Guice v. State
| Docket Number: | 2004-CT-01931-SCT Linked Case(s): 2004-CT-01931-SCT ; 2004-CT-01931-SCT ; 2004-KA-01931-COA ; 2004-KA-01931-COA |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-11-2007 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Aggravated assault - Right to speedy trial - Section 99-17-1 - Waiver Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley and Randolph, JJ. Dissenting Author : Diaz, J. Dissent Joined By : Graves and Dickinson, JJ. Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY Writ of Certiorari: Yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-04-2004 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Winston Kidd Disposition: Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentence of twenty years as a habitual offender. District Attorney: Eleanor Faye Peterson Case Number: 02-0-260 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Phelan Terrell Guice |
JOSHUA AARON TURNER
MERRIDA COXWELL |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Aggravated assault - Right to speedy trial - Section 99-17-1 - Waiver |
| Summary of the Facts: | Phelan Terrell Guice was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment as a habitual offender. He appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Guice was arraigned on October 30, 2002, and went to trial on May 3, 2004, some five hundred fifty-one days after the date of his arraignment. Guice requests that his conviction be reversed and he be discharged, not only for the violation of a federal or state constitutional right, but also for a perceived violation of our speedy trial statute. It is argued that absent a showing of good cause and a continuance duly granted by the trial court, section 99-17-1 provides for a per se discharge of a defendant. However, the statute does not mandate a discharge of the accused unless the statute is clearly violated and the accused has sustained prejudice by reason thereof. A defendant may effectively waive his right to complain of not being tried within the 270-day period set out in section 99-17-1, when the defendant does not request or assert his right to a speedy trial or object to a delay, especially when the defendant fails to show any prejudice in the failure to be tried within the statutory 270-day period. To this day, Guice has yet to assert his right to a speedy trial, and it was not until 463 days after his arraignment that Guice, for the first time via a motion to dismiss, complained of not being put to trial timely. In fact, even on his trial date, which was 551 days after his arraignment, Guice told the judge that he was not asking for a speedy trial, but he “was asking for my charges to be dismissed on the grounds of a violation of a speedy trial.” Thus, while there was a violation of the speedy trial statute, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss Guice’s indictment for this statutory violation. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
