Jones v. Mayo
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01131-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-08-2011 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce - Equitable distribution - Motion for relief - M.R.C.P. 60 - M.R.C.P. 59 - Post-trial appointment of judge - M.R.C.P. 63(b) - Clarification of judgment - Interest Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Barnes and Ishee, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Griffis and Roberts, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-01-2009 Appealed from: Lauderdale County Chancery Court Judge: FRANKLIN C. MCKENZIE JR. Disposition: ORDERED, UNDER RULE 60(a), THAT EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AWARD MAY BE SATISFIED USING QUALIFIED DOMESTIC-RELATIONS ORDER Case Number: 03-369-M |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Teresa Darlene Jones |
HENRY PALMER, ROBERT JAMES BRESNAHAN |
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| Appellee: | George Herbert Mayo, III | ROBERT R. MARSHALL | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce - Equitable distribution - Motion for relief - M.R.C.P. 60 - M.R.C.P. 59 - Post-trial appointment of judge - M.R.C.P. 63(b) - Clarification of judgment - Interest |
| Summary of the Facts: | Teresa Darlene Jones and George Herbert Mayo III (Herbert) divorced in 2005. While they agreed who should keep most of their marital property, they left the issue of equitable distribution to the chancery court. The majority of the marital property was in retirement accounts. Darlene had a state pension worth $23,000, and Herbert had two ERISA-qualifying accounts, worth $82,449 total. All the assets combined totaled $139,637. The chancellor awarded Darlene $36,488.50 as a final judgment, bearing interest at a rate of six percent. To satisfy the judgment against him, Herbert sought to transfer $36,488.50 from one of his retirement accounts to a separate account for Darlene through a QDRO. Darlene refused to execute the QDRO documents, demanding Herbert pay the judgment in cash. Herbert then filed a motion for relief under M.R.C.P. 60. The motion hearing did not occur until 2009. Because the intent of the equitable distribution award was for both spouses to take an equal share and avoid immediate tax consequences, the chancellor ordered that Herbert could satisfy the remaining balance of Darlene’s award by transferring money from his retirement to a separate account for Darlene, using a QDRO. Because Herbert had already attempted to satisfy fully the January 2005 judgment using a QDRO in February 2005, the chancellor denied Darlene’s request for interest on the balance. Darlene appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion for relief Darlene argues that the chancellor erred in allowing Herbert’s M.R.C.P. 60 motion to be treated as an M.R.C.P. 59 motion. Because Herbert sought to have the judgment altered or amended, she argues his only remedy was to file a motion under Rule 59(e), which must be filed within ten days of the entry of the judgment. And because Herbert waited four months to file his motion, it should have been dismissed as untimely. But the chancery court did not alter or amend its 2005 divorce judgment. Instead, under authority provided in Rule 60(a), it clarified an oversight or omission in the 2005 judgment. Although Rule 60(a) cannot be used to reflect a change in mind by the judge, it can be used to correct an order that failed accurately to reflect the judge’s original decision. The chancellor had the right to correct the oversight in the 2005 award that had led to Darlene and Herbert’s dispute. Darlene also argues the law-of-the-case doctrine prevented the chancellor, as the subsequently appointed chancellor, from granting Herbert’s post-trial motion. A successor judge has the same discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge, but should not overrule the earlier judge’s order or judgment merely because the later judge might have decided matters differently. M.R.C.P. 63(b) authorizes post-trial appointment of judges to perform the duties of a previous judge. Because the prior chancellor Thomas, before his recusal, had the authority under Rule 60(a) to clarify his judgment, the successor chancellor had the same authority. Issue 2: Interest Darlene argues that the chancellor erroneously denied her request for interest on the outstanding balance of her award. The 2005 divorce judgment expressly stated the award of $36,488.50 was a final judgment, accruing interest at the rate of 6% annually until fully satisfied. Herbert’s filing of a Rule 60(b) motion, in itself, did not operate as a stay of the judgment or prevent the accumulation of interest. But the pending motion was not the reason for denying interest. Because Herbert attempted to fully satisfy the judgment soon after its entry but was prevented by Darlene, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in refusing to award Darlene’s request for interest on the balance of her judgment. Darlene further argues it was error for the chancellor not to award her attorney’s fees and not to cite Herbert in contempt for failing to timely satisfy the judgment. Her argument is not proper for appeal because Darlene neither moved for a citation of contempt nor notified Herbert she was seeking attorney’s fees. |
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