Ladner v. Ladner


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-02110-COA
Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-14-2010
Opinion Author: Irving, J.
Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, remanded.
Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Adultery - Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Periodic alimony - Attorney's fees
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, P.J.
Dissenting Author : Carlton, J., dissents with separate written opinion.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-13-2009
Appealed from: Hancock County Chancery Court
Judge: Sanford Steckler
Disposition: AWARDED HUSBAND DIVORCE ON GROUND OF ADULTERY, AWARDED WIFE A DIVORCE ON THE GROUND OF CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT, DIVIDED THE MARITAL ASSETS, AWARDED WIFE PERIODIC ALIMONY, AND AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case Number: C2301-06-00351(3)
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Philip Wayne Ladner, Sr.




 J. RICHARD KANUCH



  
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief
    		•
    Appellee: Deborah Ladner ROBERT H. KOON  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Divorce: Adultery - Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Periodic alimony - Attorney's fees
    Summary of the Facts: Philip Ladner Sr. and Deborah Ladner each filed for a divorce. Deborah asserted that Philip had subjected her to habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, while Philip filed a counterclaim for divorce on the ground of adultery. The chancery court granted Philip and Deborah each a divorce on their respective fault grounds. The court then divided the marital estate, emancipated the Ladner’s minor child, granted Deborah alimony, and ordered Philip to pay part of Deborah’s attorney’s fees. Philip appeals.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment Philip argues that the chancellor erred in finding that Deborah proved that she had been subjected to habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The party alleging cruel and inhuman treatment typically must corroborate the testimony. The corroborated testimony must show conduct that endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering it impossible for the other spouse to discharge the duties of the marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance. Deborah provided evidence in the form of her own testimony that Philip had been abusive and had assaulted her. Deborah also offered two police reports and two protective orders into evidence. However, as the chancery court correctly noted, those documents had no corroborative value, as all of the information on them was provided by Deborah. The only other evidence that was offered was a statement on one of the police reports that Philip Jr. was afraid of his father and Philip’s testimony that he had broken his daughter’s door once in anger. Neither of these are sufficient to corroborate Deborah’s testimony about the alleged abuse against her. As such, there was not enough credible evidence for the chancellor to grant Deborah a divorce on the basis of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Issue 2: Periodic alimony Philip argues that the chancery court erred in granting Deborah periodic alimony, because Deborah failed to prove that she had been subjected to habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Although the chancery court erred in granting a divorce as to habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, fault is only one ground that is considered under the Armstrong factors. It is clear from the chancery court’s judgment that it adequately considered the other factors for granting alimony and found that alimony is justified. Most significantly, the chancery court found that Philip makes approximately four times as much as Deborah, and Deborah is in poor health compared to Philip. Thus, there was no error. Issue 3: Attorney’s fees Philip argues that the chancery court erred in ordering Philip to pay Deborah’s attorney’s fees because she is able to pay them. The chancery court did not make any specific finding as to Deborah’s inability to pay her attorney’s fees. Therefore, this issue is remanded.


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