Miss. State Federation of Colored Women's Club Housing for the Elderly in Clinton, Inc. v. In re L.R., a minor child
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00508-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-16-2010 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: On Direct Appeal: Reversed and Remanded. On Cross-Appeal: Reversed and Remanded. Appellant and appellees taxed with costs of appeal. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Motions in limine - Evidence of consent to rape - Evidence of prior sexual molestation - M.R.E. 412 - Economic cost of raising child - Expert testimony - Emotional distress - Apportionment of fault - Additur Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson, P.J., Dickinson and Lamar, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Waller, C.J., and Graves, P.J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Kitchens, J., Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part With Separate Written Opinion. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-20-2008 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: WILLIAM F. COLEMAN Disposition: A jury established L.R.’s total damages to be $200,000. The jury separately allocated fault: forty percent to Federation and sixty percent to her father. The trial court entered final judgment against Federation for $80,000 on June 20, 2008. Following post-trial motions, by order dated October 31, 2008, the trial court assessed fault entirely to Federation and ordered additur of $800,000 to the $200,000 total damages assessed by the jury, contingent upon acceptance. Judgment was then entered against Federation for $1,000,000. Neither party agreed to the additur. Case Number: 251-02-884-CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Mississippi State Federation of Colored Women's Club Housing for the Elderly in Clinton, Inc. d/b/a Federation Tower and Southland Management Corporation |
MICHAEL WAYNE BAXTER, ANDY LOWRY, WALKER REECE GIBSON |
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| Appellee: | In the Interest of L. R., a Minor Child by and Through her Mother and Next Friend, and her Mother, Individually | JAMES ASHLEY OGDEN, JAMES W. SMITH, JR. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Motions in limine - Evidence of consent to rape - Evidence of prior sexual molestation - M.R.E. 412 - Economic cost of raising child - Expert testimony - Emotional distress - Apportionment of fault - Additur |
| Summary of the Facts: | L.R. was impregnated after being raped at Federation Tower, an apartment building where her father lived. Her parents brought suit, individually and on behalf of L.R., against the building owner, Mississippi State Federation of Colored Women’s Club Housing for the Elderly in Clinton, Inc. d/b/a Federation Tower; and the apartment management company, Southern Management Corporation. A jury established L.R.’s total damages to be $200,000. The jury separately allocated fault: forty percent to Federation and sixty percent to her father. The trial court entered final judgment against Federation for $80,000. Following post-trial motions, the trial court assessed fault entirely to Federation and ordered additur of $800,000 to the $200,000 total damages assessed by the jury, contingent upon acceptance. Judgment was then entered against Federation for $1,000,000. Neither party agreed to the additur. Federation appeals, and L.R. cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motions in limine L.R. argued pretrial that evidence of consent was barred by criminal statute. The trial court rejected this argument and denied the motion. In her arguments post-trial and on appeal, L.R. added a hearsay argument. Federation argues that the criminal statute is irrelevant to this civil suit and the hearsay argument comes too late and is not supported in the record. Criminal statutes do not control evidentiary rulings in a civil trial, absent authority within the rules themselves. There being no such exception, the Rules of Civil Procedure control admissibility of evidence in this civil trial. The record does not support L.R.’s hearsay argument. Some jurisdictions have adopted a per se civil-liability rule that would prevent a trier-of-fact from considering consent. Other jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff's consent is relevant in civil proceedings and that the defendant may introduce evidence and cross-examine the plaintiff regarding this issue. Others go further and hold it fundamentally unfair to permit a civil litigant to obtain money damages while preventing the trier-of-fact from considering relevant evidence regarding damages and credibility. All can agree that L.R. suffered injury as a proximate result of the criminal acts of Tony Kelly, a nonparty. The jury found Federation liable, an issue not appealed. The acts and conduct surrounding the crimes were relevant to Federation’s defense that it was not negligent and to prove that others’ fault led to the plaintiff’s damages. The trial judge was correct when he found that consent was not pertinent to the duty owed by the landowner, for rape was committed on the premises. Thus, he properly allowed the evidence and instructed the jury to determine whose conduct proximately caused L.R.’s injury and the nature and extent of L.R.’s damages. The jury heard conflicting testimony that L.R. not only called Kelly, but let him enter a back (or side) door to the building, as opposed to L.R.’s assertion that Kelly entered an unlocked door and subsequently threatened bodily harm to her father. Federation argues that it was within the exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the rape and accompanying claim of threats of violence to her father were less psychologically damaging. It was within the jury’s exclusive province to reject L.R.’s claim of being unable to have sex after these encounters, based on evidence presented at trial. L.R. also argued pretrial that evidence of prior sexual molestation should be excluded, as it violated M.R.E. 412. In her post-trial motion and on appeal, she adds relevance arguments. L.R. failed to argue the issue, cite relevant authority, or overcome the presumption of a correct decision. Also, the evidence here was relevant. The jury received the testimony of L.R.’s psychiatric expert that the prior molestation had not harmed her and that all of her psychiatric problems had resulted from Kelly’s actions. However, the jury was not bound by this testimony. Credibility and weight accorded to expert testimony, like all witness testimony, is a decision for the jury. Issue 2: Economic cost of raising child L.R. argues that it was error to exclude testimony on the cost of raising her child. The admissibility of testimony related to the costs of raising a child is matter of first impression for this State. The overwhelmingly prevailing rule in other jurisdictions is that a child is not damage. Even if it were otherwise, the benefits of having a child – a value impossible to determine – would have to be deducted from the award. Issue 3: Expert testimony L.R. argues that preventing her expert witness from repeating what L.R. had told her was a violation of the expert-witness rules. L.R. was not prejudiced by the trial court’s sustaining Federation’s objections. Even if the trial court had allowed the expert to testify to the specifics of L.R’s version of events, it would have been cumulative evidence. Further, the expert was allowed to testify that L.R. had “made a credible disclosure of rape.” Issue 4: Emotional distress Federation successfully argued at trial that the mother’s claims of the consequences of emotional distress (untreated headaches, stomachaches, and insomnia) did not meet the standard set by caselaw. Here, the trial court considered the bystander-liability issue but in the end decided that proof of damages to support the mother’s claim was lacking. As the trial court’s decision was in accord with precedent and consistent with the testimony offered at trial, there was no error in granting a directed verdict regarding L.R.’s mother’s claim of emotional distress. Issue 5: Apportionment of fault The parties dispute whether allocation of fault to a parent is barred. Federation argues that application of parental-immunity cases, which predate the comparative-fault era, is not justified. L.R. argues the parental-immunity bar extends to allocation of fault. At trial, the court allowed allocation, rejecting L.R.’s argument then presented, i.e., allocation to anyone other than the named defendants was improper, based on L.R.’s testimony (which was disputed) that all sexual encounters occurred in the public areas of the building. Post-trial, the trial court reversed itself, not for the legal reason now being presented, but on a factual basis, i.e., lack of evidence. Although a basis existed for the trial court to reverse itself on allocation of fault, no legal or factual basis existed for the trial court to substitute its opinion for that of a unanimous jury that determined L.R.’s total damages to be $200,000. Unless other error justified a new trial, the jury verdict should stand fast. Issue 6: Additur L.R. argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial and in ordering an additur, which was, in the alternative, the relief sought. The trial court was not in error for denying a new trial, as a new trial was not warranted. The trial court’s additur order includes no findings of fact. The record reveals that the trial court expressed shock at the amount of the award, but the trial court failed to make a finding that the jury was influenced by bias, passion, or prejudice; or that the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. A finding of one of these is a prerequisite to setting aside a jury verdict. Thus, the court abused its discretion. |
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