Doe v. Jameson Inn, Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00722-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00722-SCT ; 2009-CA-00722-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-13-2011 Opinion Author: Pierce, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Premises liability - Single cause of action - Status as licensee - Willful and wanton injury - Exemption of minor Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Dickinson, J. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J. Dissent Joined By : Chandler, J. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, P.J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-20-2009 Appealed from: Rankin County Circuit Court Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: The trial court found that none of the defendants had breached any duty, and granted summary judgment in favor of Jameson Inn, Inc., Kitchin Hospitality LLC, and Erica Covington. |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Jim Doe and Barbara Doe, Individually, and as Natural Parents of A.D. a Minor |
WAYNE E. FERRELL, JR., JANICE T. JACKSON, BRIAN K. HERRINGTON |
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| Appellee: | Jameson Inn, Inc., Kitchin Hospitality, LLC and Erica Covington | B. STEVENS HAZARD, AARON REESE EDWARDS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Premises liability - Single cause of action - Status as licensee - Willful and wanton injury - Exemption of minor |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jim and Barbara Doe, individually and as natural parents of Ann Doe, filed suit against Jameson Inn, Inc., Kitchin Hospitality LLC, and Erica Covington, after Ann was raped at the Jameson Inn. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. The Does appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Single cause of action The Does argue that the case is not only one of premises liability, but also a case of simple negligence. Whether Ann’s cause of action falls under the general theory of negligence or a specific type of negligence warrants a review of the facts that gave rise to Ann’s claim. The injury of Ann, i.e., the rape, took place in a private room on the premises of the Jameson Inn. And the Does allege that Ann’s injury resulted from the dangerous condition of the Jameson Inn. Since premises liability is a theory of negligence that establishes the duty owed to someone injured on a landowner’s premises as a result of “conditions or activities” on the land, the trial court properly treated the Does’ claim as one of pure premises liability. Issue 2: Status as licensee Ann argues she was an invitee at the time she entered the premises of the Jameson Inn and was raped. But the trial court determined Ann’s status to be that of a licensee. Where the facts of the case are not largely in dispute, the classification of a plaintiff becomes a question of law for the trial judge. Here, the only fact pertinent to the determination of Ann’s status is her reason for leaving the movie theater and entering the Jameson Inn property. The record shows that, while Ann’s attacker denied that he had smoked marijuana in the hotel room, he admitted that he could not remember whether anyone else had smoked marijuana. Ann, however, admitted that she had left the movie theater to smoke marijuana and, in fact, had taken one puff off a marijuana cigarette while in the hotel room. Since Ann’s attacker does not confirm or contest whether Ann left the movie theater to smoke marijuana, Ann’s reason for leaving Tinseltown remains undisputed. Therefore, the determination of Ann’s status was properly a question of law to be decided by the trial judge. A licensee is one who enters upon the property of another for his or her own convenience, pleasure or benefit, pursuant to the license or implied permission of the owner. An invitee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual benefit or advantage. According to Ann, she entered the premises of the Jameson Inn to perform the illegal activity of smoking marijuana. Thus, Ann’s status on the night in question could not be that of invitee, as the element of mutual benefit is lacking. Jameson Inn received no benefit by virtue of Ann’s presence on the premises. The defendants owed no higher duty to Ann other than to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring her. To constitute willful and wanton injury, something more than mere inadvertence or lack of attention is required. Because the record lacks any evidence to suggest that the defendants intended willfully or wantonly to injure Ann the night she was raped at the Jameson Inn, the defendants did not violate any duty to Ann. Issue 3: Exemption of minor The Does would like the Court to consider the notion that Ann was not capable of understanding the consequences of entering a private hotel room with strange men she did not know and without an adult. Yet the facts uncontrovertedly show that Ann understood the potential danger of going to the hotel room with strangers. In fact, Ann admitted in her deposition that she was aware of the potential danger, but went to the hotel anyway. Since Ann admittedly recognized the potential consequences of her actions, and the defendants owed only a duty to refrain from willful and wanton injury to Ann, the Does’ argument on this point must fail. |
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