Sanders v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-01925-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-01925-COA ; 2009-CT-01925-SCT ; 2009-CT-01925-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-08-2011 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Hearsay statements - M.R.E. 803(1) - Present-sense impression - M.R.E. 803(2) - Excited utterance - Duty to retreat instruction - Castle doctrine - Section 97-3-15(3)(4) - Exclusion of evidence - M.R.E. 103(a)(2) - Plain error - M.R.E. 103(d) - Victim's character - M.R.E. 404 - M.R.E. 405 - Declarant's state of mind - M.R.E. 803(3) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Myers, Barnes, Roberts and Carlton, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Maxwell, J. Concurs in Result Only: Irving, P.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-09-2008 Appealed from: Hancock County Circuit Court Judge: Lawrence Paul Bourgeois, Jr. Disposition: Sentenced to Life in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections District Attorney: Cono A. Caranna II Case Number: B2301-07-012 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Edna Mae Sanders |
BRIAN B. ALEXANDER, WILL BARDWELL |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: W. GLENN WATTS, LADONNA HOLLAND | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Hearsay statements - M.R.E. 803(1) - Present-sense impression - M.R.E. 803(2) - Excited utterance - Duty to retreat instruction - Castle doctrine - Section 97-3-15(3)(4) - Exclusion of evidence - M.R.E. 103(a)(2) - Plain error - M.R.E. 103(d) - Victim's character - M.R.E. 404 - M.R.E. 405 - Declarant's state of mind - M.R.E. 803(3) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Edna Mae Sanders was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Hearsay statements Sanders challenges the trial court’s use of the hearsay exceptions “present sense impression” and “excited utterance” to admit hearsay statements made by the victim to emergency responders. The hearsay exception of present sense impression is found in M.R.E. 803(1) and allows for out-of-court statements to be deemed admissible in court if the statements are describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. Sanders argues that the victim’s statements were made in response to an inquiry from the officer and not spontaneously. Sanders further argues that too much time had passed between the victim receiving the burn injuries and the emergency responders arriving on the scene for the statements to be considered a “present sense impression” under Rule 803(1). The record shows that emergency responders arrived shortly after the incident had occurred and found the victim alive and conscious. In speaking with him to determine criminal investigatory needs and medical diagnoses, the responders stated that the victim’s voice was “shaky,” but understandable. While the responders did ask him basic preliminary questions in order to provide proper medical care and help, it is feasible to interpret the victim’s statements as spontaneous descriptions of what had just occurred. After receiving such severe burn injuries, it is indisputable that the victim was in an excited condition, possibly shock, for some time after his injuries were inflicted. Thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by applying the present-sense-impression exception to the victim’s hearsay statements. The excited-utterance exception to hearsay is found under M.R.E. 803(2) and allows for statements relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. It is reasonable to determine that at the time the victim spoke with responders, he was still under extreme stress caused by his severe burn wounds. Issue 2: Duty to retreat instruction Sanders argues that the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with an instruction that she was not under a duty to retreat from an assault made on her in her home. A defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be submitted as a factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction of the court. The record shows that Sanders was not the initial aggressor. Both Sanders and her daughter testified that the victim attacked Sanders first and without provocation. The record also shows that Sanders was not engaged in unlawful activity and, clearly, had a right to be in her own home. Additionally, Sanders feared great bodily harm and imminent death to herself and her children at the hands of the victim. Not only did the victim violently attack Sanders’s daughter and threaten Sanders’s life on numerous occasions, he drew his gun and pointed it directly at her immediately after telling her he would kill her. Accordingly, the Castle Doctrine of section 97-3-15 (3)(4) is applicable to Sanders and directly relates to her self-defense theory. Without being informed of the rights Sanders possessed under the Castle Doctrine through a jury instruction, the jury was improperly allowed to consider Sanders’s failure to retreat as evidence that her use of force was unnecessary, excessive, or unreasonable. Issue 3: Exclusion of evidence Sanders argues that the trial court committed manifest error by excluding testimony from defense witnesses that directly related to her self-defense theory. Generally, under M.R.E. 103(a)(2), when a party objects to the exclusion of evidence, he must make an offer of proof on the record for the benefit of the appellate court. However, Rule 103(a)(2) provides an alternative to making a formal proffer of evidence and allows for appellate review of evidence that was apparent from the context of the testimony and questions asked. Sanders’s counsel attempted to present testimony to further Sanders’s assertion that she reasonably apprehended imminent great personal injury or a felonious act committed by the victim on herself and her children. Sanders and her daughter’s testimony were meant to support her claim of self-defense and defense of others, as it would help to establish Sanders’s reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury to Sanders and her daughter. However, the trial judge prohibited all testimony regarding the victim’s sexual assault on Sanders’ daughter. While Sanders’s counsel only discussed this error in passing in the appellate brief, the error is addressed as plain error under M.R.E. 103(d). M.R.E. 404 and 405 govern admissibility of testimony regarding a person’s character. A victim’s character trait of violence is made an essential element of a charge when an accused claims self-defense and defense of others. Accordingly, Rule 404(a)(2) provided Sanders with the requisite authority to introduce evidence of the victim’s violent character. Rule 405(b) further allowed her to introduce evidence of specific instances of the victim’s violence toward her and her children, given her claim of self-defense and defense of her children. These rules alone make the daughter’s testimony as to the victim’s rape of her and Sanders’s testimony as to her sudden discovery of the rape both relevant and admissible. Sanders was periodically prevented from fully testifying throughout her time on the witness stand. When a criminal defendant relies on a theory of self-defense and defense of others, he or she is of right entitled to offer evidence that the victim had previously and recently threatened the defendant. This evidence is relevant on the issue of the defendant’s state of mind. The victim’s threats to kill Sanders are certainly relevant under Rule 404(b) in order to show the victim’s intent and plan to kill Sanders. They are also admissible hearsay statements as they fall within M.R.E. 803(3), which allows a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition. It is apparent from the context of the testimony that the victim had threatened Sanders’s life prior to this occasion and that he was threatening her life during the incident. It is also clear that Sanders knew he possessed a gun that was hidden in their bedroom. Furthermore, Sanders’s testimony makes it apparent that upon letting her go, the victim threatened to kill her and subsequently headed toward the bedroom where he ultimately retrieved his gun and began pointing it at her. The suppression of this evidence prevented the jury from fully understanding the victim’s state of mind and intention to kill Sanders, Sanders’s state of mind during the attack, and the grounds for her reasonable apprehension that she and her children were in serious imminent danger. |
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