State v. Delaney


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01640-SCT
Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-13-2011
Opinion Author: Kitchens, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.
Additional Case Information: Topic: Extortion - Dismissal of indictment - Probable cause hearing - Section 99-3-28 - URCCC 7.06 - M.R.A.P. 44(a)
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Graves, P.J., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar, Chandler and Pierce, JJ.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 09-28-2009
Appealed from: HOLMES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Jannie M. Lewis
Disposition: The trial judge considered the arguments and found that the probable cause hearing mandated by Section 99-3-28 could not be bypassed by means of an indictment. The trial judge also found that the proper remedy was dismissal with prejudice because, she opined, if Delaney were to be indicted again on the same charge, he would be subjected to double jeopardy.
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: State of Mississippi




 JAMES H. POWELL, III, STEVEN WALDRUP, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN HENRY, JR.



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
    		•
    Appellee: Johnny Delaney EDWARD BLACKMON, JR.  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Extortion - Dismissal of indictment - Probable cause hearing - Section 99-3-28 - URCCC 7.06 - M.R.A.P. 44(a)
    Summary of the Facts: Johnny Delaney, a trooper with the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, was indicted by a Holmes County grand jury for one count of extortion pursuant to section 97-11-33. The indictment alleged that Delaney, while acting under color of his office, promised Jessie Jordan that he would dismiss Jordan’s speeding ticket in exchange for cash. Following the return of the indictment, the Holmes County Circuit Clerk immediately issued a capias for Trooper Delaney’s arrest. Bail was set and posted on December 19, 2008. On December 22, 2008, Delaney waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. On September 16, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State had failed to comply with section 99-3-28. Defense counsel contended that the language of the statute is mandatory, and that there are but two exceptions to the requirement of holding a probable cause hearing, neither of which was present in his client’s case. The district attorney argued that section 99-3-28 applied only to charges filed in justice court or municipal court, and that the indictment obviated the need for a probable cause hearing. He also argued that the circuit court could not apply the statute to the present case because it conflicts with URCCC 7.06, which governs indictments. The trial court found that the probable cause hearing mandated by section 99-3-28 could not be bypassed by means of an indictment and that the proper remedy was dismissal with prejudice. The State timely appealed the dismissal, challenging the applicability and the constitutionality of section 99-3-28. Because the validity of a statute was being challenged, the Court ordered the parties to serve the Attorney General with copies of their briefs and allowed the Attorney General thirty days from the last date of service to file a response in accordance with M.R.A.P. 44(a).
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: The State argues that, once an indictment has been issued, a probable cause hearing pursuant to section 99-3-28 is unnecessary. Our case law and uniform rules do not address probable cause hearings pursuant to section 99-3-28, and a traditional preliminary hearing is somewhat different from the sort of statutory probable cause hearing under review in this case. The plain language of the statute does not make exceptions for cases in which indictments have been returned. However, to require a probable cause hearing pursuant to section 99-3-28 after an indictment has been returned by a state grand jury would create an inherent conflict with precedent and court rules. Because section 99-3-28 conflicts with precedent and uniform rules in that it does not provide an exception for indictments, the procedural requirements of section 99-3-28 are inapplicable once an indictment has been returned by a Mississippi grand jury. Therefore, the trial judge erred in dismissing the indictment based on the absence of a probable cause hearing pursuant to section 99-3-28.


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