WALTON v. WALTON
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01615-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-25-2011 Opinion Author: Chief Judge King Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Fraud - Statute of limitations - M.R.C.P. 4(d)(2)(A) - Section 91-7-309 - Section 15-1-7 - Fraudulent concealment - Sanctions - M.R.C.P.11(b) |
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| Topic: | Real property - Fraud - Statute of limitations - M.R.C.P. 4(d)(2)(A) - Section 91-7-309 - Section 15-1-7 - Fraudulent concealment - Sanctions - M.R.C.P.11(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | In 2009, Justin Walton sued his uncles, John Walton and Kenneth Walton, and argued that he should have inherited land in 1992 from his grandfather’s estate, which was conveyed by deed to John and Kenneth in 1989. The chancellor dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and as time-barred. Justin was ordered to pay $1,000 in sanctions to John and Kenneth for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Justin appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Fraud A complaint will be dismissed when a party fails to sufficiently plead allegations of fraud. Justin pleaded a fraudulent conveyance in general terms; he failed to state with particularity what made the conveyance fraudulent. Thus, the chancellor did not err by dismissing the lawsuit. Issue 2: Statute of limitations Justin maintains that he was not properly noticed in the estate proceeding; thus, he was not a party. However, the record shows the contrary. The chancery court’s docket shows that a summons was issued to both Justin and his mother, as required by M.R.C.P. 4(d)(2)(A), giving them notice of the probate of Edward’s estate, and that the summonses were returned. Justin also argues that the chancellor erred by finding that his claim is time-barred pursuant to section 91-7-309, because the statute of limitations was tolled based on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment and by the minor’s savings provision under section 15-1-7. In pertinent part, section 15-1-7 provides a ten-year statute of limitations in actions to recover land; the minor savings provision allows a minor to file suit within ten years after he has attained majority. However, this is not an action to recover land. In all the cases applying section 15-1-7, the contested issue always concerns ownership or possession of the property in question, such as adverse possession, a suit to remove a cloud on title, or confirmation of mineral rights. Justin’s claim was an attempt to reopen Edward’s estate. Regardless, Justin’s claim is still time-barred. The statute of limitations began running against Justin on November 26, 1999, his twenty-first birthday. Justin did not file this lawsuit until May 21, 2009, well outside of the statute of limitations. Justin argues that the statute of limitations was tolled by John and Kenneth’s fraudulent concealment of the 1989 deed. However, an alleged fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute of limitations for matters of public record. Also, there is evidence that Justin should have known that he had a cause of action. Issue 3: Sanctions Justin argues that the chancellor erred by imposing sanctions against him under M.R.C.P.11(b). In the first lawsuit that was dismissed for failure to state a claim, Justin sued John and Kenneth and requested the chancellor to set aside a 1997 deed, which conveyed Kenneth and Jacqueline’s interest in one tract of land to John. This tract of land was also one of the six tracts of land that was conveyed to John and Kenneth in the 1989 deed. Justin failed to plead his claim of fraudulent conveyance with particularity; thus, there was no way that he could prove the claim, making the claim frivolous. Upon granting the motion for sanctions, the chancellor ordered John and Kenneth to submit proof of the reasonable expenses they had incurred defending this action. However, there is no evidence in the record that John and Kenneth submitted proof of their expenses to the chancellor. Although the actual award of attorney’s fees is still dependent upon specific proof, based upon the pleadings and documents contained in the record, it is more probable than not that John and Kenneth spent more than $1,000 in defending this action. Accordingly, the award of $1,000 in attorney’s fees is reasonable, and the absence of specific proof is harmless error in this case. |
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