In Re: V.M.S.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-01081-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-28-2006 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Child custody - Newly discovered evidence - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) - Termination of parental rights - Section 93-15-103(3)(f) Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Diaz, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Cobb, P.J., Easley and Graves, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-12-2005 Appealed from: Lowndes County Youth Court Judge: Beverley Franklin Disposition: Youth Court terminated Appellant's parental rights. Case Number: 00-0740-Y2 |
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| Topic: | Child custody - Newly discovered evidence - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) - Termination of parental rights - Section 93-15-103(3)(f) |
| Summary of the Facts: | The Lowndes County Department of Human Services petitioned the County Court of Lowndes County, Youth Court Division, to terminate the parental rights of T.S.T. and “Unknown Putative Father” with respect to V.M.S., a minor child who was in the custody of the Department at the time the petition was filed. The trial court found that the mother’s parental rights should not be terminated. However, the court did terminate the father’s parental rights in that same order and additionally found that the child should not be in the mother’s care, though visitation with the mother remained a possibility. The Department was awarded full custody; however, visitation was only to be afforded to the mother at the request of her daughter. The Department filed a motion under M.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) for relief from the judgment. The mother filed a Motion for Dispositional Review of the case, requesting custody be returned to her and a Motion for Immediate Visitation and Other Relief. After a hearing on the motions, the court granted the Department’s motion for relief, awarding custody to the Department, denying all other motions before the court, and terminating the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Newly discovered evidence The initial trial court determination that the parental rights of the mother should not be terminated was based on the lack of evidence of any substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship or any deep-seated antipathy toward the mother by the child. Upon granting the Motion for Relief from Judgment, the judge referred to testimony of the child as her basis for finding that the parent-child relationship had been severed, granting the motion, and terminating the mother’s parental rights. The judge found that the evidence was newly discovered and could not have been discovered in time for the Department to file a motion for a new trial. The mother argues that the only basis for the court’s decision was the interview the youth court judge conducted with the child at the hearing on the mother’s Motion for Immediate Visitation and Other Relief and that the record is devoid of any evidence which could have been newly discovered as to satisfy M.R.C.P. 60 (b)(3). In fact, the Rule 60 motion was filed by the Department before the interview with the child had taken place. In filing the Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the Department neither presented nor described any new evidence which would entitle the agency to relief from the trial court’s judgment. The actual interview the trial judge conducted with the child was obviously not the basis for the Department motion at the time of filing as that interview did not take place until much later. The subject matter of that interview – the child’s feelings about her mother – could also not have been newly discovered evidence as the Department itself admits that those feelings had existed well before trial and therefore could have easily been discovered in time for the Department to move for a new trial. Therefore, the facts of this case do not merit terminating the mother’s parental rights. Issue 2: Termination of parental rights In order to terminate a parent’s rights, the trial judge must be satisfied by clear and convincing proof that the mother was within the grounds laid out within the statute requiring termination of her parental rights. In this case, the facts are not sufficient to undergird the trial court’s ultimate decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Although the mother has a history of drug abuse and addiction and has been diagnosed as bi-polar, testimony was presented to show her pursuit of regular treatment, her dedicated regimen of medication, and her sobriety for several years prior to the hearing. It is clear that for parental rights to be terminated under section 93-15-103(3)(f), any antipathy or erosion of the relationship must be caused at least in part by the parent’s serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable failure to visit or communicate, or prolonged imprisonment.” Here, the circumstances of the case wholly fail to rise to such a level required by the statute to necessitate terminating the mother’s parental rights. Testimony at the motion hearing, as well as evidence within the entire record, is certainly not lacking as to the mother’s rehabilitation efforts and that she in fact makes efforts to maintain contacts with her daughter by, among other things, writing her letters twice a week and sending her Christmas presents. Whether the mother is afforded visitation with her daughter, and if so, to what extent and on what terms, is a decision quite appropriately left to the trial judge on remand. |
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