Trammell v. State


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Docket Number: 2009-KP-00196-COA
Linked Case(s): 2009-KP-00196-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-11-2011
Opinion Author: Myers, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Armed robbery - Motion to suppress - Weight of evidence - Jury instructions - Competency hearing - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Excessive sentence
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 01-22-2009
Appealed from: Warren County Circuit Court
Judge: Frank G. Vollor
Disposition: Convicted of Armed Robbery and Sentenced to Thirty Years in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
District Attorney: Richard Earl Smith, Jr.
Case Number: 07,0351 CRV(3)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Clayton Trammell




PRO SE



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND  

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    Topic: Armed robbery - Motion to suppress - Weight of evidence - Jury instructions - Competency hearing - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Excessive sentence

    Summary of the Facts: Clayton Trammell was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to thirty years. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Motion to suppress Trammell argues that the gun should have been suppressed because it was not specifically listed in the search warrant and was not in plain view. Under the plain-view doctrine, the police may make a warrantless seizure when the officer is lawfully in a position to view an object; the object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and the officer has a lawful right of access to the object. Property which has a sufficient nexus to the crime being investigated may be seized at the time officers are properly executing a warrant authorizing a search for other items. During the suppression hearing in this case, Officer Brown testified that when he opened the closet door, he noticed some articles of clothing on the shelf above where other clothing articles were hanging. Upon inspecting the items, Officer Brown located a gun. Based upon the evidence in the record, Officer Brown was lawfully on the premises. Officer Brown was entitled to make reasonable inspection of places where the items identified in the search warrant may have been hidden, and the living-room closet was such a location. Having discovered the gun, it was reasonable for Officer Brown to believe, under the circumstances of the investigation, that the gun had evidentiary value. Issue 2: Weight of evidence Trammell argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence because the victim: did not see Trammell brandish a gun during the robbery, did not testify that she was in fear for her life, and did not testify that Trammell threatened her during the robbery. Trammell also argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proof showing that he had actual knowledge of the gun used in the robbery which was found at his mother’s residence. The victim testified that when Trammell presented her with the demand note, which indicated that Trammell had a gun, she complied by giving him “the whole bag of money” belonging to the Piggly Wiggly store. And she testified that Trammell’s actions placed her in fear for her life. The fact that she never saw a weapon is of no matter. The gun was introduced into evidence at trial during Officer Brown’s testimony for the jury’s consideration that Trammell possessed the means to commit the crime of armed robbery, as represented by the note he displayed to the victim. The respective testimonies presented factual questions for the jury’s determination as to whether the gun found at Trammell’s place of residence was connected to the robbery of the Piggly Wiggly. Thus, the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the State’s evidence. Issue 3: Jury instructions Trammell argues that he was denied an opportunity to present a defense jury instruction on his theory of the case and that the jury instructions given were not adequate and misled the jury. Although a criminal defendant is entitled to present jury instructions which support his theory of the case, that entitlement is limited in that the trial court may properly refuse instructions which are cumulative, incorrectly state the law, or are fairly covered by other jury instructions. An elements instruction was properly denied as being cumulative. A circumstantial-evidence instruction was properly denied, because eyewitness testimony constitutes direct evidence. A form-of-the-verdict instruction, which included directions for the form of the verdict on two additional counts on which Trammell had been indicted, was properly refused since Trammell was granted a directed verdict on both of these counts. Issue 4: Competency hearing Trammell argues that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to conduct a hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Trammell’s defense counsel filed a motion for appointment of a psychiatrist to conduct a psychiatric evaluation. But the motion was never pursued to a decision. A movant is charged with the duty of pursuing a motion through to a hearing for a decision. Issue 5: Ineffective assistance of counsel The bulk of Trammell’s allegations of ineffective assistance involve alleged inaction by defense counsel based on matters outside the record. And the record does not affirmatively show ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions. Therefore, Trammell’s ineffective assistance-of-counsel claim is dismissed without prejudice so that he may pursue it in a post-conviction proceeding if he chooses. Issue 6: Sentence Trammell argues that his thirty-year sentence is effectively a life sentence which requires reversal because the jury did not recommend a life sentence. When a jury does not recommend a life sentence on a conviction for armed robbery, the trial court’s imposition of a sentence is proper where the trial court takes into consideration the defendant’s life expectancy and all the relevant facts necessary to fix a sentence for a definite term of years reasonably expected to be less than life. Here, the trial court consulted two different actuarial tables of life expectancy before imposing Trammell’s thirty-year sentence. The trial court made a record and considered all the relevant factors necessary to determine Trammell’s sentence, which the record supports as being reasonably less than life.


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