Cox v. State
| Docket Number: | 2001-KA-01427-SCT Linked Case(s): 2001-KA-01427-SCT ; 2001-KA-01427-SCT |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-17-2003 Opinion Author: Waller, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Sufficiency of evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Destruction of evidence - Continuance - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(1) - M.R.E. 803(2) - Closing argument - Medical records - M.R.C.P. 45(d)(2)(A) - Confidential medical privilege - M.R.E. 503(a)(4) - Presence of third party - Computer-generated animation Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., McRae and Smith, P.JJ., Cobb, Diaz, Easley and Graves, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Carlson, J. Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY; Motion for Rehearing |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-08-2001 Appealed from: Tallahatchie County Circuit Court Judge: George C. Carlson, Jr. Disposition: The Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. District Attorney: Ann H. Lamar Case Number: CR-2000-8-CTI |
|
| Note: | The motion for rehearing filed by appellant is denied. The prior opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Robert Lester Cox |
DAVID G. HILL
DAVID L. MINYARD |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DEIRDRE McCRORY SMITH MURPHEY |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Murder - Sufficiency of evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Destruction of evidence - Continuance - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(1) - M.R.E. 803(2) - Closing argument - Medical records - M.R.C.P. 45(d)(2)(A) - Confidential medical privilege - M.R.E. 503(a)(4) - Presence of third party - Computer-generated animation |
| Summary of the Facts: | The motion for rehearing is denied, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Robert Cox was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Cox argues that the guilty verdict could not rest on circumstantial evidence because he presented the alternative theory of suicide which was a reasonable hypothesis of his innocence that could not be excluded. To sustain a conviction on circumstantial evidence, every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence must be excluded. The State established motive and opportunity, and Cox made no attempt to impeach evidence of the existence of his wife's affair with victim or that he knew his wife was having the affair. Cox's suicide theory is considerably weakened when one considers the fact that the shotgun which caused the victim's death belonged to Cox, while there were other shotguns and a handgun in the victim's house which were not used. From the evidence, the jury could conclude that Cox's defense of suicide did not constitute a reasonable hypothesis of innocence and that the circumstantial evidence used to convict Cox was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 2: Destruction of evidence Cox argues that he was denied due process due to the loss of evidence, specifically that the death scene was insufficiently documented and promptly cleaned up before law enforcement could complete the investigation, that the gun and the body were moved, and that law enforcement destroyed fingerprints on the gun. Unless a defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. The record is devoid of any evidence that the law enforcement officers acted in bad faith. There is no constitutional requirement that certain investigative procedures be performed at each scene of a suspicious death or that the investigation rise to a certain level of expertise. In addition, the sufficiency or insufficiency of a police investigation goes to the weight of the evidence, and it is for a jury to decide what evidence to believe. Issue 3: Continuance Cox argues that the court erred in denying his motion for continuance which he needed to develop facts surrounding another possible suspect. Denial of a continuance is not grounds for reversal unless manifest injustice resulted. No manifest injustice resulted in this case because Cox has not presented any evidence that he was unable to call the person as a witness at this trial which lasted three weeks. Issue 4: Hearsay Cox argues that the court improperly admitted hearsay testimony about a conversation a witness had with the victim ten months before his death. Because the victim contemporaneously related the event to the witness, the statement was admissible as a present sense impression under M.R.E. 803(1). In addition, the statement was admissible as an excited utterance under M.R.E. 803(2) since the victim was anxious and admitted that he was scared. Because the incident to which the witness testified is just one more incident which fits the pattern of Cox's behavior, was not unduly prejudicial to Cox, and did not confuse the issues, it was properly admitted as relevant. Issue 5: Closing argument Cox argues that the State made improper comments during closing argument on Cox’s right not to testify. There is a difference between a comment on a defendant's failure to testify and a comment on the failure to put on a successful defense. Here, the State's comments on Cox's failure to explain the fact that his shotgun killed the victim were not improper comments on Cox's failure to testify, but merely comments on Cox's failure to put on a successful defense. Issue 6: Medical records On cross-appeal, the State argues that Cox obtained the victim’s medical and pharmacological records by improperly-issued subpoenae duces tecum because no notice was given to the State. M.R.C.P. 45(d)(2)(A) provides that a copy of a subpoena should be served upon opposing parties immediately after service of the subpoena. Cox failed to serve copies of the subpoena to the State. In addition, the medical and pharmacological records were privileged. Cox argues that the presence of a third party at one of the physical examinations that the victim underwent waived the privilege. Whether the presence of a third party at a medical examination waives the privilege is an issue of first impression in Mississippi. M.R.E. 503(a)(4) provides that a communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview. The third party present in this case assisted in developing the victim’s medical history. Therefore, the records were confidential. A criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him does not override a confidential medical privilege. In this case, allowing access to all of the victim's medical records was error, though harmless under the circumstances. In the future, the court should conduct an in camera review of the medical records to determine if the evidence is material, relevant and exculpatory would be appropriate. If the court finds that the records are admissible, the records should be redacted as much as possible to show only the evidence which is relevant and exculpatory. Any error in admitting the records was harmless because the jury convicted Cox and did not give credence to the suicide defense. Issue 7: Computer-generated animation The State argues that the court erred in admitting a computer-generated animation which demonstrated how the victim’s alleged suicide could have occurred. To be admissible, a computer-generated animation must be based on scientific, identifiable, and objective facts. Any computer animation which was not based on actual, physical measurements from the crime scene was mere speculation. The animation was admitted as an exhibit and was included in the evidence which was given to the jury to consider during its deliberations. The State argues this was error. Evidence which is admitted for demonstrative purposes only should not be given to the jury for its consideration during deliberations. Although the court erred in admitting the animation and allowing the jury to consider the animation during deliberations, any error was harmless because Cox was convicted. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
