Corp. Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene Rural Health Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, Greene County
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00681-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-04-2010 Opinion Author: Graves, P.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contract - Jurisdiction - Service of process - M.R.C.P. 81 - M.R.C.P. 5 - M.R.C.P. 70 - Authority of special chancellor - Section 9-5-85 Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Pierce, J. Concurs in Result Only: Dickinson, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-06-2009 Appealed from: Greene County Chancery Court Judge: T. Kenneth Griffis, Jr. Disposition: The special chancellor determined that it had limited jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Transition Order, and that certain provisions identified in the Transition Order required clarification. Case Number: 2005-134PN |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Corporate Management, Inc. |
DARREN E. GRAY |
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| Appellee: | Greene Rural Health Center Board of Trustees, Greene County, Mississippi, John Marshall Eubanks, Tommy Roberts and Marion Pierce | SETH CHRISTOPHER HALL, HEBER S. SIMMONS, III, DAVID M. OTT, DOUGLAS G. MERCIER |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contract - Jurisdiction - Service of process - M.R.C.P. 81 - M.R.C.P. 5 - M.R.C.P. 70 - Authority of special chancellor - Section 9-5-85 |
| Summary of the Facts: | The original litigation in this matter stems from two contracts entered into by the Trustees of the Greene County Health Center and Corporate Management, Inc. for the management of Greene County’s community hospital and nursing home in early 2005. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the contracts to be invalid. Greene County then entered into a long-term lease with George Regional Health System for the management of Greene County’s community hospital and nursing home. On July 2, 2008, the special chancellor entered a judgment which set out the responsibilities and duties of Greene County and CMI. Paragraph 7 provided that “the parties shall attempt to agree upon and submit an Agreed Transition Order setting forth the necessary terms and conditions that will control the expiration of the management agreement between GRHC and CMI, and the initiation of the lease agreement with George Regional Health System.” On July 23, 2008, the special chancellor entered a Transition Order detailing the terms and conditions concerning GRHC’s transfer of management. In 2009, Greene County filed its Motion of Greene Rural Health Center Board of Trustees and the Board of Supervisors of Greene County for Contempt and for Damages, alleging that CMI had violated the court’s transition order which required CMI to provide all books, records, and other information. Thereafter, CMI filed its response to Greene County’s motion and later an amended response contesting the court’s jurisdiction. The trial court denied both CMI’s motion for continuance and motion for recusal. Greene County was then allowed to proceed on its motion for contempt. The trial court subsequently entered its order, granting in part and denying in part Greene County’s motion for contempt. Specifically, the trial court found that its jurisdiction was limited to enforcement of the terms of the Transition Order, and that Greene County’s request for damages was beyond the court’s jurisdiction. In addition, the trial court did not hold CMI in contempt, but rather, it clarified certain terms of the Transition Order relating to the transfer of information from CMI to George Regional Health System and Greene County. CMI appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction CMI argues that M.R.C.P. 81 governs, and that it was entitled to service of process before being subjected to the trial court’s jurisdiction. CMI fails to realize that, although the special chancellor ordered that the second amended final judgment be a Rule 54(b) final judgment, the trial court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its judgment. Because the court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its judgment, M.R.C.P. 5 applies. Further, Greene County’s motion for contempt is a pleading subsequent to CMI’s original complaint and, therefore, was subject to the service requirements of Rule 5(a). Rule 5(b) provides the method by which pleadings and other papers may be served under Rule 5(a). At the time Greene County filed its motion for contempt and for damages, CMI was still a party who is represented by an attorney of record in the proceedings. Greene County effected service upon CMI by mailing its motion, via United States mail, to counsel for CMI, which is in compliance with the requirements of Rule 5(b). Thus, Greene County properly served CMI under Rule 5(b). Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Greene County’s motion for contempt, and no new service of process was needed. Further, M.R.C.P. 70 provides that the purpose of Rule 70 is to provide ample power to the courts for dealing effectively with parties who seek to thwart judgments by refusing to comply with orders or perform specific acts. Thus, the trial court was vested with the authority to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its judgment under Rule 70. Issue 2: Authority of special chancellor CMI argues that the special chancellor did not have authority to conduct a hearing outside the chancery district in which the matter was filed, and that the matter should be heard in Greene County, Mississippi, not Jackson, Mississippi. While CMI alleges that it was denied due process by not being able to call particular witnesses and present evidence, CMI fails to recognize section 9-5-85, which states that the chancery courts of this State have the power to summon or subpoena any witness, whose appearance in court may be deemed necessary for any purpose, whether such witness resides in the same county or any other county. Thus, prior to the hearing, CMI could have requested the chancery court to issue subpoenas for the witnesses it expected to call, but did not. In addition, the special chancellor did not transfer venue in this matter. The special chancellor held only one hearing in Jackson, and it was held at the convenience of counsel for CMI. |
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