Coleman v. Ford Motor Co.


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-00207-COA
Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00207-COA2009-CT-00207-SCT
Oral Argument: 08-10-2010
 

 

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Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-11-2011
Opinion Author: Myers, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wrongful death - Comparative fault - Admission of blood alcohol tests - M.R.E. 503(f) - Challenges for cause - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Note-taking instruction - URCCC 3.14(2) - Closing argument - Deposition testimony - M.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) - M.R.E. 103
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Barnes, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-06-2008
Appealed from: Lowndes County Circuit Court
Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr.
Disposition: Jury Found Vehicle Not Defective
Case Number: 2002-0209-CV-1

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Sandra Coleman, As Personal Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Randy Coleman, Deceased




RALPH EDWIN CHAPMAN, JOHN M. MONTGOMERY, DANA J. SWAN, SCOTT THOMAS MCARDLE, SARA BAILEY RUSSO



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Ford Motor Company MICHAEL B. WALLACE, WALKER (BILL) JONES III, REBECCA L. HAWKINS, ROBERT F. WALKER, PERRY W. MILES IV  

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    Topic: Wrongful death - Comparative fault - Admission of blood alcohol tests - M.R.E. 503(f) - Challenges for cause - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Note-taking instruction - URCCC 3.14(2) - Closing argument - Deposition testimony - M.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) - M.R.E. 103

    Summary of the Facts: Randy Coleman was severely burned when his 1999 Ford F-150 pickup truck caught fire after a head-on collision with another vehicle. He died of his injuries. His wife, Sandra Coleman, brought a wrongful death suit against Ford Motor Company, alleging that the F-150 truck had burned because of a defective fuel line. A jury found that the vehicle was not defective. Coleman appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Comparative fault Coleman argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of comparative fault in causing the accident leading to the fire that killed her husband. Coleman contends that her suit against Ford only sought damages for enhanced injuries – those that would not have been suffered if the vehicle had not been defective – and that evidence unrelated to the crashworthiness of the vehicle was irrelevant. A comparative negligence defense is available in crashworthiness suits. There was unquestionably a factual basis to support this defense, that is, there was evidence that Coleman’s negligence contributed to the accident that resulted in his death. Therefore, the trial court properly allowed Ford to present the defense. Issue 2: Blood alcohol tests Coleman argues that the trial court erred in admitting the results of two blood-alcohol-content (BAC) tests that were conducted as part of her husband’s medical treatment after the accident, because it was irrelevant and it was admitted in violation of the physician-patient privilege. Because Ford was entitled to present a comparative negligence defense, evidence of Randy Coleman’s intoxication was clearly relevant to his fault in causing the accident. The blood-alcohol tests were not ordered by law enforcement; they were conducted by Randy’s doctors in the effort to save his life after he suffered severe burns. Randy was never prosecuted for driving while intoxicated or for any other crime related to the accident. It appears that Ford obtained these test results by subpoenaing Randy’s medical records from the treating hospitals. Additionally, the BAC results were the only strong evidence of his intoxication. At issue is the whether these test results fall under the exception provided by M.R.E. 503(f). Coleman concedes that she placed her husband’s physical condition at issue by seeking damages for his injuries, treatment, and death. But she notes that an attending physician testified that the BAC test was routinely given to admittees at the facilities where Randy was treated, and his BAC results did not require any changes to his treatment regimen. Coleman contends that the trial court exceeded the scope of the exception by permitting Ford to use the blood-alcohol test results for a purpose not related to the issue of her husband’s injuries or care – to show that he had been intoxicated and had negligently caused the accident. Randy’s BAC was tested as part of the treatment of his injuries. An attending physician testified that BAC testing was “standard practice” and that it was “important” in the course of burn treatment. Coleman waived the privilege to her husband’s medical records by placing his injuries and the course of his treatment at issue in the lawsuit. Once the privilege was waived, the BAC test results were no longer privileged, and Ford was free to use them for any legitimate purpose at trial, including to establish Randy’s fault in causing the accident. Issue 3: Challenges for cause During voir dire, Coleman challenged for cause a number of potential jurors that owned or had previously owned an F-150 Ford truck. The trial court denied all of these challenges, accepting each venireman’s individual promise that he or she could be fair and impartial. Coleman argues that she was denied a fair and impartial jury as a result. Coleman had an opportunity to further question these potential jurors regarding their relationship to Ford or their experiences with its products, but she did not do so. Instead, Coleman relies entirely on their statements that they owned an F-150 truck. From that, she speculates about a potential for bias, but she offers no compelling reason to disregard each juror’s affirmation that he or she could be objective. Thus, there was no error. Issue 4: Expert testimony Ralph Newell, Ford’s fire cause and origin expert, testified as to his findings about how and where the fire began. Coleman’s experts had concluded that the fire began when fuel spilled from a ruptured flexible fuel line, located under the cab. Newell determined instead that the fire had begun inside the cab of the truck, under the driver’s seat. Coleman argues that his opinion was speculative and inadmissible. Under Rule 702, the expert must be qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience or education, and the witness's scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge must assist the trier of fact in understanding or deciding a fact in issue. The trial judge must determine whether the expert testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant in a particular case. Newell testified that he had relied largely on the observations of witnesses to the fire, who had stated that shortly after the collision, smoke was coming from inside the cab of the F-150 but not from underneath the vehicle. Newell examined the grommet and concluded that it would have burned out more easily from above than below. This would have been consistent with the accounts of witnesses that the fire appeared under the vehicle only later. It was undisputed that the flexible fuel lines, located underneath the cab, had eventually burned after the accident. Coleman’s attack on Newell’s expert opinion focuses on his inability to specifically identify the source of the spark that ignited the liquid electrical tape – Newell concluded that it had been either a push-button torch or an air-conditioning capacitor. Neither could be excluded as a possible ignition source. Newell never implied that his methodology required him to determine the exact ignition source. Instead, it appears that he relied on the conclusion – which he stated he had reached to a reasonable degree of certainty – that one of the two had started the fire. Coleman offers no attack on this finding and no explanation of why Newell would have had to identify the exact ignition source to render his opinion. Thus, there is no error. Issue 5: Note-taking instruction The trial court permitted the jurors to take notes during the trial, but gave an abbreviated preliminary instruction on note-taking. Coleman argues this was error. Coleman has not demonstrated that the trial court’s variances from the form language in URCCC 3.14(2) caused her any prejudice. She also made no objection to the trial court’s preliminary instructions at trial. Failure to make a contemporaneous objection to preliminary instructions waives this argument on appeal. Issue 6: Closing argument Coleman cites no authority in her brief on appeal to support her argument on the closing argument, and consequently, this issue is procedurally barred on appeal. Issue 7: Deposition testimony Coleman argues that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence several portions of the deposition of Sunil Sharma, an engineer at Ford and its designated corporate representative under M.R.C.P. 30(b)(6). She argues, in a sentence or two for each ruling, that the excluded portions of the deposition testimony were relevant to her claims against Ford – but Coleman makes no effort to demonstrate that the rulings were prejudicial. Under M.R.E. 103, error may not be predicated upon a ruling which excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.


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