McCool v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc.


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01332-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-05-2010
Opinion Author: Lee, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-49 - Section 15-1-29 - Conversion - Negligence - Emotional distress - Section 15-1-35
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Myers, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-15-2009
Appealed from: Coahoma County Circuit Court
Judge: Al Smith
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS
Case Number: 14-CI-06-0032

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Drusilla McCool




RUBY WHITE



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Coahoma Opportunities, Inc.; Kathy McDougal, Head Start Director; Johnny McGlown, Board Chair; Mayo Wilson, Executive Director; and Jimmie Ann Sellers, Personnel Director ALISON TASMA VANCE, PAULA GRAVES ARDELEAN  

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    Topic: Contract - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-49 - Section 15-1-29 - Conversion - Negligence - Emotional distress - Section 15-1-35

    Summary of the Facts: Drusilla McCool filed a complaint against her former employer, Coahoma Opportunities, Inc., after her employment was terminated. The following employees of COI were also named as defendants: Kathy McDougal, Head Start Director; Johnny McGlown, Board Chair; Mayo Wilson, Executive Director; and Jimmie Ann Sellers, Personnel Director. McCool alleged the following claims against COI: wrongful termination, conversion, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. COI filed for summary judgment on the grounds that McCool’s claims for wrongful termination and emotional distress were barred by the statute of limitations and that her claims for conversion and negligence were not supported by the evidence. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of COI. McCool appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Breach of contract McCool argues that COI breached its employment contract with her when her employment was terminated. The trial court found that McCool’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations because no written employment agreement existed. McCool argues that the applicable statute is section 15-1-49, which calls for a three-year statute of limitations for all actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed. Under section 15-1-29, the statute of limitations for an action based on an unwritten contract of employment is one year from the time the cause of action accrues. McCool names two documents that she asserts show evidence of a written contract: the personnel manual and a personnel action form. Where a person is not named in the written contract and parol evidence is necessary to show the existence of the contractual relationship, the contract is unwritten insofar as that person is concerned and the limitations statute relating to written contracts is not applicable. Further, an employee handbook cannot be considered a contract between the employer and the employee where the handbook explicitly states that the employee can be terminated at will. McCool is not named in the personnel manual, and the manual does not detail any alleged employment contract between COI and McCool. The language in the personnel manual states that the “policies and procedures do not constitute a contract of employment.” The personnel manual also explicitly states that employment with COI is strictly “at will.” As for McCool’s argument that the personnel action form was evidence of a written contract, this argument is barred as it is being raised for the first time on appeal. Since McCool’s employment was at will, the applicable statute of limitations is one year as stated in section 15-1-29. Her complaint for breach of contract is procedurally barred, since her employment was terminated on July 28, 2004 and she filed this suit on March 23, 2006. Issue 2: Conversion McCool argues that COI was guilty of conversion because it paid her bankruptcy payments and insurance premiums late. To establish a conversion, there must be proof of a wrongful possession, or the exercise of a dominion in exclusion or defiance of the owner’s right, or of an unauthorized and injurious use, or of a wrongful detention after demand. COI did not have the funds to pay its additional expenses, and McCool admits she was aware of this fact. Since COI did not possess the funds, the first element of conversion, wrongful possession, is not met. Issue 3: Negligence McCool argues COI engaged in negligent accounting practices which led to it being unable to meet its financial obligations. The trial court found that McCool’s negligence claim was barred, as the exclusive remedy against COI is the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. McCool argues that her claims fall outside the Act because COI’s actions were willful and malicious. However, McCool testified that her negligence claim was solely related to her employment and that COI’s actions were not related to a personal vendetta against her. Two elements must be met in order to avoid the exclusivity of the Act: the injury must have been caused by the willful act of another employee acting in the course of employment and in the furtherance of the employee’s business, and the injury must be one that is not compensable under the act. McCool has not shown that COI’s actions were willful and malicious. Further, McCool has failed to present evidence showing that she suffered damages because of COI’s actions. Issue 4: Emotional distress McCool argues that COI’s actions intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her. The statute of limitations under section 15-1-35 for a claim of IIED is one year after the cause of action accrued. McCool’s claim is based on the termination of her employment, which occurred on July 28, 2004. The suit was filed on March 23, 2006. Therefore, her claim is procedurally barred.


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