King v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-DP-00419-SCT Linked Case(s): 2005-DP-00419-SCT ; 2005-DP-00419-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-31-2007 Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty - Motion for funds for expert assistance - Mental retardation - Change of venue - Deficient indictment - Cruel and unusual punishment - Impartial jury - Admission of evidence - Victim impact testimony - Heinous, atrocious, cruel aggravator - Jury instructions - Disproportionate sentence Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, P.J., Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Easley and Lamar, JJ. Dissenting Author : Diaz, P.J. Dissent Joined By : Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY - DIRECT APPEAL |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-28-2003 Appealed from: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: R. Kenneth Coleman Disposition: On December 5, 1980, Mack Arthur King was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 6716 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | MACK ARTHUR KING |
JAMES E. ROCAP, III
MICHAEL R. FARROW |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty - Motion for funds for expert assistance - Mental retardation - Change of venue - Deficient indictment - Cruel and unusual punishment - Impartial jury - Admission of evidence - Victim impact testimony - Heinous, atrocious, cruel aggravator - Jury instructions - Disproportionate sentence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Mack Arthur King was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. After the Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence of death and remanded the case with instructions to return to the state court for reconsideration of the sentence of death in light of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Court vacated the sentence of death and remanded for a new sentencing trial. King was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing on the ground that the trial judge committed reversible error by commenting that the jury should disregard, in toto, sympathy in its deliberations. The jury again returned a sentence of death, and King appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion for funds for expert assistance King argues that the court committed error when it improperly denied his Motion For Funds To Obtain Expert Assistance without providing legal or factual reasoning. Relief for the denial of expert assistance will only be granted where the accused demonstrates that the trial court’s abuse of discretion is so egregious as to deny him due process and where his trial was thereby rendered fundamentally unfair. King has not shown the required substantial need to obtain an independent expert pathologist because the State’s argument was rebutted by a witness on cross-examination. With regard to his request for a mental health expert to investigate and present definitive evidence that he is mentally retarded at his re-sentencing, King has not shown the substantial need required to obtain funds for an independent expert. In addition, the jury was presented with mitigating evidence of his mental capacity. Issue 2: Mental retardation King argues that the court failed to follow the proper procedures to determine whether he was mentally retarded. A review of the record reveals that considerable evidence was presented to the trial court before it made its determination as to King’s mental capacity. Both sides presented expert testimony and other evidence regarding King’s mental retardation claim. After hearing all the evidence, which was substantial, the trial judge outlined the evidence that he had considered and gave his reasons for concluding that King was not mentally retarded. Thus, King was afforded a hearing on his mental retardation claim in satisfaction with required procedures. Issue 3: Change of venue King argues that he presented prima facie evidence showing that a change in venue was necessary. A motion for a change of venue is not automatically granted in a capital case. There must be a satisfactory showing that a defendant cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in the county where the offense is charged. While this is a capital case under a heightened standard of review, that is but one element of the overall factors to consider in determining an irrebuttable presumption in favor of a change of venue. Further, King’s argument that an irrebuttable presumption arose based on his race and that of the victim also fails. Of the articles submitted, only three articles dated from 1998 identify the race of King, none of which identify the race of the victim. Furthermore, King did not present any evidence that he could not receive a fair trial from the twelve jurors who heard his case. Furthermore, nearly two years of silence intervened between the news coverage of King’s case and the 2003 resentencing trial. Issue 4: Deficient indictment King argues that, although his indictment identified burglary as the felony that elevated the killing to capital murder, burglary is unlike any other felony in that it requires an intent to commit another crime as an essential element of the felony. This concern about the indictment was not expressed at any time during King’s trial, nor was it raised to the trial court or on appeal during King’s 1998 resentencing. Further, King did not challenge his conviction on this basis under the Mississippi Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. Thus, King is barred from raising the matter at this time. Issue 5: Cruel and unusual punishment King argues that serving an excessive period on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his constitutional rights. The Court has considered and rejected this argument