Thomas v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-00216-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-00216-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-23-2010 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Fourth-degree arson - Sufficiency of evidence - Lesser offense instruction - Section 97-17-39 - Section 97-17-67 - Section 97-17-9(1) - Right to speedy trial - Disproportionality of sentence Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar and Pierce, JJ. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Graves, P.J., and Dickinson, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-09-2009 Appealed from: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Richard Smith Disposition: Conviction of fourth-degree arson and sentence of life imprisonment, as an habitual offender, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without the possibility of parole or probation. District Attorney: Willie Dewayne Richardson Case Number: 2008-0113 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Tonnie L. Thomas |
OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS: LESLIE S. LEE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN R. HENRY, JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Fourth-degree arson - Sufficiency of evidence - Lesser offense instruction - Section 97-17-39 - Section 97-17-67 - Section 97-17-9(1) - Right to speedy trial - Disproportionality of sentence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Tonnie Thomas was convicted of fourth-degree arson. Thomas had a separate sentencing hearing and was determined to be an habitual offender. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole or probation. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Thomas argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict, because he was simply trying to get attention because he wanted to make a telephone call and to get medical attention. The evidence at trial showed that Thomas wilfully and maliciously attempted to set fire or burn the Greenville City Jail. A fire occurred in the jailhouse cell occupied by Thomas. Jailers responded to the fire by opening a fire extinguisher and dousing the cell with the chemical. After the fire was extinguished, the evidence recovered from Thomas’s cell consisted of a burned blanket, pieces of a burned sheet, a burned mattress, and an empty matchbox, which normally held wooden matches. The cell was charred by the fire, and the walls had to be sanitized and repainted. Upon notification of the fire, the fire department responded, and while there was no longer a fire on their arrival, the jail had thick smoke and had to be ventilated by fire department personnel. Numerous witnesses testified that Thomas had admitted to setting fire to the jail. No testimony was elicited at trial which supported Thomas’s claim on appeal that he merely had wanted to use the telephone and to get medical attention. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a jury could have found the essential elements of fourth-degree arson beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 2: Lesser offense instruction Thomas argues that the trial court erred by refusing his lesser-offense jury instructions on malicious mischief and/or vandalism, because they represented his theory of the case. A defendant is entitled to jury instructions on his theory of the case whenever there is evidence that would support a jury's finding on that theory. However, a trial court may refuse a jury instruction when it is an incorrect statement of law, fairly covered in other instructions, or has no foundation in the evidence. The trial court refused both of Thomas’s instructions because there was no evidence of the value of the destroyed items. Thomas argues that enough circumstantial evidence and testimony about the damage had been presented for the jury to infer the misdemeanor penalty for the cost of repairing the items to be less than $500 for malicious mischief and less than $300 for vandalism. A lesser included offense requires that the elements of the greater offense contain the elements of the lesser offense. On the other hand, a lesser non-included offense applies where there is evidentiary support that a defendant is guilty of a lesser charge arising from the same nucleus of operative facts. Here, there was no error in the refusal of Thomas’s jury instructions. The instructions were incorrect statements of law, and they lacked an evidentiary basis in the record. The record contains no evidence of the monetary value of the items destroyed or damage sustained in the jail by the fire. A review of both statutes, sections 97-17-39 and 97-17-67, shows that both would require proof of monetary value in order to gain a conviction. There is no value component whatsoever to the essential element of fourth-degree arson under section 97-17-9(1), nor is there a distinction between a felony or misdemeanor violation as in the malicious mischief and vandalism statutes. Issue 2: Right to speedy trial Thomas argues that the State violated his right to speedy trial and that the charges against him should be dismissed. To determine if a defendant’s right has been violated, the court considers length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. The length of the delay between Thomas’s arrest and his trial was 696 days, which is presumptively prejudicial. Apart from one request for a continuance for a brief thirty-five to forty day period, no delay was attributable to Thomas. The State explained that the delay occurred because of the need to reindict Thomas. The State indicted Thomas three times for the fire under different statutes. During this time period, Thomas was incarcerated in the jail on other, unrelated charges and was tried and convicted of those other charges prior to the trial at issue on fourth-degree arson. Also while detained in the jail, Thomas later was charged with assault against a law-enforcement officer. The State attributed the delay to negligence and not to an intentional delay on its part. Thomas asserted his right to speedy trial on June 26, 2008, shortly after the third and final indictment in his case. He subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, raising the speedy trial issue through counsel on September 29, 2008. Thomas did not argue, and there was no showing that he suffered any prejudice in being able to defend his case. Indeed, the witnesses were mainly jail staff, law-enforcement officers, and fire-department personnel. There was no claim that Thomas was unable to defend his case. Considering the totality of the circumstances, no speedy-trial violation occurred. While Thomas had a presumptive delay in his trial that, at a minimum, was due to the State re-indicting Thomas several times, the State had no deliberate reason to cause the delay. Issue 3: Disproportionality of sentence Thomas argues that his sentence of life without parole as an habitual offender was grossly disproportionate to his crime. Sentencing is within the complete discretion of the trial court and not subject to appellate review if it is within the limits prescribed by statute. At the sentencing hearing, the evidence presented showed that Thomas met the criteria to be determined to be an habitual offender. Thomas had a long history of being a repeat offender. His sentence did not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute and thus was not grossly disproportionate. |
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