Jackson v. State


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Docket Number: 2005-CT-01580-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-01580-COA ; 2005-CA-01580-COA ; 2005-CA-01580-SCT ; 2005-CT-01580-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-27-2007
Opinion Author: EASLEY, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Post-conviction relief - Statute of limitations - Illegal sentence - Bifurcated trial - UCCCR 10.04(B)
Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: PCR
Writ of Certiorari: Yes
Appealed from Court of Appeals

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-29-2005
Appealed from: Montgomery County Circuit Court
Judge: Joseph H. Loper
Disposition: Jackson filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the trial court denied on July 29, 2005. The court found that Jackson was procedurally barred from bringing his claim pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2006).
District Attorney: Doug Evans

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Joseph Leon Jackson, Jr.




IMHOTEP ALKEBU-LAN



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  

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Topic: Post-conviction relief - Statute of limitations - Illegal sentence - Bifurcated trial - UCCCR 10.04(B)

Summary of the Facts: Joseph Jackson, Jr. pled guilty to armed robbery and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Jackson then filed a petition for post-conviction relief which the trial court denied. Jackson sought post-conviction relief and his appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals. Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals’ decision, Jackson filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Statute of limitations Jackson’s judgment of conviction for armed robbery was entered in October 2001. Jackson filed his petition for post-conviction relief on July 19, 2005. Generally, section 99-39-5(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. However, petitions alleging an illegal sentence are not subject to the time bar. Jackson argues that the trial court did not have legal authority to have him tried by a jury on sentencing after it accepted Jackson’s guilty plea to armed robbery. Jackson asserts that the trial court should have imposed the sentence after accepting his plea of guilty, rather than allowing a jury to determine the appropriate sentence. If the trial court did not have authority to empanel a jury for sentencing in a non-death penalty capital case, then Jackson’ s failure to timely raise the illegal sentence and failure to object to the sentencing procedure would not render this assignment of error procedurally barred by the statute of limitations. Jackson's petition for post-conviction relief was not untimely filed, as Jackson asserted that he received an illegal sentence. Issue 2: Illegal sentence Jackson argues that the authority to impose sentence rested solely in the control of the trial court after the trial court accepted his guilty plea. Based on the plain language of UCCCR 10.04(B), which applies in non-death penalty criminal cases, there is nothing which prohibited the trial court from ordering a bifurcated, jury trial for sentencing after accepting Jackson’s guilty plea. Nothing in Rule 10.04 distinguishes the use of the bifurcated sentencing by a jury after a plea of guilty as opposed to a jury determination of guilt. As such, they should be treated the same. It is clear that Jackson pled guilty after being made aware that the trial court did not have authority to sentence him to life, so a jury would be empaneled to determine whether he should be sentenced to life. Jackson voiced no objection and indicated that he understood the proceedings. The record also shows that the trial court expressly informed Jackson of the charges against him; the consequences of his guilty plea, including the minimum and maximum penalties in sentencing; and the implications of waiving his right to trial by jury, right to confront adverse witnesses, and right to protection against self-incrimination. Thus, Jackson’s post-conviction claim that he had not been properly advised of the consequence of a guilty plea is without merit.


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