before. King also argues that because his prior death sentence was mentioned before the jury, the trial judge should have declared a mistrial due to unavoidable jury bias. It is logical that criminals of this nature would be confined in a maximum security area --regardless of whether they were awaiting execution. Additionally, as the jury members were aware of their responsibility for determining whether King received the death penalty for the murder, the comments did not relieve the jury of its separate responsibility to make the determination. Issue 6: Impartial jury King argues that the court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury when it excused for cause potential jurors who expressed moral convictions against the death penalty. Absent a clear showing that the prospective juror would be unable to follow the court’s instructions and obey the juror’s oath, that juror’s feelings regarding the death penalty do not constitute grounds for a challenge and the granting of such a challenge is reversible error. It is reversible error if one juror is erroneously excused from the jury on the basis of his view on the death penalty. The record shows that the court properly excluded the jurors. One of the jurors repeatedly switched positions as to whether she supported or opposed the death penalty, and gave wavering responses when asked whether she could vote for the death penalty. The other responded that she could not vote for the death penalty. Issue 7: Admission of evidence King argues that the court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine, which sought to prevent King from arguing that he did not kill the victim, and that evidence that someone other than King killed the victim is relevant to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances considered by the jury in making its sentencing determination. In an appeal from a resentencing trial for capital murder, the issue of guilt is res judicata and cannot be relitigated. Accordingly, this issue is procedurally barred from further consideration. Issue 8: Victim impact testimony King argues that testimony concerning the impact the victim’s death had on the family at King’s sentencing hearing constituted impermissible testimony. Because the testimony from the victim’s daughter was not designed to incite the jury but described the impact that losing her mother had on her family, the testimony was permissible. Issue 9: Heinous, atrocious, cruel aggravator The instruction given by the trial court concerning the heinous, atrocious, cruel aggravator conforms to the minimum standard. However, trial courts are cautioned about giving different instructions other than the specific one that the Court has directed the court to use. King argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the HAC aggravator instruction, because the evidence at best was unclear that the victim suffered extended or torturous suffering before losing consciousness. The victim’s ability to remain conscious after sustaining the lethal wounds does not have any relevance to this issue. The HAC aggravator was properly presented to the jury, as it was sufficiently supported by the evidence. Issue 10: Jury instructions King argues that the court erred in refusing two jury instructions which would have instructed the jury that they could choose to sentence a defendant to life in prison even if aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances or in the absence of any mitigating circumstances. There was no error in the exclusion of these instructions. Neither instruction was a correct statement of the law. King argues that the court should have imposed a life sentence due to the jury’s failure to return a verdict that did not find any of the Enmund factors. However, the judge did not give the jury any specific instructions to find an Edmund factor as King suggests. King argues that it was error to submit to the jury an instruction on the “avoiding arrest” aggravator because there was insufficient evidence to support that instruction. Based on the facts of the case, the jury may reasonably have inferred that a substantial reason that King killed the victim was either to conceal his identity or to avoid detection and eventual arrest. King argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the potential mitigating circumstance that he was only “an accomplice in the capital offense committed by another person,” based on his assertion that his uncle played a role in the crime. As this case was before the trial court for the sole purpose of sentencing, the court properly refused this instruction which pertained to the question of King’s guilt in a killing for which he had already been convicted. King argues that the court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction which required that the State’s evidence be strong enough “to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, or supposition” and that “facts or circumstances in this case acceptable to two reasonable interpretations” be resolved in the defendant’s favor, because the State’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. The jury’s finding that King actually killed the victim indicates its rejection of any other reasonable hypothesis of his participation in the crime. Therefore, King’s argument that he was entitled to the instruction based on the circumstantial evidence as to whether he killed Patterson is without merit. Issue 11: Disproportionate sentence King’s death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. Further, upon comparison to other factually similar cases where the death sentence was imposed, the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate in this case. The jury did not consider any invalid aggravating circumstances. |
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