Roberson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-00847-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-00847-COA ; 2009-CT-00847-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-07-2010 Opinion Author: Irving, J. Holding: The judgment of the Circuit Court of Washington County of conviction of sexual battery of a child under eighteen by a person in a position of authority and trust and sentence of twenty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with twenty years to serve and five years of post-release supervision, is affirmed. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual battery - Suppression of statement - Victim's prior sexual conduct - M.R.E. 412 - Youth court records - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Weight of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Carlton, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Maxwell, J., concurs in part and in the result without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-20-2009 Appealed from: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Richard Smith Disposition: CONVICTED OF SEXUAL BATTERY OF A CHILD BY A PERSON IN A POSITION OF TRUST OR AUTHORITY AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH TWENTY YEARS TO SERVE AND FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION District Attorney: WILLIE DEWAYNE RICHARDSON Case Number: 2007-370 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Benjamin Roberson |
GEORGE T. HOLMES |
|
|
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Sexual battery - Suppression of statement - Victim's prior sexual conduct - M.R.E. 412 - Youth court records - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Weight of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Benjamin Roberson was convicted of sexual battery of a child by a person in a position of trust or authority over the child. He was sentenced to twenty-five years, with twenty years to serve and five years of post-release supervision. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Suppression of statement Roberson argues that the circuit court erred when it refused to suppress the inculpatory statement that Roberson gave to two officers. Roberson’s argument fails for several reasons. First, as the circuit court found, Roberson was not “in custody” when he gave his statement to police. In Mississippi, the right to counsel attaches only once an individual is “in custody.” Roberson voluntarily came to the police station; in fact, Roberson made the initial contact with the police. Roberson was accompanied to the police station by his girlfriend and her son. He was questioned in an officer’s office, not in an interrogation room. The questioning lasted for approximately two hours, during which time Roberson was not physically restrained or prevented from leaving in any way. Roberson was not searched prior to the interview, and he, in fact, retained possession of a cellular telephone that he used to send text messages during the meeting. Roberson testified that the text messages concerned going out to eat with his girlfriend and her son after the interview. It is clear that Roberson was making plans for the immediate future that did not include being arrested. Although Roberson questioned whether he needed an attorney, the officers told him that he would have to make that decision, and Roberson then continued to talk to the officers. Even had Roberson been in custody, the circuit court would not have been in error for finding his statement admissible under these circumstances. Although the officers indicated that they discussed procedural issues with Roberson, such as where he might be housed and when he might be arrested, both officers were adamant that they never promised Roberson anything in return for his confession. Issue 2: M.R.E. 412 Roberson argues that the court erred in denying his M.R.E. 412 motion to use evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct. There was no error with the circuit court’s decision. First, as pointed out by the circuit court, Roberson failed to make any offer of proof as to a prior false sexual allegation. It is clear that evidence of any of the victim’s prior sexual conduct would not fall under any other exception in Rule 412. Although there was some evidence of a prior sexual encounter with someone else, Roberson utterly failed to prove that Jane had made a false allegation of prior sexual contact with that person. Furthermore, even if Roberson had made a proper offer of proof, the circuit court was entitled to deny the motion on the basis of its untimeliness and Roberson’s failure to serve the notice on the victim. Although a Rule 412 motion can be filed later than fifteen days before trial where there is newly-discovered evidence, Roberson failed to show that the motion was filed on May 4 due to newly-discovered evidence. Issue 3: Youth court records Roberson filed an ex parte motion in the circuit court requesting that the circuit court compel the youth court to release its records related to the victim. Ultimately, the circuit court ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to compel the youth court to release its records. The circuit court found that Roberson would have to petition the youth court to release the records to the circuit court for an in camera inspection. The circuit court then delayed the trial in order to give Roberson time to petition the youth court. It is clear that the records were not released to Roberson by the trial date, and the trial proceeded. Roberson now argues that the circuit court erred in not compelling the youth court to release its records. Resolution of this issue is complicated by two facts. First, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the victim had falsely accused anyone in a prior sexual encounter. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the State was aware of any such conduct on the part of the victim and, therefore, was under a duty to voluntarily disclose any such information to Roberson. Second, Roberson did not timely seek assistance from the circuit court. Roberson’s Sixth Amendment right to a vigorous cross-examination of his accuser trumps any state statutory protection granted the victim as a youthful offender. Consequently, a circuit judge presiding over a defendant’s criminal trial where there is a serious allegation that the prosecuting witness may have falsely accused another under circumstances similar to those presented in the instant trial is not powerless to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights, if those rights are impacted by a youth court’s failure or refusal to produce relevant records. However, Rule 412 provides a procedural framework that must be complied with as prerequisite to the exercise of that right against a victim of a sex crime. Roberson failed to comply with the provisions of the rule. Roberson’s Rule 412 motion did not contain any allegation that the victim previously had falsely accused an individual of a sexual encounter with her, nor was the motion served on the State and the victim at least fifteen days prior to trial, as required by the rule. Therefore, even if the youth court had produced, either voluntarily or by compulsion, the victim’s records, Roberson still would have not been able to use them because he failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 412. Issue 4: Ineffective assistance of counsel Roberson argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel waited until May 4 to file his Rule 412 notice. Roberson also complains that his trial counsel failed to obtain the victim’s youth court records. M.R.A.P. 22(b) provides that issues which may be raised in post-conviction proceedings may also be raised on direct appeal if such issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. Where the factual basis for an issue is not fully apparent, a defendant has the right to raise the issue during post-conviction proceedings. During post-conviction proceedings, Roberson may be able to introduce the youth court records to show what additional benefit they would have provided to him. Roberson’s trial counsel will also be available to testify about counsel’s trial strategies. Issue 5: Weight of evidence Roberson argues that the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support his conviction, because the victim’s testimony was hopelessly contradictory and his confession was not voluntary. The discrepancy in the victim’s testimony as to the exact location of the assault was questioned during her cross-examination by Roberson’s attorney. As to the differences between Roberson’s confession and the victim’s account of what happened, the jury heard both Roberson’s confession and the victim’s testimony. The jury is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Several common points of what happened were shared by both Roberson’s confession and the victim: that Roberson sexually assaulted the victim, that he did so near a levee in Washington County, and that he did so during the time when he took her into custody after her mother had called the police. Whether the assault occurred on the way to or from the police department and the exact location of the assault were not consistently testified to. Given the conflicting evidence, it was the jury’s prerogative to determine what actually happened between the victim and Roberson. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
