Sturdavant v. Sturdavant


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01855-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-08-2011
Opinion Author: Carlton, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Modification of periodic alimony - Modification of child support
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 11-02-2009
Appealed from: LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: JOHNNY LEE WILLIAMS
Disposition: MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY GRANTED
Case Number: 2005-0163-GN-W

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Thomas Sturdavant




DEBORAH J. GAMBRELL, CAROL LEATRICE JONES



 

Appellee: Regina Sturdavant S. CHRISTOPHER FARRIS  

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Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Modification of periodic alimony - Modification of child support

Summary of the Facts: Thomas and Regina Sturdavant were granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce. The couple agreed on a property-settlement agreement, alimony payments, and child-custody arrangements, which were incorporated into the final decree for divorce. The chancellor granted Regina’s subsequent petition to modify and increase Thomas’s child-support and periodic-alimony payments. Thomas appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Periodic alimony Thomas argues that the chancellor erred in modifying his periodic-alimony payments because Regina failed to show that a material change of circumstances had occurred since the chancellor entered the divorce decree. Periodic alimony can be modified by increasing, decreasing, or terminating the award; and such modification can occur only if there has been a material change in the circumstances of one or more of the parties that could not have been anticipated by the parties at the time of the original decree. Thomas argues that the chancellor failed to consider all of the Armstrong factors during the modification hearing. The central issue to periodic alimony modification is whether there has been a material change in circumstances subsequent to the decree of divorce and not a balancing of the Armstrong factors. At the time the original divorce decree was entered in May 2008, Thomas had represented to the chancellor that his income for 2007 was estimated to be $37,252. Thomas also represented to the chancellor that he had filed for bankruptcy at the time of the divorce. However, at the modification hearing, Thomas testified that his yearly income for 2008 amounted to $109,465.64, and his gross monthly income for 2009 amounted to $20,768. In determining whether to modify an award of periodic alimony in the event of a material change in circumstances, the supreme court has held that a chancellor should consider a substantial increase in earnings by one party subsequent to the divorce decree. During the modification hearing, the chancellor noted that Regina provided evidence that she could barely meet her living expenses based on Thomas’s alimony payments. The chancellor also stated that Regina’s testimony revealed that she had cut back on what she and the children “had been able to do before the divorce in terms of leisure and activities.” The evidence in the record supports the chancellor’s decision to increase the amount of periodic alimony awarded to Regina based on the substantial increase in Thomas’s income. The record also shows that the chancellor properly weighed the relative positions of the parties at the time of the request for modification in relation to their positions at the time of the divorce decree. Issue 2: Child support Thomas argues that the chancellor erred in finding that his increase in income warrants a modification in the child-support payments for Thomas and Regina’s two children. Child support can be modified if there has been a substantial or material change in the circumstances of one or more of the interested parties. The chancellor properly determined that Thomas’s substantial increase in income indeed constituted a material change in circumstances. Regina argues that the chancellor erred by failing to increase the child support to an amount based upon twenty percent of Thomas’s income, which would result in a monthly child-support payment of $2,600, instead of the chancellor’s modified award of $1,200 per month. The chancellor provided the required findings explaining his calculation of expenses and his decision to deviate from the statutory guidelines mandating that the child-support award shall be based upon twenty percent of Thomas’s adjusted gross income for his two children. The record supports Regina’s expenses and the calculations of the chancellor.


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