Jones v. State


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Docket Number: 2009-CP-00288-COA
Linked Case(s): 2009-CP-00288-COA ; 2009-CT-00288-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-01-2011
Opinion Author: Roberts, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Post-conviction relief - Time bar - Successive writ - Suspended sentence conditions - Due process - Revocation hearing
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Myers, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: PCR; Dismissal
Nature of the Case: PCR

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-28-2009
Appealed from: Lawrence County Circuit Court
Judge: Prentiss Greene Harrell
Disposition: Motion for Post-Conviction Relief Dismissed
Case Number: 2008-117 H

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Eric De'Juan Jones




PRO SE



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE  

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Topic: Post-conviction relief - Time bar - Successive writ - Suspended sentence conditions - Due process - Revocation hearing

Summary of the Facts: In 2003, Eric Jones pled guilty to the possession of 6.2 grams of cocaine. After he was sentenced and his post-release supervision revoked, Jones filed a motion for post-conviction relief which the court dismissed. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Procedural bars The circuit judge erred when he determined that Jones’s PCR motion was barred by the three-year time and successive-writ bars. Jones claimed that his sentence had expired and that his conditional release was unlawfully revoked; thus, his claim is an exception to the time and successive writ bars. Issue 2: Suspended sentence conditions Jones argues that the circuit judge did not orally inform him of the conditions and terms of his suspended sentence before that suspended sentenced could be revoked for a violation of those conditions and terms. To satisfy due process, the defendant must at least be orally informed of the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence, but it is not a requirement that the defendant be orally informed when such information has been recorded in written form. Here, Jones was informed in writing of the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. Thus, this issue is without merit. Issue 3: Due process Jones argues that he was denied due process at his revocation hearing. The minimum requirements of due process at revocation hearings are: written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; disclosure to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking (probation or) parole. Jones argues that the circuit court failed to appoint him an attorney at his revocation hearing. However, an indigent’s right to an appointed attorney at every revocation hearing is not a minimum requirement for due process. The issues in this case were not complex or difficult enough to warrant appointment of counsel. Jones also argues that he was not permitted to present witnesses and evidence or cross-examine adverse witnesses. However, the record shows that Jones had the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, but he did not make proper use of the time he was given.


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