A.B. v. Y.Z.


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01575-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01575-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-10-2011
Opinion Author: Kitchens, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Civil commitment - Dismissal by stipulation - M.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(ii) - M.R.C.P. 81(a)(6) - Section 41-31-5 - Hearing
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., and Chandler, J.
Non Participating Judge(s): Randolph, Pierce and King, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Lamar, J. With Separate Written Opinion
Dissent Joined By : Dickinson, P.J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 09-28-2009
Appealed from: Perry County Chancery Court
Judge: Joe Dale Walker
Disposition: The chancellor ordered that A.B. be committeed to the East Mississippi State Hospital for ninety days and that A.B. complete a program as directed by LJAP.
Case Number: 2009-0018

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: A. B.




PRO SE, JAMES W. NEWMAN, III



 

Appellee: Y. Z. PRO SE  

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Topic: Civil commitment - Dismissal by stipulation - M.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(ii) - M.R.C.P. 81(a)(6) - Section 41-31-5 - Hearing

Summary of the Facts: A.B.’s brother, Y.Z., filed a “Petition and Affidavit for Detention, Care and Treatment of Alcohol and Drug Addiction” in chancery court. In his petition, Y.Z. asked that the chancery court commit A.B. for treatment, alleging that A.B.’s addiction to alcohol, illegal narcotics, and prescription medications had rendered A.B. unfit to look after his affairs and had caused A.B. to become a danger to himself and to others. A.B., Y.Z., and Y.Z.’s attorney signed an agreed order whereby A.B. agreed to submit to an evaluation at COPAC, the “Conducive Out-Patient Addiction Center.” A.B. agreed to submit to an evaluation within forty-five days of signing the order, and Y.Z. was to pay for A.B.’s evaluation and treatment. A.B. also agreed that he would not operate a motor vehicle after consuming alcoholic beverages. When A.B. did not submit to an evaluation within forty-five days, and after he had been charged with at least one driving under the influence offense in the interim, Y.Z. filed a motion for contempt. The chancellor found that A.B. had violated the agreed order, and he ordered A.B. to be taken into custody and transported to COPAC. The chancellor also ordered that a detailed report of A.B.’s evaluation at COPAC be forwarded to the court so that the court might order further treatment if necessary. The COPAC report recommended that A.B., an attorney, undergo intensive inpatient treatment and that he participate in the Mississippi Lawyers and Judges Assistance Program. A.B., who was represented by counsel, attempted to have the proceedings dismissed via a joint stipulation of dismissal, signed by both A.B. and Y.Z. and prepared by Y.Z.’s attorney. The chancellor refused to dismiss the action, reasoning that the stipulation could not undo the court’s September 11 order or the COPAC evaluation. The chancellor found that, based on the COPAC report, and the fact that he had received “several” DUIs, A.B. was in need of treatment. The chancellor ordered that A.B. be committed to the East Mississippi State Hospital for ninety days and that A.B. complete a program as directed by LJAP. A.B. appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Dismissal by stipulation A.B. argues that the chancellor was required to dismiss the case pursuant to M.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(ii). However, M.R.C.P. 81(a)(6) provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure have only limited applicability to proceedings pertaining to the adjudication, commitment, and release of narcotic and alcohol addicts and persons in need of mental treatment. Moreover, Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) clearly provides that a voluntary dismissal is subject to any statute of the State of Mississippi. Thus, section 41-31-5, which governs involuntary commitment of alcoholics and drug addicts, is controlling. This section imposes on the chancellor a mandatory duty to order the commitment of the respondent if the respondent admits that the allegations in the petition are true. The chancellor found that A.B. had admitted the allegations of his brother’s petition in the Answer and Waiver signed by A.B., and that this finding is by clear and convincing evidence. As the appellant, A.B. has the burden of demonstrating that the chancellor erred. Because he does not provide any evidence to the contrary, or even allege that he never made the admission, the finding of the chancellor that A.B. had admitted the allegations contained in his brother’s petition is accepted. Once A.B. admitted the allegations, the chancellor was duty bound by the statute to commit him for treatment. Issue 2: Hearing A.B. argues that the chancellor erred in committing him without a hearing as required by section 41-31-5. However, the statute also provides that, once A.B. had admitted the contents of the petition, the chancellor was required to order his commitment for treatment. When he admitted the facts of the petition, A.B. thereby waived any and all right to contest the petition.


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