The Lamar Companies v. COCAJO Trust
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01581-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01581-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-17-2011 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Motion to intervene - M.R.C.P. 24(c) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-16-2009 Appealed from: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: JIM PERSONS Disposition: Approximately two months after having granted Lamar a portion of the relief it sought, the chancery court denied Lamar’s “Motion for Leave to Intervene,” concluding that Lamar’s interest would be “adequately protected” by Pitts. Case Number: C2401-04-02903-1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | The Lamar Companies |
MARK D. HERBERT |
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| Appellee: | COCAJO Trust, Clifton B. Clark, Sr., Trustor; Colin Ray Clark, Trustee for COCAJO Trust and Mary Clark | MACK A. BETHEA |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Motion to intervene - M.R.C.P. 24(c) |
| Summary of the Facts: | In December 2004, the CoCaJo Trust; Clifton B. Clark, Sr., Trustor; Colin Ray Clark, Trustee; and Mary Clark filed suit alleging that Debbie R. Pitts, a/k/a Debbie R. Cuevas, the former trustee of the Trust, had misappropriated property of the Trust. In 2005, after suit had been filed, Pitts entered into lease agreements with The Lamar Companies to place outdoor advertising structures, visible to travelers on Interstate 10, on the subject property. In 2009, the Trust sent correspondence to Lamar asserting that Pitts did not own the subject property and was not authorized to execute the 2005 leases; and further notifying Lamar that a padlocked fence had been constructed around its advertising structures, as well as alleging monetary damages for willful trespass and breach of contract against Lamar. Shortly thereafter, Lamar filed a “Motion for Leave to Intervene.” The proposed complaint asked that Lamar be permitted to interplead its rent payments into the court registry, and requested a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent the Trust from denying Lamar access to its sign structures. The chancery court granted temporary injunctive relief. Approximately two months after having granted Lamar a portion of the relief it sought, the chancery court denied Lamar’s “Motion for Leave to Intervene,” concluding that Lamar’s interest would be adequately protected by Pitts. Lamar appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | When Lamar filed its “Motion for Leave to Intervene,” it attached a proposed “Intervener’s Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory, and Interpleader Relief” to the motion. This proposed complaint was provided in accordance with M.R.C.P. 24(c). In the proposed complaint, Lamar requested that the chancery court declare the true owner of the subject property; determine the validity of Lamar’s sign location leases; and identify the party to whom Lamar should pay rent. Of import to this appeal, Lamar further asked that it be allowed to interplead its rent payments into the court registry, and requested a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent the Trust from denying Lamar access to its sign structures. The chancery court issued an order that partially granted the temporary relief sought by Lamar. Specifically, the chancellor enjoined the Trust from denying Lamar access to its sign structures, pending a final disposition of the matter, and ordered that Lamar interplead future rent payments into the court registry. When the chancery court partially awarded the relief sought by Lamar, it effectively partially granted Lamar’s “Motion for Leave to Intervene.” Thus, Lamar should have been permitted to participate in the proceeding as a matter of law. |
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