Jackson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-00173-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-00173-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-28-2010 Opinion Author: Griffis, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual battery, Aggravated assault, Armed robbery & Burglary of a dwelling - Excessive sentence - Sequestration of witness - URCCC 9.04 - Peremptory challenges - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Irving, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-17-2008 Appealed from: PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: David H. Strong Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNTS I AND II, SEXUAL BATTERY, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS FOR EACH COUNT; COUNT III, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS; COUNT IV, ARMED ROBBERY, AND SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS; AND COUNT V, BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, AND SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS, ALL TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND TO PAY A $5,000 FINE FOR EACH COUNT District Attorney: Dee Bates Case Number: 07-526-PKS |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Carlos F. Jackson a/k/a Los |
DANIEL ELLIS MORRIS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LISA LYNN BLOUNT |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sexual battery, Aggravated assault, Armed robbery & Burglary of a dwelling - Excessive sentence - Sequestration of witness - URCCC 9.04 - Peremptory challenges - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Carlos Jackson was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and one count each of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and burglary of a dwelling. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Excessive sentence Jackson argues that the trial court erred during the sentencing phase because it considered evidence outside of the evidence introduced at trial, and it did not consider Jackson’s mental defects. He argues that his sentence is excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment because he is legally mentally retarded. A sentence that is within the statutorily defined parameters of the crime, usually is upheld and not considered cruel and unusual punishment. Because Jackson’s sentence was within the statutory guidelines, there is no legal basis to regard Jackson’s sentences as excessive or to find that the trial court abused its discretion. The question of Jackson’s sanity, at the time of the crime, was a question of fact that was determined by the jury. As to Jackson’s allegation that he was mentally retarded, there was a reference to the fact that Jackson may be mildly retarded. However, that issue was not raised or presented to the trial court. Issue 2: Sequestration Jackson argues that the testimony of a witness prejudiced Jackson because the State failed to list her as a witness and because she was not properly sequestered during trial. URCCC 9.04 requires the State to disclose to the defense the names and addresses of all witnesses for the State’s case-in-chief, along with any written or recorded statements. The State has no duty to disclose the names of possible rebuttal witnesses unless the State has requested a notice of alibi defense. Here, the evidence offered through the witness to overcome the insanity defense was rebuttal evidence; thus, allowing a witness, who was first disclosed on morning of trial, to testify was not a discovery violation. While the witness-sequestration rule applies to rebuttal witnesses, the defense failed to object to the witness testifying at trial on the ground that she was not properly sequestered during trial. Also, there is no evidence in the record to show that she was in the courtroom during previous testimony. Issue 3: Peremptory challenges Jackson argues that the State failed to make a prima facie case to prove that race was the controlling issue in the use of the defense’s peremptory challenges. The State had the burden to make a prima facie case that the defense exercised its peremptory challenges on the basis of race before a Batson hearing was necessary. However, because the Jackson’s counsel offered his race-neutral reasons for the strikes before the trial court ruled on the question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the State made a prima facie case was waived by Jackson and is now moot. Issue 4: Ineffective assistance of counsel Jackson argues that his counsel’s performance was ineffective. Jackson argues that his expert witness was intoxicated and that his defense counsel should not have put him on the stand. Counsel's failure to file certain motions, call certain witnesses, ask certain questions, or make certain objections falls within the ambit of trial strategy. In addition, nothing in the record supports Jackson’s claim that the expert was intoxicated. Jackson argues that he did not have the mental capacity to choose what his trial strategy should have been, but his counsel assured his family that the defense of insanity was the best defense. Defense’s strategy to argue that Jackson was insane falls under the ambit of trial strategy and does not give rise to ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson argues that had defense counsel spent more time on voir dire, he would have laid the proper foundation for the defense’s peremptory challenge. Generally, an attorney's actions during voir dire are a matter of trial strategy. |
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