Olive v. McNeal
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01095-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-09-2010 Opinion Author: Myers, P.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Mutual mistake - Confidential relationship Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Irving, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-01-2009 Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: Cynthia Brewer Disposition: MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEED DENIED Case Number: 2004-763 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Ceasar Olive |
ROBERT B. OGLETREE |
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| Appellee: | Willie B. McNeal and Bernice O. Bouldin | BILL WALLER SR. | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Mutual mistake - Confidential relationship |
| Summary of the Facts: | Ceasar Olive executed a warranty deed conveying his home and approximately thirty-six acres of surrounding land in Madison to his stepchildren, Willie McNeal and Bernice Bouldin. Olive reserved a life estate. Approximately seven months later, Olive sought to extend a one-third ownership interest in the property to one of his natural children, Betty Rugley. McNeal and Bouldin refused. Olive brought suit to set aside the deed, arguing undue influence and mutual mistake in its execution. The chancellor denied relief, and Olive appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Mutual mistake Olive argues that the deed should be set aside on the grounds of mutual mistake. Olive testified that he believed the document he executed was a will he could revoke at any time. McNeal admitted that he believed that because Olive had reserved a life estate, Olive could revoke the deed or modify it at any time prior to his death. As both men believed the conveyance was revokable, Olive argues, the chancellor erred in not granting the relief he requested. A deed may be reformed where it is shown to result from the mutual mistake of the parties in contracting for it. Ordinarily, a contract may not be set aside for a unilateral mistake absent proof of fraud or other inequitable conduct on the part of the benefitting party. It is undisputed that this was a voluntary conveyance – a gift that was not bargained for. The giving of a gift is a unilateral act, so mutuality of mistake is not required to set it aside. Instead, the rule of law is that a deed effecting a voluntary conveyance may be reformed, at the insistence of the grantor, if it did not carry out his intent in making the gift. The party seeking reformation of a deed on a mistake theory bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether Olive mistakenly conveyed the property presents a question of fact; therefore, the issue on appeal is whether the chancellor abused her discretion in finding that Olive had failed to prove his mistake beyond a reasonable doubt. Olive does not dispute that he had intended to give the property to McNeal and Bouldin; he only takes issue with the form of the conveyance. Olive testified that he had instructed McNeal to visit Olive’s attorney and draft a will for him that would convey the property. McNeal returned with a deed and affidavit, which Olive alleges he executed without reviewing. Olive claimed to have discovered the mistake about six months later, when he attempted to modify the “will” to give a one-third interest in the property to his natural daughter, Rugley. The evidence casts a reasonable doubt on Olive’s claims. The instrument Olive executed was clearly labeled a deed, and McNeal testified that he had explained the nature of the document to Olive. The execution of the deed took place in the chancery clerk’s office and without the formalities of the execution of a will. Olive was literate, and he had several opportunities to review the document. It was also noted that Olive had some experience with real estate transactions in the past, and it was never suggested that he did not know the difference between a deed and a will. Moreover, his conduct of his business suggested that Olive would not have signed a document without reviewing it; around the time he executed the deed, Olive insisted on personally observing the removal of scrap cars from his salvage yard. Thus, the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in finding Olive’s testimony not credible and, consequently, she did not abuse her discretion in finding that Olive did not meet his burden to prove mistake beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 2: Confidential relationship Olive argues that the chancellor erred in not finding that a confidential relationship existed between Olive and McNeal. If a confidential relationship existed, Olive argues, the chancellor erred in not enforcing a presumption of undue influence in the inter vivos gift. Gifts between family members are a normal occurrence, and a deed from a parent to a child alone and of itself raises no presumption of undue influence since, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the parent is presumably the dominant party. This is true even though the parent is aged, or aged and infirm. On the other hand, where a deed has been procured by one in contravention of duties owed the grantor by reason of a confidential or fiduciary relationship existing in law or in fact, our courts will not hesitate to intervene. A confidential relationship arises where on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependance, or trust, justifiably reposed. It is true that Olive was seventy-seven years of age, had recently lost his wife of many years, and was recovering from a car accident at the time of the conveyance. These circumstances may have created a potential for weakness or dependence, but the record does not bear this out. Olive continued to live alone, with some assistance from his children, and continued to operate his own business. Despite his age and injuries, nothing in the record suggests that Olive suffered from any permanent or severe physical infirmity. Olive’s own testimony at trial downplayed his reliance on his stepson, and Olive suggested that he had received similar help from others. Both parties agreed that Olive had trusted McNeal, but from all appearances in the record it was trust in his stepson’s integrity and competence rather than reliance on his judgment or counsel. Thus, Olive did not show by clear and convincing evidence that McNeal exerted an overmastering influence over him. |
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