Anderson v. ALPS Auto., Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2009-IA-00987-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-IA-00987-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-18-2010 Opinion Author: Kitchens, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Amendment of complaint - Timely substitution of fictitious defendant - M.R.C.P. 9(h) - M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-29-2009 Appealed from: LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Michael M. Taylor Disposition: The trial judge allowed the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, he subsequently granted ALPS’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the nine-and-a-half-month delay was unreasonable. Case Number: 2006-052LT |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Janis Anderson, Individually, and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Jesse J. Anderson, Jr., Deceased |
PATRICIA LOVERNE BEALE, PAUL T. BENTON, JOHN WINCIE LEE, JR., MICHAEL JACOB SHEMPER |
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| Appellee: | ALPS Automotive, Inc. | BRENDA B. BETHANY, EDWARD M. KRONK, J. WYATT HAZARD | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Amendment of complaint - Timely substitution of fictitious defendant - M.R.C.P. 9(h) - M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Following an automobile accident, Janis Anderson filed suit for her injuries and for the wrongful death of her husband, Jesse Anderson, Jr., against General Motors Corporation, Stan King Chevrolet, Inc., and two fictitious defendants, alleging product liability, strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Nearly two years after filing her complaint, Anderson learned that ALPS Automotive, Inc., had manufactured a key component of an airbag that she contended had failed to deploy properly. However, she did not seek leave to substitute ALPS for one of the fictitious defendants until nine-and-a-half months after she had discovered ALPS’s identity. Although the trial judge allowed the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, he subsequently granted ALPS’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the nine-and-a-half-month delay was unreasonable. The Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for interlocutory appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Anderson argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating that she failed to use reasonable diligence in amending her complaint by waiting nine-and-a-half months from the date she learned that ALPS had manufactured the clockspring before seeking leave to amend her complaint. The phrase “when his true name is discovered” in M.R.C.P. 9(h) suggests that an immediate amendment of the complaint is required properly and timely to substitute a true defendant for the fictitiously named defendant. Under M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2), a proper amendment pursuant to Rule 9(h) will relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. The plaintiff in the present case must have made a “proper” amendment to avoid the running of the statute of limitations regarding ALPS. Anderson acted consistently with Rule 9(h) by filing her original complaint against two known defendants and two fictitious defendants. Anderson described ABC, Inc., and XYZ, Inc., as “fictitiou[s] defendants sued because the identities of all entities involved in the design, manufacture, sale and repair of the subject vehicle and the airbag mechanism at issue are presently unknown.” Anderson knew the reason for the failed deployment of her husband’s airbag was a defective component of the airbag system; she was merely unaware of all maintenance facilities that had serviced the van and of the identity of the manufacturer of the allegedly defective part. By participating in the discovery process, Anderson was able to ascertain the true identity of both fictitious defendants. The plaintiff alleged that ALPS had notice of the lawsuit as early as June of 2005, eight months prior to the actual filing of the lawsuit and well within the three-year statute of limitations. In the motion to reconsider, Anderson asked the trial court to consider her second amended complaint under Rule 15(c) instead of Rule 9(h). In denying her motion to reconsider, the trial court reasoned that Anderson had acted with due diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the fictitious party under Rule 9(h), but that she had failed to act with due diligence in amending her complaint under Rule 15(c). In the absence of any reasonable explanation by Anderson of why she waited more than nine months after learning ALPS’s identity to seek the trial court’s leave to include it as a defendant in her lawsuit, the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence to bring this party into the litigation in a timely manner. The plain language of Rule 9(h) contemplates that the plaintiff must amend her complaint in a reasonably diligent manner once she learns the true identity of the fictitious party. |
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