Rainey v. Grand Casinos, Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01577-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-23-2010 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Service of process - Lack of ownership and control - Amended complaint - M.R.C.P. 15(c) - M.R.C.P. 9(h) - M.R.C.P. 4(h) Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Carlton, J. concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-10-2009 Appealed from: TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Al Smith Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED FOR APPELLEES Case Number: 2007-201 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Delfenia Rainey |
RALPH STEWART GUERNSEY, THOMAS UPTON REYNOLDS II |
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| Appellee: | Grand Casinos, Inc., Caesars Entertainment, Inc. and Harrah's Operating Company | ROBERT LEWIS MOORE | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Service of process - Lack of ownership and control - Amended complaint - M.R.C.P. 15(c) - M.R.C.P. 9(h) - M.R.C.P. 4(h) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Delfenia Rainey filed her original complaint for negligence on July 30, 2007, naming Grand Casinos, Inc., Caesars Entertainment, Inc., and Harrah’s Operating Company as defendants. In their answer, the defendants countered that they “are foreign corporations licensed to do business within the State of Mississippi, but who do not and never have done business as the Grand Casino and Hotel in Tunica, Mississippi.” Discovery then proceeded. Nearly two years after Rainey had filed her complaint, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 1, 2009, arguing that none of the defendants owned or operated what was formerly called the Grand Casino Tunica at the time of the incident and that Rainey had sued the wrong entity; thus, the defendants could not be liable. On July 22, 2009, Rainey filed her supplemental response, a motion to amend her complaint under M.R.C.P. 15(c), and an amended complaint, omitting the named defendants and naming “BL Development, Inc. D/B/A Grand Casino” as the sole defendant. The court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment. Rainey filed a motion to amend or vacate the summary judgment because, due to a clerical error, Rainey’s supplemental brief had only been sent to the defendants, and not to the judge. On September 14, 2009, the circuit court issued a supplemental order, explaining that it had now considered Rainey’s supplemental brief, affirmed its grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and denied Rainey’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The circuit court also found that the statute of limitations had expired; thus, the court could not allow the amended complaint to relate back under Rule 15(c); therefore, Rainey’s attempt to name a new defendant was procedurally barred. Rainey appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Rainey raises the issue of whether the circuit court improperly dismissed the case upon granting summary judgment, but he also relates this issue to the failure of service of process on the proper defendant, BL Development Corporation. However, failure of service of process is not at issue before this Court; the issue was not raised before the circuit court and was not a basis for summary judgment. In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that they did not own or operate what was formerly called the Grand Casino Tunica at the time of the incident; thus, Rainey had sued the wrong entity, and the defendants could not be liable. Attached to their motion was an affidavit by a representative of Harrah’s Operating Company, stating that at no time have the three named corporate defendants owned or operated the casino property described in Rainey’s complaint. It was not until the defendants filed their supplemental reply to Rainey’s response to the summary-judgment motion, providing the name of the proper defendant, BL Development Corporation, that Rainey filed a proposed amended complaint which excluded the original three defendants and named BL Development Corporation as sole defendant. There is no genuine issue of material fact in the record regarding whether Rainey sued the wrong defendants. The defendants met their burden of proof by providing sufficient evidence that they lacked ownership and control over the Grand Casino Tunica and that BL Development Corporation, and not the three named defendants, was “doing business as” the Grand Casino Tunica. Thus, there was no error in the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the three originally named defendants. The circuit court incorrectly stated that there was no motion to amend the complaint and thus it did not rule upon the motion in its order. However, the record shows Rainey did file a motion to amend her complaint under Rule 15(c) on July 22, 2009, along with a proposed amended complaint and a supplemental response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Rainey’s motion to amend the complaint was filed before the circuit court’s ruling on summary judgment was entered. As such, it is necessary to remand this case for a ruling on Rainey’s motion to amend her complaint. When an amended complaint changes a named defendant, as is the case here, three requirements must be met: the claim in the amended complaint must arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as that set forth in the original complaint; the newly-named defendant must have received notice of the action within the 120 days in M.R.C.P. 4(h); and, the newly-named defendant must have or should have known that an action would be brought against him within the 120 days unless a mistake existed as to the parties' identities. Rainey makes several arguments regarding how these factors were met, such as the original and amended defendant corporations having the same officers, the same ownership of stock, and interlocking boards. However, the record is insufficient to determine whether the motion to amend is proper under the factors of Rule 15(c). The circuit court stated that if an amended complaint is filed after the statute of limitations has run, regardless of when the motion to amend is made, the statute of limitations bars the newly named defendants, and the circuit court cannot allow the amended complaint to “relate back.” This is incorrect, for this is exactly the situation Rule 15(c) was designed to prevent. If the factors under Rule 15(c) are met, then the amended complaint will “relate back” to the date of the original complaint and not be barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court also stated that Rainey was not “reasonably diligent” in trying to ascertain the proper defendants as required by Rule 9(h) and Rule 15. Rainey’s amended complaint does not fall under Rule 9(h). Rule 9(h) is for “fictitious parties” and allows pleadings to be amended when a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in his pleading. In order for Rule 9(h) to apply, there must be a substitution of a true party name for a fictitious one. That is not the case here. Rainey’s amended complaint does not fall under Rule 9(h) because she named no fictitious parties in her original complaint that she wished to substitute with BL Development Corporation. Rainey sought to change the already named defendants, which falls under Rule 15(c). |
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