Conservatorship of the Estate of Moor v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01077-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-02-2010 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Transfer of property by deed - Reverter clause - Construction-expenditure condition Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment; Declaratory Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-04-2008 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: J. Dewayne Thomas Disposition: G R A N T E D S UMMA R Y J U D GME N T DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ DECLARATORYJUDGMENT ACTION CONCERNING THE TITLE TO THE FLOREWOOD PLANTATION STATE PARK Case Number: G-2005-737T/1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Conservatorship of the Estate of Robert Baird Moor, by Betty Pearson Moor, Robert Baird Moor, Jr., Co-Conservators, and Janie Logan Moor |
DONALD W. BOYKIN |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi, Mississippi Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks; Leflore County, Mississippi; and Leflore County School District | PETER W. CLEVELAND, WILLIE JAMES PERKINS SR., JOYCE IVY CHILES, LEM E. MONTGOMERY III, DESHANDRA LALAYNE ROSS, LEANN W. NEALEY, KYLE VERNON MILLER | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Transfer of property by deed - Reverter clause - Construction-expenditure condition |
| Summary of the Facts: | In 1973, R.B. Moor, Charles H. Moor, and Marion M. Moor conveyed real property to the state, which promised to fulfill three conditions: to utilize the property to construct a state park, expend $2 million or more in constructing the park, and begin construction before July 1, 1976. The state began construction of the Florewood River Plantation Park in 1974, spending more than $2 million on the project over the next decade. The state operated Florewood Plantation as a state park until 2005, when it leased the park to Leflore County based on the Legislature’s 2004 authorization to close, transfer, lease, or sell. Aggrieved because the state is no longer operating Florewood Plantation, the successors of R.B., Charles, and Marion filed a declaratory action, seeking reversion. The court granted summary judgment to the state, and the Moors appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The Moors argue the state violated the intended purpose of the property’s transfer by failing to continue to use the property as a historical state park and expend $2 million on the park’s buildings and fixtures. Deeds are construed like contracts, first looking to the “four corners” of the deed and the language the parties used to express their agreement. There can be no reversion unless the grantor intended the deed should have that effect, and the deed so provided in plain terms. In the absence of a reverter clause, a mere statement in a deed that the land is to be used for a specified purpose is merely a declaration of the purpose of the conveyance, and does not in any way limit the grant. The Moors’ deed had no reverter clause. There is no provision that the property shall revert in the event the property is not used as a historical state park, and there is no provision the state should have the property “so long as” it is used as a historical state park. Nor does the deed clearly restrict the state’s use of the property to operating a historical state park. In fact, the deed does not require the state operate a park at all, let alone for perpetuity. The only condition on use of the property was the requirement the grantee “utilize said property for the construction of a Historical Park.” Once construction began in 1974, this condition was satisfied. Meeting this condition also ended the Moors’ option to repurchase. The Moors also argue the state failed to meet all three conditions for constructing the historical park. There is no question the state utilized the property to construct a historical park (condition 1) and began construction before July 1, 1976 (condition 3). The only condition that must be addressed is whether the state expended $2 million or more “in constructing [the] Historical Park” (condition 2). In support of its motion for summary judgment, the state presented an itemized list of its expenditures on Florewood Plantation, showing the state spent more than $2 million from 1974 to 1985. The Moors did not dispute the list’s accuracy. Instead, the Moors claimed not all of the listed expenditures were “construction” costs because they did not pay for buildings or fixtures. The mere fact the parties dispute what falls under the definition of “construction” does not make the term ambiguous as a matter of law. To “construct” means “to form by assembling or combining parts.” The Moors essentially argue the furniture and exhibits were not part of the “construction” of the park because they were not buildings or fixtures. But neither the common definition of “construction” nor its use in the deed is so limited. The deed did not require the state to spend $2 million in constructing “the buildings and fixtures” but instead in constructing the “Historical Park.” The state allocated $2 million for the Florewood Plantation project and used all of its budget on physical items it assembled to create the historical park, including furniture, equipment, and exhibits. Therefore, the chancellor did not err in finding the $2 million construction-expenditure condition, along with the other two construction conditions, had been met. |
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