Moffett v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-DP-00541-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-DP-00541-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-16-2010 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty direct appeal - Statute of limitations - Section 99-1-5 - Speedy trial right - Voir dire - Challenges for cause - Third-party guilt - Right to testify - Hearsay - Admission of evidence - Admission of photograph - Cautionary jury instruction - Victim-impact testimony - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Deliberation instruction - Punishment instruction - Cooling-off period - Section 99-19-101(1) - Defective indictment - Aggravating factors - Section 99-19-105(3) review Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Dickinson, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, P.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY - DIRECT APPEAL |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-26-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Conviction of capital murder and sentence of death by lethal injection. District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith Case Number: 02-0-245 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Eric Moffett |
OFFICE OF CAPITAL DEFENSE COUNSEL: ANDRE DE GRUY |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JASON LEWIS DAVIS, MARVIN L. WHITE, JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty direct appeal - Statute of limitations - Section 99-1-5 - Speedy trial right - Voir dire - Challenges for cause - Third-party guilt - Right to testify - Hearsay - Admission of evidence - Admission of photograph - Cautionary jury instruction - Victim-impact testimony - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Deliberation instruction - Punishment instruction - Cooling-off period - Section 99-19-101(1) - Defective indictment - Aggravating factors - Section 99-19-105(3) review |
| Summary of the Facts: | Eric Moffett was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Statute of limitations Moffett argues that, because he was indicted in 2002 on a charge of capital murder, Mississippi’s two-year statute of limitations, section 99-1-5, should bar his prosecution. This issue is one of first impression in Mississippi. However, the courts of Texas have dealt with the same issue and have found that there is no limitation for the offense of capital murder under their statute which is similar to Mississippi’s. The Court expressly finds there is no statute of limitations for capital murder. Issue 2: Speedy trial right Moffett was first arrested and charged with capital murder on December 31, 1994. After a preliminary hearing in Hinds County Court on February 7, 1995, he was bound over for grand-jury action. Moffett remained in custody until a grand jury issued a no-bill on September 7, 1995. He was released the same day. Officers in the JPD cold-case unit reviewed the file years later. In 2002, the case was presented to a grand jury, which indicted Moffett on April 9, 2002. Moffett was arrested the same day. During Moffett’s second incarceration (2002-2006), twelve separate trial settings were continued for one reason or another. Two defense attorneys made appearances, but later withdrew as Moffett’s counsel. Moffett also filed two pro se motions. No speedy-trial rights under the Sixth Amendment are applicable to the period after Moffett was released following the 1995 no-bill until after he was indicted in 2002. The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. With regard to Moffett’s constitutional speedy trial right, the two incarcerations totaled 1,656 days. Thus, a presumption of prejudice arises. The first delay was due to the volume of physical evidence requiring laboratory analysis. Other delays were for various reasons, changes of defense counsel, continuances agreed to by both parties or continuances required of them by the court’s docket. A neutral reason such as overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily than a deliberate delay by the government. A defendant may not later complain of any delay caused by him, such as continuances and changes in defense counsel. The assertion factor weighs in favor of the State. Moffett never asserted the right to a speedy trial during his first incarceration. Moffett did not assert a right during his second incarceration until his motion to dismiss, which was filed more than three years after he had been in custody. With regard to prejudice, Moffett’s mother died during the time Moffett was a free man. Thus, she was unavailable to testify at trial. Such prejudice could result in denial of a defendant’s speedy-trial rights. Although Moffett asserts that the loss of his mother as a witness prejudiced his defense, Moffett was able to offer the same evidence through the testimony of his sister. Weighing all factors, Moffett’s Sixth-Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated. Issue 3: Voir dire Moffett argues that he sought in a pretrial motion to explore as a part of individual voir dire potential jurors’ views on drug and alcohol use. The request was based specifically on the potential evidence of Moffett’s use of drugs or alcohol being introduced in this case. The State asserted that it would not put on testimony related to alcohol use, and the trial court denied Moffett’s motion. Moffett complains of testimony given during the State’s redirect examination of a police officer regarding Moffett’s demeanor before his arrest. However, the officer’s innocuous comment was not induced by or responsive to a question about alcohol. The State did not ask the witness a question about alcohol or drugs. The witness mentioned alcohol, and the defense did not object at the time of the testimony. Thus, there was no error in the court’s ruling. Issue 4: Challenges for cause Moffett argues that it was reversible error for the trial court to excuse three prospective jurors, because of their opinions on the death penalty. A juror's position on the death penalty must be unmistakably clear, or a trial judge may properly remove the juror for cause in a capital case. None of these three prospective jurors provided an unmistakably clear and consistent answer regarding whether their views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with the jury instructions and oath. Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in excusing these three jurors for cause. Issue 5: Third-party guilt Moffett argues that the court erred by excluding evidence of third-party guilt. The court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, as it was hearsay without an exception; irrelevant; and if relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. The trial court correctly applied the rules of evidence to the facts of the case, and there was no abuse of discretion in excluding this evidence. Issue 6: Right to testify Moffett argues that his right to testify was denied. This issue is moot, because Moffett exercised his right not to testify. If he wanted to testify, he could have. Issue 7: Hearsay Moffett argues that the State elicited hearsay testimony from the victim’s mother when she was recalled to the witness stand during the defense’s case. The State used this testimony to attack the weight and worth of another witness’s testimony before that witness ever took the stand. This was not impeachment of the witness’s testimony. Therefore, the testimony was inadmissible. However, given the overwhelming evidence presented in support of conviction, the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Issue 8: Admission of evidence The State moved pretrial to prohibit any reference to Moffett’s 1995 no-bill. The prosecutor stated that it was irrelevant that Moffett “didn’t get into trouble for a period of time . . . .” The court granted the motion. Moffett argues that the State violated the ruling on the State’s motion in limine by asking questions about Moffett having been “in trouble” and “charged with murder.” The State’s motion in limine excluded any questions, eliciting of answers, or argument regarding whether Moffett was no-billed, living in the City of Jackson as a free man, not charged with any crime, out of jail, not in trouble, and having no problems during that period of time, or having been incarcerated since 2002. The trial court cannot be held in error for enforcing its ruling on the motion in limine when the State timely objected. In addition, the defendant raised no objection, and thus waived the issue. Issue 9: Admission of photograph Moffett argues that the court erred in admitting a photograph taken at the emergency room of the victim’s perineal injuries. This photograph was admitted during the testimony of the pediatrician who attempted to save the victim’s life at the emergency room. Photographs of a victim have evidentiary value when they aid in describing the circumstances of the killing or supplement or clarify witness testimony. The photograph at issue aided in describing the victim’s injuries and supplemented the testimony of three witnesses. Issue 10: Challenge for cause Moffett argues that the court erred by failing to replace a juror who was an uncle of an arresting officer, after the officer’s name was mentioned in the testimony of other policemen. The relationship of a juror to a witness, either by affinity or consanguinity, regardless of how close the relationship may be, does not disqualify such juror. Moffett argues further that the prosecutor committed misconduct by remaining silent when the defense raised its concerns about mentioning the officer. If Moffett had valid concerns that seating the juror would be detrimental to his case, he had the opportunity to remove him via a peremptory challenge, but declined to do so. Issue 11: Cautionary jury instruction Moffett argues that it was error to deny the cautionary instruction he proposed with regard to testimony given by a jailhouse informant. However, the evidence reveals that the prosecutor’s plea proposal was not offered in exchange for the informant’s testimony and that all requests for prosecutorial assistance were denied. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing the instruction. Issue 12: Victim-impact testimony Moffett filed a “Motion to Preclude Introduction of Victim-Impact Evidence.” At the sentencing phase, the victim’s sister and mother offered victim-impact testimony. Although Moffett made no contemporaneous objection, he now argues that the motion preserved this issue for appeal. The only issue preserved for appeal is whether victim-impact statements in their entirety are prohibited. The answer to that question is clearly no. Victim-impact evidence is permissible, but must be relevant to allow the jury to know exactly who the victim was and what impact her death had. A relative of the victim is usually in the best position to provide information to the court about the direct impact of the crime on the victim’s family. Here, there is no evidence that the jury was affected by passion or prejudice as a result of this limited testimony. To find that the jurors permitted this limited testimony, when considering all the evidence presented, to influence them to the point of passion, bias, or prejudice, would require an assumption that they failed to follow the instructions given by the trial court. Issue 13: Expert testimony Moffett argues that, because of alleged deficiencies in the autopsy report and the lack of histological slides, Dr. Hayne’s testimony could not possibly have met the requirements of M.R.E. 702. Nothing in the record suggests that Dr. Hayne relied on anything other than his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, upon the facts and data presented in this case, using reliable principles and methods and applying them to formulate his opinions. His testimony regarding active bleeding as one method to determine whether an injury occurred antemortem or postmortem, as an alternate means when histological slides are unavailable, was conceded by Moffett’s own expert. