GORTON v. RANCE
| Docket Number: | 2009-IA-01111-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-27-2011 Opinion Author: Justice Chandler Holding: Reversed and rendered. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Tort Claims Act - Notice of claim - Section 11-46-11(1) - Public hospital - Employment status - Statute of limitations - Borrowed-servant doctrine |
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Tort Claims Act - Notice of claim - Section 11-46-11(1) - Public hospital - Employment status - Statute of limitations - Borrowed-servant doctrine |
| Summary of the Facts: | Shumaera Rance filed a complaint against Dr. Sidney Carlton Gorton, Dr. Daisy Thomas, Humphreys County Memorial Hospital, and John Does 1-5 for the wrongful death of her ten-month-old son, Dexter Jordan, Jr. Dr. Gorton filed a motion for summary judgment which the court denied. The Supreme Court granted Dr. Gorton’s petition for an interlocutory appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Section 11-46-11(1) requires a party claiming injury under the MTCA against a governmental entity, such as a public hospital, to file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity ninety days prior to maintaining an action. The MTCA also provides a one-year statute of limitations on all actions brought under its provisions which is tolled by a timely-filed notice of claim. It is undisputed that Greenwood Leflore Hospital is a public hospital entitled to the protections of the MTCA. Dr. Gorton argues that the documentation before the trial court established his status as an employee of Greenwood Leflore Hospital and it was not a genuine issue of material fact. The documents submitted by Dr. Gorton established that he was employed by Greenwood Leflore Hospital on the relevant dates of August 7-8, 2007. Rance provided no specific facts that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that merits trial. Instead, Rance provided mere unsubstantiated allegations. Therefore, the evidence before the trial court failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Dr. Gorton’s status as an employee of Greenwood Leflore Hospital, a government entity covered by the MTCA. Dr. Gorton argues that Rance failed to provide pre-suit notice to Greenwood Leflore Hospital’s chief operating officer pursuant to the MTCA. The ninety-day notice requirement under section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces. Rance provided pre-suit notice to HCMH. When Rance filed the suit, she separately served HMCH, Dr. Thomas, and Dr. Gorton. But because Dr. Gorton was employed by Greenwood Leflore Hospital, a covered entity, he was personally immune from suit, and could have been joined in a suit against his employer in a representative capacity only. Because Rance did not serve notice on the chief executive officer of Greenwood Leflore Hospital ninety days prior to filing suit, Rance failed to follow the pre-suit notice requirements of the MTCA. Dr. Gorton also argues that the statute of limitations had expired before Rance filed the complaint. According to the allegations of the complaint, the tortious, wrongful, or otherwise actionable conduct that caused Jordan’s death occurred on August 7-8, 2007. Rance filed suit on November 5, 2008, more than one year later. Although the statute provides for tolling during the notice period, because Rance provided no notice to Dr. Gorton’s employer, Greenwood Leflore Hospital, the tolling provision is inapplicable. Therefore, Rance’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations under the MTCA. Rance argues that Dr. Gorton was the borrowed servant of HCMH, and thus her notice to HCMH was sufficient. The borrowed-servant doctrine is a common-law rule that a servant, in general employment of one person, who is temporarily loaned to another person to do the latter’s work, becomes, for the time being, the servant of the borrower, although he remains in the general employment of the lender. Rance argues that Dr. Gorton was the borrowed servant of HCMH because, at the time of the alleged negligence, he was working at HCMH pursuant to his employment contract with Greenwood Leflore Hospital, which provided that Dr. Gorton would be on the active medical staff of HCMH. Assuming for the sake of argument that the borrowed-servant doctrine could be applied to an MTCA claim, it is plainly inapplicable to the facts presented by this case. The only evidence of the relationship between Dr. Gorton and HCMH was Dr. Gorton’s employment contract with Greenwood Leflore Hospital, requiring him to be on the active medical staff of HCMH. No evidence of any contract between Dr. Gorton and HCMH or between HCMH and Greenwood Leflore Hospital affecting Dr. Gorton’s employment is in the record. A physician’s appointment to the medical staff of a hospital and the grant of clinical privileges do not equate to an employment contract between the physician and the hospital. |
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