Anderson v. State


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Docket Number: 2009-KA-00968-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-07-2010
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Arson - Sufficiency of evidence - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 404(b) - Prosecutorial misconduct
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-12-2009
Appealed from: Lamar County Circuit Court
Judge: R.I. PRICHARD III
Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT II, ARSON, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS, WITH THE SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO A PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED SENTENCE, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND TO PAY RESTITUTION OF $136,391
District Attorney: HALDON J. KITTRELL
Case Number: 2003-K-428P

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Charles Anderson




HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE MCCRORY  

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Topic: Arson - Sufficiency of evidence - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 404(b) - Prosecutorial misconduct

Summary of the Facts: Charles Anderson was convicted of arson and sentenced to twenty years. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Anderson argues that the jury verdict was against the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The fact arson was committed was undisputed; the only question was who did it – Anderson or Shelton. The State provided sufficient proof to convict Anderson. Gas was not detected on Shelton, but three people smelled it on Anderson. The State’s expert witnesses all testified that the fire could not have been started as Anderson stated, and Shelton would have been badly burned, but he was not. It is ultimately the jury that resolves any conflicts in the evidence. Anderson had a motive for arson as well, and the evidence showed he lured Shelton to his home in order to purchase tapes of Shelton’s wife having an affair. Issue 2: Ineffective assistance of counsel Anderson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons. Usually, because the record on direct appeal is insufficient to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, it is best that these claims be brought in post-conviction-relief proceedings. However, the reviewing court may address an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if the presented issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. Anderson first claims that at trial, his counsel was deficient for failing to renew his objection or make a motion to strike certain parts of a witness’s testimony on direct examination about where the fire was ignited and where Anderson said Shelton was standing. Trial counsel did promptly object when he thought the State was going to refer to the un-Mirandized statement that had not been recorded. His performance was not deficient in this regard. Anderson relatedly complains that his trial counsel should not have entered the case summary into evidence during his cross-examination of the witness because “[t]he statement was clearly taken in violation of Anderson’s Miranda rights.” However, Anderson’s statement that the witness references in the case summary cannot be said to be un-Mirandized. On cross-examination, defense counsel also requested the entire case summary be read to the jury and entered into evidence. Anderson contends this was constitutionally ineffective as well, for the statement contained other prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay statements. However, it is quite plausible Anderson’s trial counsel entered the case summary into evidence in order to show that Shelton lit the fire. Anderson also argues that his trial counsel was deficient for stipulating to the admission of the fire investigator’s report, which contained language about a previous residential fire loss by Anderson. Anderson argues that this evidence is inadmissible under M.R.E. 403 and 404(b). Anderson’s trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient for failing to redact the two sentences in the report. Even though the jury asked about this information, they were properly instructed by the trial judge to disregard the previous fire loss. The record does not indicate that Anderson’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective at any point in the proceedings. Issue 3: Prosecutorial misconduct Anderson argues that he was denied his fundamental rights to due process and a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. Anderson claims the State’s use of prejudicial evidence that had been previously ruled inadmissible evinces a purposeful trial tactic to inflame the jury. A case will be reversed only if such conduct endangers the fairness of a trial and the impartial administration of justice. There are no such instances here. While the lengthy report did include two sentences about a previous fire loss of Anderson’s, which was to have been excluded from the evidence, there is no indication the State agreed to its admission to inflame the jury. When the jury asked about the previous fire loss during deliberations, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard it.


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