Chamberlin v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-DR-01690-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-DR-01690-SCT ; 2008-DR-01690-SCT ; 2008-DR-01690-SCT ; 2008-DR-01690-SCT ; 2008-DR-01690-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-10-2010 Opinion Author: Lamar, J. Holding: Petition for Post Conviction Relief Denied. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Exculpatory evidence - Cruel and unusual punishment Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Randolph, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DEATH PENALTY - POST CONVICTION |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-04-2006 Appealed from: Forrest County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Helfrich Disposition: Lisa Jo Chamberlin was convicted on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. Chamberlin’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal in Chamberlin v. State, 989 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 908, 173 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2009). District Attorney: JON MARK WEATHERS Case Number: 04-715CR |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Lisa Jo Chamberlin |
ELIZABETH UNGER CARLYLE, KATE MARGOLIS, MICHAEL BENTLEY |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL: PAT McNAMARA |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Exculpatory evidence - Cruel and unusual punishment |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lisa Jo Chamberlin was convicted on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. Chamberlin’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Chamberlin has now filed a motion for post-conviction-relief, asking for leave to proceed in the trial court. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Chamberlin argues that her counsel was deficient in four main areas during the guilt-innocence phase of her trial. She argues that her counsel was deficient during jury selection when he failed to rebut the State’s proffered reasons for peremptory strikes, when he failed to develop and present evidence regarding her methamphetamine withdrawal and its effect on her during interrogation, when he failed to introduce evidence that she was dominated by her codefendant, and when he failed to object to the testimony of Vanessa Stringfellow. A thorough review of the record in this case, including the jury questionnaires provided by Chamberlin, discloses that each of the African-American jurors struck had at least one response in his or her jury questionnaire that differentiated him or her from the white jurors who were accepted by the State. Therefore, there was no disparate treatment of the struck jurors. On direct appeal, the Court thoroughly examined the voluntariness and admissibility of Chamberlin’s statements to police and found no error. Thus, Chamberlin’s counsel was not deficient for failing to consult an expert about the possible effects of her methamphetamine addiction. Chamberlin confessed numerous times and to several people, but never stated that her co-defendant made her do anything, or that she was in fear of him for any reason. It does not appear that Chamberlain was “dominated” by anyone, but rather was a willing participant in the robbery and murder of the two victims. Moreover, the decision whether to introduce evidence – if any existed – that Chamberlin was dominated by the co-defendant falls directly into the ambit of trial strategy. With regard to the testimony of Vanessa Stringfellow, Chamberlin’s defense counsel was not deficient for failing to object to Stringfellow’s testimony, as he attempted to exclude her testimony before trial began. All of Chamberlin’s claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase are without merit. Chamberlin also argues that her trial counsel was deficient before and during the penalty phase of her trial, because he conducted only a minimal investigation of her background in search of mitigating evidence. During sentencing, the jury heard testimony from a defense expert of the sexual and physical abuse in Chamberlin’s family – by her mother, her half-brother, her biological father, her stepfather and a fourth-grade teacher. The jury heard about Chamberlin’s severe drug addiction, and that she had started drinking at age twelve and using methamphetamine at age thirteen. The jury heard that Chamberlin had post-traumatic stress disorder, and that she met the criteria for borderline personality disorder. While it is true that the mitigation evidence uncovered during post-conviction investigation is more detailed than that presented at trial, the jury was made aware of all of the abuse and addiction in Chamberlin’s life. Chamberlin was not prejudiced, as the additional mitigating evidence would, if anything, barely have altered the sentencing profile presented’ to the decisionmaker. Issue 2: Exculpatory evidence Chamberlin argues that the prosecution’s failure to disclose a “favorable” letter written by the co-defendant violated the rule pronounced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show, among other things, that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Although Chamberlin argues that the letter would have contradicted the prosecution’s theory that she was the instigator of the crime, it seems, at best, to show merely that the co-defendant wanted her to remain silent about the crime. In addition, overwhelming evidence existed to support the jury’s verdict, and the introduction of this vague letter was highly unlikely to affect the outcome. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that, had the letter been introduced, the outcome would have been different. Issue 3: Cruel and unusual punishment Chamberlin failed to make any argument regarding the method of execution on direct appeal, and, therefore, the claim is barred. In addition, Mississippi’s method of lethal injection does not violate the Eighth Amendment. |
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