Carpenter v. Berry
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01200-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01200-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-10-2011 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Negligence - Setting aside settlement - Minor under guardianship - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52(a) - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - UCCR 6.10 Judge(s) Concurring: Randolph and Kitchens, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Pierce, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Lamar, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., and Dickinson, J. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, P.J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-30-2009 Appealed from: ADAMS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: KENNIE MIDDLETON Disposition: Approximately three years after approving the settlement, the Guardians filed a petition to set aside the settlement, and the chancellor granted the requested relief under Rule 60(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Case Number: 2005-432 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Laura Carpenter |
HEBER S. SIMMONS, III, CHRISTOPHER G. HENDERSON, SETH HALL |
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| Appellee: | Tangela Berry, Ricky Banks and the Guardianship of Ryheim Banks | SHANE F. LANGSTON, REBECCA M. LANGSTON, TIMOTHY W. PORTER, PATRICK C. MALOUF, JOHN T. GIVENS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Negligence - Setting aside settlement - Minor under guardianship - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52(a) - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - UCCR 6.10 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Tangela Berry and Ricky Banks filed a negligence action in the circuit court for damages related to Berry’s pregnancy and the birth of their son, Ryheim Banks. They named as defendants: Tom Carey, M.D.; Natchez Community Hospital, Inc.; OB-GYN Clinic, Inc.; Donielle Daigle, M.D.; Laura Carpenter [registered nurse]; and Jane Does 1-4. While the negligence action was pending in circuit court, Berry and Banks obtained Letters of Guardianship and petitioned the chancery court for authority to settle minor’s claim against Laura Carpenter. The Guardians requested approval of a $25,000 settlement to be apportioned among the parties (Berry, Banks, and Ryheim), with $10,000 of it as the attorney’s fee. Under the proposed settlement, the Guardians agreed to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice of their individual claims against Carpenter. On August 11, 2005, the chancellor entered an order authorizing settlement of the claims and approving the apportionment. The chancellor attached the Guardians’ proposed release as an exhibit to his order. On July 21, 2008, the Guardians, with new counsel, filed a petition to set aside the settlement under M.R.C.P. 60(b). The chancellor issued an order granting the petition to set aside settlement. Carpenter appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Findings of fact Carpenter argues the chancellor abused his discretion by not including findings of fact and conclusions of law with his order. She argues that the discretionary language of M.R.C.P. 52(a) is modified by the Court’s decision in Tricon Metals & Services, Inc. v. Topp, 516 So. 2d 236 (Miss. 1987), in which the Court held that that where a case is hotly contested and complex and the facts greatly in dispute, failure to make findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a) will generally be regarded as an abuse of discretion. In this case, the chancellor did not grant the Rule 60(b) petition without any reasoning. His order indicates that he found “insufficient” evidence to support the settlement and “additional” evidence that it should be set aside. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion, as the issue in this case is not complex, nor are the facts greatly in dispute. Issue 2: Settlement Carpenter correctly argues that the chancellor had no discretion to rule on the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), since the chancellor had approved the settlement three years prior. So the chancellor must have proceeded under Rule 60(b)(5) or Rule 60(b)(6), because Rule 60(b)(4) for void judgments is inapplicable. Under Rule 60(b)(5), the court may relieve a party from final judgment if the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application. And under Rule 60(b)(6), the court may grant relief for any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. This is no ordinary Rule 60(b) case, because it involved the rights of a minor under guardianship. A minor under guardianship is a ward of the chancery court. Additional considerations are presented because procedures under Uniform Rule of Chancery Court Procedure 6.10 were not followed. While the petition for settlement requested that the Chancellor find the settlement of $25,000 to be a fair, just, and equitable settlement in the minor’s best interest, it did not state “the reason for such compromise and settlement.” It set forth only a cursory description of the facts relating to the claim. And, no “material witnesses concerning the injury or death and the damages resulting therefrom” were “produced before the Chancellor for examination.” Thus, the chancellor had no witness testimony before him substantiating the minor’s injury and the potential value of the case. The prior settlement proceedings were inadequate to have enabled the chancellor’s determination that the settlement was fair and reasonable to the minor under guardianship. It is apparent that the chancellor recognized his error in approving the settlement, as well as his ultimate duty to assure that the settlement was fair to the minor under guardianship, and appropriately set aside the settlement. Because the chancellor had no special duty to protect the Guardians, and the Guardians’ claims were properly dismissed by the order as agreed by the parties, the set-aside of the minor’s settlement is affirmed. To the extent that the chancellor’s order disturbed the settlement of the Guardian’s individual claims, it is reversed. |
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