Dillon v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-CP-01228-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-CP-01228-COA ; 2009-CT-01228-SCT ; 2009-CT-01228-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-23-2010 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Voluntariness of plea - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Right to appeal - Competency hearing - URCCC 9.06 - Alford plea Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-24-2009 Appealed from: LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: David H. Strong Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED Case Number: 2009-066-LS |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Lawanda Dillon |
PRO SE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Voluntariness of plea - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Right to appeal - Competency hearing - URCCC 9.06 - Alford plea |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lawanda Dillon pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty years, with six years suspended and five years of post-release supervision. She filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was denied. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Voluntariness of plea Dillon argues that facing the possibility of a life sentence if she went to trial on the charge of murder destroyed her ability to think and balance the risk and benefits of going to trial and therefore, her plea was not voluntarily or intelligently given. While a defendant is free to collaterally attack a guilty plea, there is a strong presumption of validity to solemn declarations made in open court. At the plea hearing, the circuit court thoroughly explained to Dillon what rights she would be waiving and her possible sentence. Then, when asked if she understood the waiver of rights and possible sentence, Dillon said stated that she did. Thus, Dillon’s guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently given. Issue 2: Ineffective assistance of counsel Dillon argues that her defense counsel conspired with the State to assist in securing a guilty plea by using a frivolous indictment for murder. She also argues that counsel’s failure to investigate and interview witnesses, who would have given mitigating circumstances that Dillon was acting in self-defense, was ineffective assistance, and that defense counsel should have submitted a motion for a competency hearing. Nothing in the record indicates that the indictment against Dillon was frivolous and meant to coerce a guilty plea for manslaughter from Dillon. It is undisputed that Dillon ran over the victim multiple times with her car, causing his death. There were witnesses available to testify at trial that Dillon’s actions were perceived to be deliberate. The State’s reason for agreeing to the lesser charge of manslaughter was not because the evidence did not support a murder charge; rather, it was because the State was concerned that a jury might be partial to Dillon due to the history of abuse that she had suffered from the victim. Dillon fails to show how counsel’s actions in not presenting mitigating testimony from witnesses resulted in any prejudice or how this testimony would have altered the outcome. Also, there was no evidence presented that Dillon was incompetent to enter a guilty plea. Issue 3: Right to appeal Dillon argues that the circuit judge was obligated to inform her that she had the right to appeal her sentence. However, a circuit court is not required to inform a defendant who pleads guilty of his right to appeal the resultant sentence. Issue 4: Competency hearing Dillon argues that the circuit court had a duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding her mental and emotional well-being, prior to accepting her guilty plea. The key phrase in URCCC 9.06 in determining whether a competency hearing is required is “reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent.” The circuit judge is in the best position to view the evidence and to observe the demeanor and behavior of the defendant. Dillon offered no evidence at her plea hearing that she was incompetent. The circuit judge asked Dillon if she understood the rights that she was waiving and her possible sentence; Dillon stated that she understood. The circuit court specifically asked Dr. Lott if Dillon was considered sane under the M’Naughten test, and Dr. Lott answered affirmatively. He stated that Dillon had no problem distinguishing between right and wrong. Dillon’s expert also indicated that Dillon was competent to stand trial. Thus, there was no “reasonable ground” presented that Dillon was incompetent to enter her guilty plea. Issue 5: Alford plea At the plea hearing, Dillon entered an Alford guilty plea as she contended that she could not remember the events leading up to the murder. An “ Alford plea” is also known as a “best-interest” guilty plea. The circuit court, in questioning Dillon and her defense counsel, sufficiently ascertained that Dillon entered her Alford plea with a full understanding that it was in her best interest to do so. |
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