Hyundai Motor America v. Applewhite


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-01101-SCT
Oral Argument: 09-21-2010
 

 

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Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-10-2011
Opinion Author: Kitchens, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wrongful death - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Discovery violation - M.R.C.P. 26(f) - Seasonable supplementation
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar, Chandler and Pierce, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-21-2008
Appealed from: COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: AL SMITH
Disposition: In this wrongful death, product liability case, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $4.5 million, or $1.5 million for each of three decedents, finding that the automobile at issue was defective in both its design and manufacture.
Case Number: 14-CI-98-0086

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Hyundai Motor America and Hyundai Motor Company




J. COLLINS WOHNER, JR., JIMMY B. WILKINS, THOMAS N. VANDERFORD, JR., MICHAEL KING, ROBERT WILLIAM MAXWELL



 

Appellee: Ola Mae Applewhite, as Personal Representative of the Estate of and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Dorothy Mae Applewhite, Deceased; Ceola Wade, as Personal Representative of the Estate of and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Anthony J. Stewart, Deceased; and Ida Mae Cooper, as Personal Representative of the Estate of and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Cecilia Cooper, Deceased and Kenneth Carter RALPH EDWIN CHAPMAN, SARA BAILEY RUSSO, DANA J. SWAN, C. KENT HANEY  

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Topic: Wrongful death - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Discovery violation - M.R.C.P. 26(f) - Seasonable supplementation

Summary of the Facts: In this wrongful death, product liability case, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $4.5 million, or $1.5 million for each of three decedents, finding that the automobile at issue, a 1993 Hyundai Excel, was defective in both its design and manufacture. Hyundai appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Expert testimony Hyundai argues that the trial judge should have granted its motion for a directed verdict and/or its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the Excel was not defective and the impact was not survivable as a matter of law. In making this argument, Hyundai attacks all three of the plaintiffs’ expert opinions, alleging that they were unreliable under the standards found in M.R.E. 702. The plaintiffs argue that Hyundai did not preserve this error for appeal because no proper Daubert challenges were made prior to or during trial. While the trial judge has discretion with regard to when and how to decide whether an expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable to be heard by a jury, this does not eliminate the requirement that the party opposing the evidence make a timely objection to its being admitted into evidence. M.R.E. 103 provides that the failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the evidence waives the issue on appeal. Hyundai was well aware of the substance of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony and had sufficient opportunity to challenge its reliability before trial. Instead, Hyundai waited until the trial was underway to make its Daubert objections. Regarding the plaintiff’s expert Webb, Hyundai moved to strike his testimony before trial, not on a question of its reliability, but because of the plaintiff’s failure timely to notify the defendant of a change in this expert’s calculations. It was not until after Webb had left the witness stand that Hyundai moved to strike his testimony based on its alleged failure to comply with Rule 702 and Daubert. The trial judge rightly refused to strike Webb’s testimony because the defendant had failed to make a contemporaneous objection and the testimony was already before the jury. As for Dr. Burton, Hyundai did not object to his testimony as unreliable until it moved the court for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to strike the testimony of Dr. Burton without a contemporaneous objection. With regard to the testimony of the plaintiffs’ design engineer, James Mundo, Hyundai argued to the trial court that Mundo was not qualified to render opinions about the Excel’s design after Mundo had testified about his qualifications, but before he had given his expert opinions. After he testified, Hyundai argues that his opinion was not based on reliable principles and methods. Thus, Hyundai did timely raise a Daubert objection to Mundo’s expert testimony. Hyundai first takes issue with Mundo’s statement that “cars aren’t suppose [sic] to be breaking into pieces.” Essentially, Hyundai faults Mundo for relying on Webb’s reconstruction and Webb’s opinions regarding the severity of the crash. Hyundai did not raise a timely objection to the reliability of Webb’s expert testimony, and, therefore, the trial judge did not err in admitting Webb’s testimony. Hyundai argues that Mundo never refuted Hyundai’s evidence that the design of the Excel met or exceeded the state of the art for subcompacts in 1993. However, Mundo testified that the design methods he used were available in 1993. While Hyundai presented expert testimony to the contrary, there was no error in the trial judge’s conclusion that this difference of opinion created a fact question for the jury. Hyundai criticizes Mundo’s alternative design because it was “an unvalidated computer simulation of a single component.” Contrary to Hyundai’s assertions, Mundo’s testimony indicated that his design alternative was not limited to a single component. Hyundai argues that Mundo was required to create a model of his alternative design and perform strength tests on the model in order to validate his opinion. Mundo’s utilization of a computer program for that purpose goes to the weight and credibility of such evidence and not to its admissibility. To support his theory that the welding was defective, Mundo pointed to nineteen welds that had come apart during the crash, all of which he considered to be defective. Hyundai criticizes Mundo’s methodology. Hyundai’s arguments on this point were for the jury’s resolution, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by finding Mundo’s testimony sufficiently reliable for purposes of Rule 702. Issue 2: Discovery violation Hyundai argues that it is entitled to a new trial because it was ambushed by changes to Webb’s opinion. One of Webb’s main contentions was that, had the Excel remained intact, the vehicle would have experienced a delta-v of no more than thirty-five miles per hour. Hyundai deposed Webb on December 18, 2007, at which time Webb gave a detailed explanation of his calculations. On February 6, 2008, Webb signed an errata sheet concerning his deposition testimony, changing four variables that he purportedly had used to make his calculations. At trial, Webb testified about the errata sheet, claiming that he had to change several variables because he realized after he had been deposed that he had made some mistakes in his initial analysis. Hyundai moved to strike Webb’s testimony, alleging that it had never received the errata sheet and that these changes were a surprise. In response, the plaintiffs argued that the changes were not material because they did not alter Webb’s ultimate conclusion. The plaintiffs also produced a letter addressed to one of Hyundai’s attorneys and dated February 11, 2008, to demonstrate that they had forwarded Webb’s errata sheet to the defendant. M.R.C.P. 26(f) imposes a duty on the parties to amend a prior response when the party knows that the response, though correct when made, is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. The failure seasonably to supplement or amend a response is a discovery violation that may warrant sanctions, including exclusion of evidence. Even if Hyundai did receive the errata sheet, simply giving the defendant this document did not relieve the plaintiffs of their duties under Rule 26(f). The purpose of an errata sheet is to correct scrivener’s errors or provide minor clarification; it is not a means of making material, substantive changes to a witness’s testimony. If a witness changes his testimony in a manner that conflicts with prior discovery responses, the sponsoring party has a duty under Rule 26(f) seasonably and formally to amend or supplement the response. This is the responsibility of the party or parties sponsoring the witness, not the responsibility of the witness. The changes in Webb’s calculations were material changes because they were essential components of the basis for his opinion. When Hyundai attempted to cross-examine Webb about his calculations, Webb referred to his errata sheet at least seven times to demonstrate that he had corrected his mistakes. It is clear from Webb’s testimony that the figures on the errata sheet were important to his calculations. Moreover, when Hyundai’s experts performed crash testing, they used the figures given by Webb in his deposition in an attempt to refute Webb’s testimony. Thus, this issue warrants reversal.


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