to compensate the Harknesses for its involuntary taking of an interest in the Harknesses’ property. Here, BHC sought to obtain access in a manner that, if sufficiently demonstrated, would not have required it to compensate the Harknesses at all. The judgment of the chancellor is reversed and judgment rendered for the Harknesses. |
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