Lestrade v. Lestrade
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01354-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-09-2010 Opinion Author: Myers, P.J. Holding: Reversed and rendered. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Modification of property settlement agreement - Division of retirement benefits Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Irving, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-17-2008 Appealed from: Harrison County Chancery Court Judge: Sanford R. Steckler Disposition: MODIFIED 1989 PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND AWARDED WIFE PAST RETIREMENT BENEFITS Case Number: C2402-08-59(3) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Oscar P. Lestrade, Jr. |
PATRICK W. KIRBY |
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| Appellee: | Audrey A. Lestrade | E. FOLEY RANSON | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Modification of property settlement agreement - Division of retirement benefits |
| Summary of the Facts: | Oscar and Audrey Lestrade were divorced in 1989. As part of their irreconcilable differences divorce, the Lestrades entered into a property settlement agreement. The agreement addressed the issues of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, and property division. Among other things, it provided that Oscar “[would] pay one-half of his Civil Service Retirement to [Audrey].” In 2008, Audrey filed a complaint for modification of the divorce decree. She alleged that she and the couple’s daughter were subsisting on approximately $1,700 per month in social security payments and that they were relying on financial assistance from her other children to make ends meet. Audrey alleged that she had expected to begin receiving Oscar’s retirement when he reached sixty-five years of age, but Oscar was now seventy-one and had not yet retired. Since Oscar had not retired, she had not received any retirement benefits. Audrey sought one-half of what Oscar’s retirement benefits would be, if he retired, and to extend that award retroactively to include lost retirement income since Oscar’s sixty-fifth birthday. The chancellor found that intent of the parties was that Audrey would receive half of Oscar’s retirement benefits “at a reasonable and customary time,” which the chancellor found to be when Oscar reached sixty-five years of age. The chancellor concluded that the circumstances required an “equitable modification” of the agreement and that Audrey was entitled to the equivalent of one-half of the retirement benefits Oscar could have received since turning sixty-five. The chancellor ordered Oscar to pay one-half of the retirement benefits he had been eligible to receive over the last five years – which the chancellor determined to be $125,000 including interest – and to pay one-half of the continuing benefits Oscar would receive if he retired, $1,875 per month. The chancellor’s order also provided that Oscar could pay only $300 per month toward the back retirement benefits. Oscar appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Modification of property settlement agreement Property settlement agreements are fixed and final, and may not be modified absent fraud or a contractual provision allowing modification or where, because of a scrivener’s error, the instrument does not reflect the actual agreement of the parties. The provision of the property settlement agreement at issue reads in its entirety: “Husband will pay one-half of his Civil Service Retirement to the Wife and will provide the proper and necessary documentary proof to effect this payment.” Audrey concedes that the property settlement agreement, as written, requires that Oscar actually retire and begin receiving benefits before she is entitled to her half. Oscar’s understanding of the property settlement stemmed only from the text of the written agreement. He stated that his understanding was that Audrey would receive her half of the benefits only when those benefits were paid to him – that is, beginning at the time he retired, which remained his decision. Audrey testified that her understanding of the agreement was essentially the same, but she added that they had “assumed” Oscar would retire at sixty-five. Oscar categorically denied that this had been his intent or understanding of the agreement. To reform a contract, mutual mistake must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden was simply not met in this case. The chancellor’s modification cannot be defended as a reformation based on mutual mistake. The chancellor styled his order an “equitable modification,” and he appears to have relied on a series of decisions where our courts have allowed some degree of modification based only on equitable considerations. Although the chancellor may order an equitable modification of divorce settlements under certain circumstances, modification may not be granted based on expectations alone. Instead, the rule remains that it requires proof of mistake, fraud, duress, or unconscionability. As none of these are present in this case, the chancellor’s judgment awarding Audrey past and future retirement benefits must be reversed and rendered. Issue 2: Division of retirement benefits Oscar argues that the chancellor erred in holding that Audrey was entitled to a full one-half of his retirement benefits. Oscar worked toward the retirement for seventeen years during the marriage; after the divorce, he has continued for another twenty. Oscar argues that some portion of his retirement benefit is not marital property and is not subject to the property settlement agreement. Oscar was free to contract away more of his retirement benefit than might have been subject to equitable distribution. The property settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous on this point: Audrey is entitled to one-half of Oscar’s retirement benefit. Thus, this issue is without merit. |
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