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that the testimony was grounded in the methods and procedures of science and was more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Moffett also argues that Dr. Hayne is not certified by a statutorily required board and because in cases in which he has testified, the Court has reversed convictions, defendants have been exonerated, and his opinions have been found not to be supported by facts. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Hayne to testify as an expert. Thus, Moffett is due no relief regarding this assignment of error. Issue 14: Deliberation instruction Moffett argues that the court erred in refusing his proposed jury instruction which reads: “The Court instructs the jury that if you cannot, within a reasonable time, agree as to punishment, the Court will dismiss you and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without the benefit of parole.” However, there is no authority for allowing the jury to determine what constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ for deliberations. Issue 15: Punishment instruction Moffett argues that the court erred in refusing his proposed jury instruction which reads: “You are to begin your deliberations with the presumption that there are no aggravating circumstances that would warrant a sentence of death, and the presumption that the appropriate punishment in [this] case would be life imprisonment. These presumptions remain with Mr. Moffett throughout the sentencing hearing, and can only be overcome if the prosecution convinces each one of you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that death is the only appropriate punishment.” The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the proposition that a defendant should go into the sentencing phase with a presumption that life is the appropriate punishment. Issue 16: Cooling-off period Moffett submitted a pretrial motion requesting a twenty-four-hour cooling-off period before beginning the sentencing phase. He now argues that this State should adopt a requirement for a minimum cooling-off period. Section 99-19-101(1) requires that the separate sentencing proceeding be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable. There is no bright line rule as to when a judge should grant a continuance or a recess. At completion of the sentencing phase in this case, the jury retired to deliberate at 11:20 p.m. without Moffett offering an objection to proceed, renewing the motion for cooling off, seeking an evening recess or continuance, seeking to inquire of the jury, or reporting that he or his attorneys needed relief. The jury returned its verdict at 12:24 a.m. Moffett argues, without offering proof, that this death sentence, under these circumstances, must have been the result of passion or prejudice, and is in violation of Moffett’s right to present his case within reasonable hours and under reasonable circumstances. The judgments in this area that have been reversed may be divided into two categories: those in which the issue was ineffective assistance of counsel due to attorney fatigue; and those in which the jury’s verdict was seen as suspect due to unreasonable timing. Moffett’s attorneys did not object, seek a recess, or claim that they, the defendant, or the jury would be adversely affected by proceeding. A trial court will not be held in error for issues not presented to it for ruling. Issue 17: Defective indictment Moffett argues that the indictment failed to include a valid statutory aggravating factor, thus, the State failed to charge all elements necessary to impose the death penalty. Under Mississippi law, the underlying felony that elevates the crime to capital murder must be identified in the indictment along with the section and subsection of the statute under which the defendant is being charged. In addition, our death penalty statute clearly states the only aggravating circumstances which may be relied upon by the prosecution in seeking the ultimate punishment. Moffett’s arguments are without merit. Issue 18: Aggravating factors Moffett argues that the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator should not have been submitted to this jury. Moffett argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s HAC finding, considering the requirement that each aggravating circumstance be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that similar instructions meet constitutional standards, as they narrow the aggravating circumstance of ‘heinous, atrocious or cruel’ and thereby channel the jury’s sentencing discretion in a principled way. Evidence of an underlying crime can properly be used both to elevate the crime to capital murder and as an aggravating circumstance. Moffett’s arguments are without merit. Issue 19: Section 99-19-105(3) review Moffett advances a number of nonpersuasive arguments that the jury must have been affected by passion and/or prejudice. There is no support in the record that the death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Evidence, fairly established, satisfied the jury beyond reasonable doubt that a five-year-old girl was viciously assaulted, asphyxiated, beaten, and ravaged. Her sister witnessed the beginning of the crime, and others testified to the resulting butchery of the crime. Moffett described the mutilation of the victim in graphic detail to a cellmate. In addition to Moffett’s confession to his cellmate, scientific evidence, including DNA, supported the jury’s decision. Given the evidence presented, there can be no doubt that a rational trier of fact could have found both aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. From the evidence presented, the death penalty was not a disproportionate or excessive sentence when compared to other capital-murder cases. |
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