Craig v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-00820-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-28-2010 Opinion Author: King, C.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Admission of DNA report - Expert witness - Chain of custody - Impartial jury Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Irving, J., concurs in result only without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-22-2008 Appealed from: Amite County Circuit Court Judge: Forrest Johnson Disposition: CONVICTED OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Ronnie Lee Harper Case Number: 07-KR-051A |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Darrell Craig |
KENYA REESE MARTIN |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Admission of DNA report - Expert witness - Chain of custody - Impartial jury |
| Summary of the Facts: | Darrell Craig was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to thirty years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Speedy trial Craig argues that he was not afforded a speedy trial. To determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the court considers length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. The time from Craig’s arraignment to his trial was 362 days which is presumptively prejudicial. The delay was caused by an overcrowded docket with older, previously scheduled cases being tried before Craig’s case. This factor only slightly favors Craig because of the acceptable justification for the delay. Craig did not actively assert his right to a speedy trial. Craig claims that his defense was impaired, because the documents needed to prove he was in Houston and not in Gloster at the time the crime was committed were destroyed. Assuming the existence of these documents, it was Craig’s responsibility to seek their timely retention and preservation. Given these factors, there was no violation of Craig’s right. Issue 2: DNA report Craig argues that the State waited almost two years to produce a DNA report even though it had possession of or access to the evidence from which the DNA sample was collected. He contends that the State’s failure to produce discovery in a timely manner resulted in his not securing a forensic expert witness in a timely manner in order to rebut the testimony offered by the State’s witness. The trial court is allowed to exclude evidence where discovery violations are willful or motivated by the desire to gain a tactical advantage. If a defendant who has been surprised by undisclosed discoverable evidence does not request a continuance at the time of such surprise, he waives this issue on appeal. Craig stated that he did not want a continuance, but merely to have the DNA evidence excluded. Thus, this issue is procedurally barred from being raised on appeal. Also, despite the length of time required to process the samples and complete a report, there was no indication that the State’s delay in providing the DNA report was willful or motivated by the desire to gain a tactical advantage. The trial court also noted that while the report was received shortly before trial, the State did not fail to disclose the results of the report in a timely manner. Issue 3: Expert witness Craig argues that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify regarding the DNA report when her testimony was speculative and amounted to mere guesswork. The trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding the qualification of the witness as an expert witness. The trial court also questioned the witness regarding the accepted standards of DNA testing and the procedures she used in the DNA extraction and analysis. The trial judge held that because the witness was the analyst who did both extractions of the samples in question, and the method of analysis was a standard DNA analysis, the witness could testify. There is no merit to Craig’s argument that the evidence was not reliable, since the witness could not conclusively testify that Craig was a 100% match to the mixture. The witness’s testimony that there was DNA from others on the boot and Craig’s testimony that he was not in possession of the boots after leaving LaPlace would be questions for the jury to decide. Issue 4: Chain of custody Craig argues that it was undisputed that the State failed to establish and authenticate the original chain of custody regarding the articles of clothing admitted into evidence. The proper test to determine whether or not there has been a showing of the proper chain of custody of the evidence is whether there is a reasonable inference of likely tampering with the evidence. Each of the officers involved indicated that when they retrieved the evidence from its point of origination and delivered to the point of destination there was no evidence of tampering. In addition, the State’s expert witness testified that when she received the boot in Burlington, via FedEx, there was no indication of tampering. The testimony of the officers indicated that there was an accounting of every person who had handled the evidence at every moment of the investigation and its analysis. In addition, Craig failed to produce any evidence that suggested there had been any tampering with the evidence. Issue 5: Impartial jury Craig argues that two African American jurors were struck after his grandmother, who had vision problems, sat beside the two jurors during lunch, even though nothing was said, and no words were exchanged. Deciding to dismiss a juror for good cause and subsequently replacing that juror with an alternate is completely within the trial court’s discretion. Here, the court reasoned that although the jurors were told not to talk to anyone regarding the case, the family members, who were aware that the two were jurors, sat down and began talking with the jurors. Although the judge did not believe anything improper took place, the parties and witnesses were informed that they were not to mix or communicate with jurors and vice versa. There was no indication in the record that the trial court abused its discretion. |
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