State v. Louisville Tire Center, Inc.


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-00052-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00052-SCT
Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-10-2011
Opinion Author: Pierce, J.
Holding: DA-Reversed and remanded; CA-Affirmed.
Additional Case Information: Topic: Constitutionality of statute - Price gouging - Section 75-24-25 - Void on face - Void as applied
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens and Chandler, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): King, J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 11-25-2008
Appealed from: Winston County Chancery Court
Judge: J. Max Kilpatrick
Disposition: The trial court granted Fair Oil's motion for summary judgment, and the State appealed.
Case Number: 2007-134
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: State of Mississippi, Ex Rel Jim Hood, Attorney General




 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: MEREDITH McCOLLUM ALDRIDGE, BRIDGETTE WIGGINS



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
    		•
    Appellee: Louisville Tire Center, Inc. d/b/a Fair Oil Company CHARLES E. WINFIELD, JOY WOLFE GRAVES  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Constitutionality of statute - Price gouging - Section 75-24-25 - Void on face - Void as applied
    Summary of the Facts: The State of Mississippi, through Attorney General Jim Hood, filed a price-gouging claim against Louisville Tire Center, Inc., d/b/a Fair Oil Co., for violations of section 75-24-25. Fair Oil filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the Price-Gouging Statute was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court granted Fair Oil’s motion. The State appeals, and Fair Oil cross-appeals.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential element of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Criminal statutes must clearly warn what conduct is prohibited when evaluated by common understanding and practice, as must civil statutes and regulations. However, a rule or standard is not objectionable merely because it is stated in general terms and is not susceptible of precise application. In this case, the chancellor appeared to declare the statute void on its face and void as applied to oil companies, in general. These are different concepts. The statute is not void on its face, and a declaration that it is void as applied is premature. The alleged conduct being prosecuted is the raising of prices after the declaration of a state of emergency, absent justification. The baseline price provided by the statute is whatever was being charged “in the same market area . . . at or immediately before” the state of emergency. “ The absence of perfect clarity and precise guidance does not render this provision unconstitutionally vague. The chancellor accurately surmised that the terms “‘market area or ‘trade area’ would be clear to any businessman who wants to charge competitive prices and attract customers” but erred in holding that the Price-Gouging Statute did not “pass constitutional muster” on its face. Though briefly considered, the chancellor never determined whether Fair Oil had violated the Price-Gouging Statute. The attorney general alleges that Fair Oil violated the statute by raising prices above a base price calculated by the attorney general using a formula devised by his office. However, his interpretation of this statute remains only a hypothetical application until that interpretation is put into force by the judiciary. And the Court will not strike down legislative enactments based on hypothetical applications. Fair Oil remains a potential violator until the trial court examines its conduct in light of a judicial interpretation of statute. Since the only basis for Fair Oil’s motion for summary judgment was its assertion that the statute was unconstitutional, summary judgment should have been denied.


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