Lenard v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-KA-01930-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-11-2011 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Felony child deprivation - Section 97-5-39(1)(b) - Mens rea - Duty to provide medical care - Reasonable parent standard - Defense of mistake-of-fact Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J, Myers, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ. Roberts and Maxwell, JJ., Concur in Part and in the Result. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-16-2008 Appealed from: Panola County Circuit Court Judge: James McClure, III Disposition: Convicted of Felony Child Deprivation and Sentenced to Five Years in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections District Attorney: John W. Champion Case Number: CR2008-4MP2 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Amy Marie Lenard |
RALPH STEWART GUERNSEY |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE MCCRORY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Felony child deprivation - Section 97-5-39(1)(b) - Mens rea - Duty to provide medical care - Reasonable parent standard - Defense of mistake-of-fact |
| Summary of the Facts: | Amy Lenard was convicted of felony child deprivation and was sentenced to five years, with two years suspended. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The State argues that the felony offense of child deprivation contains no burden of proof to show any requisite intent on behalf of the parent to deprive a child of a necessity, such as medical care. The State bases this argument on the language of the charged statute, section 97-5-39(1)(b), which prohibits a parent from willfully committing any act, or omitting the performance of any duty, which thereby deprives a child of medical care. The State argues that Lenard was not prosecuted for an intentional act even though the indictment charges Lenard with “wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously” depriving her child of necessary health care. The State further argues that if a parent omits his or her duty of providing medical care, then the offense of deprivation is thereby established by strict liability criminal responsibility, without regard to whether the parent knew or should have known to act. The error of the State’s argument lies in the legal meaning of the term “deprivation” as used in this statute, and the mens rea required to prove breach of parental duty. A duty to provide medical care by a parent arises if a reasonably prudent parent would have known medical care was warranted. The determination of whether a reasonably prudent parent would have known that medical care was required under the same or similar circumstances necessarily entails an element of proof as to mens rea, which requires a showing of either a knowing breach of parental duty based upon the circumstances of this case, or negligent breach of parental duty. Thus, with respect to mens rea, this case requires a determination by the jury of whether a duty existed herein in light of what a reasonably prudent parent under the same or similar circumstances knew or should have known. The logic of the State’s argument of strict liability criminal responsibility bypasses a determination of the existence of negligence or willfulness. This determination of negligence requires that, under these particular circumstances in which Lenard’s son was burned by hot water, a reasonably prudent parent would have known earlier that medical treatment above and beyond the antibiotic salve and the burn gel was needed, and whether in light of the facts of this case, that Lenard knowingly omitted or neglected her duty by failing to act as a reasonably prudent parent by improperly delaying seeking medical care for her son. Although Lenard’s former boyfriend was supervising Lenard’s son when he was burned, the jury must nonetheless determine whether Lenard breached her parental duty based upon what Lenard knew or should have known based upon the reasonable parent standard. To prove the offense of felony deprivation, the State must prove that the acts or omissions were negligent or intentional. Therefore, this offense does not constitute strict liability. The charge of deprivation intrinsically requires a neglectful or intentional breach of parental duty, such as the withholding of medical care where a duty exists to provide such care, as alleged herein. To determine if the omission resulted from negligence, the jury must determine if the parent knew or should have known of a duty to act, i.e., provide medical care, and whether the parent breached that duty. To prove felony deprivation, with respect to mens rea, the State must show that Lenard acted negligently, knowingly, or acted intentionally in failing to obtain medical care for her son sooner. The State must show some awareness by the parent of the need of the child, or the parent’s duty to act. The mistake-of-fact defense applies to offenses wherein some knowledge of the accused or felonious mens rea is at issue. This theory provides Lenard a potentially viable defense for violation of the child deprivation statute. The State incorrectly claims that the burden of proof contains no mens rea or intent requirement in its assertion that the defense of mistake-of-fact is inapplicable. Jurisprudence allows Lenard to assert a defense theory based upon a mistake-of-fact defense for the offense charged herein – felony child deprivation, if reasonably raised by the evidence. The circuit court found that the evidence failed to support the defense’s request for the mistake-of-fact instruction. However, a review of the record shows that sufficient evidence does exist to raise the instruction as to whether Lenard knew or should have known that the non-prescription topical medication that she applied to her son’s burns constituted insufficient medical treatment for his injury, and if so, whether she knowingly delayed seeking further medical treatment from medical professionals. The merits of Lenard’s defense theory should be before a properly instructed jury to determine. Lenard could assert alternative defense theories that included claiming that the burn gel caused the injuries, as well as the theory that she mistakenly believed that the burn gel constituted appropriate medical care for the burn. These theories assert separate and distinct defenses. The failure of the circuit court to allow her alternative theory to be considered by the jury resulted in error. The combined effect of the denial of both instructions relating to intent resulted in reversible error and materially prejudiced Lenard’s ability to present her defense to the jury for consideration. |
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