Banyard v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-CT-01843-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-01843-COA2006-KA-01843-COA2006-CT-01843-SCT2006-CT-01843-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-16-2010 Opinion Author: Lamar, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Capital murder - Duress instruction - Burden of proof Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Kitchens and Pierce, JJ. Dissenting Author : Chandler, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Joined In Part by Randolph, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Randolph, J., Concurs in Part and in Result With Separate Written Opinion. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-07-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Tomie Green Disposition: Demarious Banyard was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith Case Number: 03-0-460 |
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| Note: | This opinion reverses and remands a previous judgment by the Court of Appeals. See the original COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO53843.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Demarious Latwan Banyard a/k/a Lil Murray a/k/a Mur-Mur |
ROBERT B. McDUFF, BRYAN A. STEVENSON |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Capital murder - Duress instruction - Burden of proof |
| Summary of the Facts: | Demarious Banyard was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Banyard appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Duress instruction Banyard’s theory of the case is that he participated in the robbery under duress (thus lacking the necessary specific intent), and that the victim was accidentally shot when Banyard was handing his co-defendant the gun. He claims that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support this theory. Thus, Banyard argues, the trial court erred when it refused his duress instruction, because the refusal effectively disallowed the jury from considering Banyard’s theory of the case. A criminal defendant is entitled to have his jury instructed on all offenses of which an evidentiary basis exists in the record, even where the evidence arises only in the defendant’s own testimony. Where a person reasonably believes that he is in danger of physical harm he may be excused for some conduct which ordinarily would be criminal. The test for duress includes that the defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; that he had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in the situation; that he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal action and the avoidance of harm. The Court of Appeals held that there was no evidentiary basis to support Banyard’s proffered duress instruction. Specifically, the Court of Appeals noted that Banyard had the gun in his hand throughout much of the ordeal, and that he failed to present evidence that he did not have a reasonable opportunity to avoid participating in the crime, thus negating his duress claim. Banyard presented sufficient evidence to support his duress theory. An eyewitness testified that, in his opinion, Banyard could not change his mind once the co-defendant set the events in motion. Banyard testified consistently that he did not want to rob the pizza man, but that the co-defendant was looking “serious and mean,” and that he was scared of him. The merits of Banyard’s duress claim are for a properly instructed jury to weigh. The jurors are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, not the appellate courts. The Court of Appeals held that the duress instruction was an improper statement of law because it included a manslaughter instruction, an option that, it reasoned, Banyard was not entitled to because the victim was killed during a robbery. But Banyard’s theory throughout the entire case was that he had committed the robbery under duress. Duress is a valid defense for many crimes, including robbery. Thus, if the jury found that Banyard was indeed acting under duress, he could not be found guilty of the robbery of Ballard, one of the essential elements of the capital-murder charge. Upon that finding, the jury then could proceed to consider whether he was proven guilty of any lesser offenses which the trial court had determined were supported by the record, whether they be murder, manslaughter, or both. Issue 2: Burden of proof Banyard argues that the trial court unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof when it instructed the jury that in order to find the defendant not guilty, it had to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not guilty. Obviously, this instruction was erroneous. It is axiomatic that the burden of proof never shifts to a defendant during a criminal trial, and there is no requirement that the defendant be found not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues that the jury instructions, read as a whole, properly instructed the jury. However, the rule which requires that all instructions should be read together does not cure an erroneous instruction in conflict with a proper instruction on a vital issue where the proper instruction does not modify or clarify the erroneous instruction. |
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