Jones v. State


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Docket Number: 2006-CP-00657-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-06-2007
Opinion Author: Ishee, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Voluntariness of plea - Subject matter jurisdiction - Newly discovered evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes and Roberts, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J.
Procedural History: PCR; Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-20-2006
Appealed from: TATE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Andrew C. Baker
Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED.
Case Number: CV2006-0054BT
  Consolidated: Consolidated with 2006-CP-00654-COA; Marcia Lynn Jones a/k/a Marcia S. Jones v. State of Mississippi; Tate Circuit Court; LC Case #: CV-2004-0383-BT; Ruling Date: 03/18/2005; Ruling Judge: Andrew Baker

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: MARCIA LYNN JONES, A/K/A MARCIA S. JONES




MARCIA JONES (PRO SE)



 

Appellee: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE  

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Topic: Post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Voluntariness of plea - Subject matter jurisdiction - Newly discovered evidence

Summary of the Facts: Marcia Jones pled guilty to grand larceny and uttering a forgery. She was sentenced as a habitual offender to five years for grand larceny and to five years of post-release supervision for uttering a forgery. Jones filed two motions for post-conviction relief. The court denied the first motion and dismissed the second. She appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Jones argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, because her attorney failed to investigate the value of the stolen property, failed to interview potential witnesses, and never explained the charges to her or the possible sentences associated with those charges. Jones’ allegations of ineffective assistance are contradicted by the sworn statements in her petition to enter a plea of guilty and her testimony during the guilty plea hearing. Consequently, there is nothing in the record to overcome the presumption that Jones received effective assistance of counsel. Issue 2: Voluntariness of plea Jones argues that her guilty plea to grand larceny was not entered voluntarily and intelligently because she was induced by fear of a greater sentence to plead guilty and she was never informed of the minimum and maximum penalties for grand larceny. A guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent only if the defendant has been advised concerning the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of the plea. During the guilty plea hearing, Jones testified that she was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, and that no one tricked her or made any promises that the court would be lenient in order to induce her to plead guilty. Jones also acknowledged in the petition that she had been informed of the minimum and maximum punishment for grand larceny, and that the court could impose a sentence from zero to five years and a fine in the amount of $0 to $1,000. Therefore, this issue is without merit. Issue 3: Subject matter jurisdiction Jones argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over a charge that amounted to petit larceny. A criminal defendant who has entered a guilty plea cannot litigate his actual guilt on appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief, unless the defendant can show that the guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered. Because Jones’ guilty plea was entered voluntarily, she has waived the right to litigate her actual guilt on appeal. Issue 4: Newly discovered evidence In her second motion for post-conviction relief, Jones argues that she was not given an initial appearance and that newly discovered evidence shows that she never signed the waiver of arraignment form and entry of plea form. Jones’ newly discovered evidence consists of a report from a handwriting expert who finds indications that Jones did not write the signature on the waiver of arraignment and entry of plea form. This is not the type of new evidence contemplated by section 99-39-23(6) to overcome the successive writ bar.


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