R.K. v. J.K.


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Docket Number: 2005-CA-01267-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-04-2007
Opinion Author: Smith, C.J.
Holding: On Direct Appeal : Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part. On Cross Appeal: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Property settlement agreement - Liquidated damages provision - Unclean hands - Attorney’s fees - M.R.C.P. 60(b) relief - Contempt - Child support
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Carlson, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Graves, J.
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-24-2005
Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court
Judge: Denise Owens
Disposition: In the first case, R.K. appeals the November 15, 2004 and February 18, 2005 decisions in which the chancery court required R.K. to resume monthly periodic alimony payments and to pay arrears to J.K. J.K. cross appeals the February 2005 decision asserting that the chancery court erred (1) in not finding R.K. in contempt for violating the Agreement and (2) in not awarding her attorney’s fees. In the second case, R.K. appeals the February 27, 2006 decision of the Hinds County Chancery Court ordering him to continue child support payments and pay arrears.
Case Number: G2001-1980 0/3
  Consolidated: Consolidated with 2006-CA-00411-SCT R.K. v. J.K.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: R.K.




THOMAS W. CROCKETT



 

Appellee: J.K. JOHN BENTON CLARK BRANDI N. SMITH THOMAS RAY JULIAN  

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Topic: Property settlement agreement - Liquidated damages provision - Unclean hands - Attorney’s fees - M.R.C.P. 60(b) relief - Contempt - Child support

Summary of the Facts: These two domestic relations cases have been consolidated on appeal. Both cases concern the Property Settlement and Child Custody and Support Agreement between Plaintiff R.K. and Defendant J.K. In the first case, R.K. appeals the decisions in which the chancery court required R.K. to resume monthly periodic alimony payments and to pay arrears to J.K. J.K. cross appeals. In the second case, R.K. appeals the decision of the Hinds County Chancery Court ordering him to continue child support payments and pay arrears.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Liquidated damages provision of agreement R.K. argues that he should not have been required to pay arrears and to continue periodic alimony payments because the chancery court should have enforced the liquidated damages provision in the agreement. Notwithstanding the fact that property settlement agreements are contractual in nature and should be treated as such, courts of equity have certain discretionary power in the matter of decreeing the specific performance of contracts and they may and should make equitable modifications in the form of relief granted where to do otherwise would result in undue hardship or injustice. Pursuant to the agreement both parties requested specific performance. In deciding whether and how to order specific performance, the chancery court found it necessary to make equitable modifications to the agreement in order to prevent undue hardship or injustice against J.K. While the chancery court found that J.K. attempted with all good faith to uphold the agreement, it found the converse regarding R.K. In light of R.K.’s participation in a federal action against J.K. and R.K.’s own violation of the section he seeks to enforce, the chancery court properly considered equity in examining the dispute. One seeking relief in equity must come with clean hands or face refusal by the court to aid in securing any right or granting any remedy. Having the discretion to refuse R.K. a remedy due to his “unclean hands”, the chancery court decided the equitable remedy would be to award him actual damages. Considering the evidence drawn upon by the chancellor, the chancery court did not abuse its discretion. Issue 2: Attorney’s fees R.K. argues that the chancery court erred in refusing to allow him, pursuant to the agreement, to deduct one-half of his legal fees spent in defending J.K.’s petition to modify the settlement agreement. The language of the contract is unambiguous. R.K. and J.K. agreed that R.K. would pay J.K. a set amount as alimony and property distribution and that R.K. could deduct from these monthly payments one-half of the cost of defending particular claims. The underlying claim here is not one in which R.K. finds himself a victim defending against a suit instigated by J.K. For the agreement to take effect, J.K.’s petition for modification must have arisen from R.K.’s actions prior to the divorce. The petition for modification arose solely from the actions of R.K.’s attorney who filed suit against J.K. after the divorce. Apparently, the petition for modification arose from actions other than R.K.’s, which occurred after the divorce, and thus, R.K. is not entitled to deduct attorney’s fees pursuant to the agreement. Issue 3: Rule 60 relief R.K. argues that the chancery court erred in denying his motion under M.R.C.P. 60(b) to stay execution of the judgment and for other relief. Relief is afforded pursuant to M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) under extraordinary and compelling circumstances. R.K. argues as extraordinary circumstances J.K.’s double recovery. Double recovery is a tort doctrine that prevents unjust enrichment by precluding a recovery of the same damages multiple times or beyond 100% of the judgment. Clearly, allowing J.K. to recover the chancery court judgment for property distribution payments as well as the federal court judgment for conversion of those same payments would be contrary to this state’s policy against multiple recoveries for the same damages. At this time the occurrence of J.K.’s double recovery is uncertain. As alternative relief, R.K. requests a stay of the execution of the judgment in chancery court until the appeal in the Fifth Circuit is resolved. That request is granted. Issue 4: Contempt J.K. argues that the court erred in failing to hold R.K. in contempt. Since R.K. concedes the fact that he stopped making child support payments in September 2005, a prima facie case of contempt has been established, leaving the question of whether R.K. has a valid defense for his action. R.K. argues his cessation of payments was not a willful violation because he thought his actions were appropriate per advice of his counsel. After initially holding R.K. in contempt because he ceased making payments as required by the agreement, upon examination the chancery court decided that R.K. did not act willfully and deliberately since he acted in accordance with his attorney’s advice. There was no manifest error in the court’s final determination that R.K. was not in contempt. Issue 5: Attorney’s fees J.K. argues that she should be awarded attorney’s fees. Although precedent indicates that an award of attorney’s fees is not contingent on a finding of contempt, there was no error in the chancellor’s final decision to not award attorney’s fees to J.K. Issue 6: Child support R.K. argues that he should not have to pay child support while his daughter attends boarding school in New Jersey. The noncustodial parent is prohibited from contracting to cut off child support before the child reaches the age of twenty-one, unless the child is emancipated. Therefore, R.K.’s contentions that the trial court erroneously interpreted the phrase “lives at home” in the agreement are irrelevant to whether he must pay child support. As precedent requires, R.K. must continue paying child support despite his daughter’s attendance at a New Jersey boarding school. The trial court properly required R.K. to pay arrears and to continue child support payments.


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